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Abstract 
 
 
This doctoral thesis consists of a collection of three independent chapters. The 
first chapter reports the results of a laboratory experiment designed to 
investigate whether antisocial behaviour is driven by nastiness, defined as an 
intrinsic pleasure derived from lowering the well-being of others. As we shall 
see, people are not nasty for the sake of being nasty. Rather, people become 
nastier when lowering somebody’s welfare is monetarily beneficial. The 
second chapter explores the effects of the relative price and monetary stakes on 
the Dictators’ decisions in three different contexts. The data shows the 
experimental context matter: the effect of the monetary stakes is strong and 
significant on giving, but is weak and insignificant on taking. The third chapter 
presents an experiment designed to investigate the role of ex-post acquisition 
information in Sender-Receiver games. The analysis reveals that deception 
decreases when the Receiver can learn about the structure of the payoffs. 
Furthermore, a significant minority of Receivers choose to get ex post 
information about the payoffs. 
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Introduction   
 
 
This doctoral thesis is a collection of three independent chapters and as such, each 
chapter focuses on a different topic. Methodologically, however, these three chapters 
share an important common feature: they all use controlled laboratory experiments. In 
this sense, this thesis is a contribution to the experimental method and to economic 
science.  
 
The first chapter was motivated by the relatively limited experimental studies that 
examine antisocial behaviour in the laboratory. Antisocial behaviour is now widely 
recognized as a major social and economic problem in the real world.1 People litter the 
streets, damage private properties, steal information, harass other people, and send 
malicious computer viruses.2 According to the British Crime Survey (2016), the police 
recorded around 1.8 million incidents of antisocial behaviour in 2012/2013.3 These 
actions are, for sure, costly and have a negative effect on people’s lives. For instance, 
Governments spend resources on patrolling problem areas and creating new laws 
aiming to tackle the problem, while individuals spend money to secure their properties.4 
It is clearly important to investigate the motivations underlying this behaviour. 
 
In recent years, significant progress has been made by empirical studies to gather 
information about antisocial behaviour. Despite these efforts, there is a problem of 
defining and measuring the behaviour itself. Common understandings of antisocial 
behaviour are still characterised by vagueness and subjectivity. There are as many 
                                                          
1 The growing alertness that this problem generated is reflected in an increasing number of local initiatives 
to combat this behaviour. For instance. There is an increasingly high emphasis being placed by the 
Government on antisocial behaviour (ASB) and methods to tackle it. They range from the Antisocial 
Behaviour Order (ASBO) to lighting on streets and opening playing fields with football and rugby facilities. 
2 Other examples of antisocial behaviour include vandalism, graffiti, street drinking, and using residential 
premises for illegal purposes 
3 See https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins 
4 Grossman and Komai (2012) measured the cost of antisocial behaviour in the laboratory and found that 
antisocial behaviour reduces total economic welfare by around 20%. 
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definitions of antisocial behaviour as there are studies of this behaviour. For instance, 
according to The Metropolitan Police in the UK, anti-social behaviour can be described 
as `behaviour by a person which causes, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or 
distress to one or more persons not of the same household as the person.’5 In addition, 
data is restricted to those incidents that have been reported. Hence, it becomes extremely 
difficult if we wish to compare data and study antisocial behaviour seriously. 
 
Laboratory experiments have helped to overcome these problems by collecting data in a 
controlled manner. Behavioural economists who are concerned with the dark side of 
human behaviour have developed a new class of experimental games where they can 
elicit antisocial preferences. Many experimental studies have discovered that subjects 
are willing to reduce their participant's earnings even though this is costly to themselves. 
This result is undoubtedly a puzzle for these economists, given the abundant evidence 
on pro-social behaviour (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness 
and Rabin, 2002) 
 
In Chapter 1, I report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to determine 
whether antisocial behaviour is driven by nastiness, defined as an intrinsic pleasure 
derived from inflicting harm on others (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009).6 Whether the 
nastiness hypothesis is robust is an important economic question. If nastiness explains 
antisocial behaviour, it may not then be possible to control it. This is important, not only 
in order to understand antisocial behaviour, but also to have a clear picture of the 
behaviour of individuals. While the nastiness hypothesis is intuitively appealing, this 
hypothesis has not yet tested experimentally. In the first chapter, I aim to fill this gap. 
 
The experimental set up is a destruction game (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009, Abbink and 
Herrmann 2011). Two subjects were randomly matched and assigned the role of either 
Player 1 or Player 2. Each player received an initial endowment of £6. They 
simultaneously chose whether to reduce the other player’s endowment by £3. The 
                                                          
5 See https://www.met.police.uk/anti_social_behaviour  
6 Experimental studies have different explanations for this behaviour (Zizzo 2003, Zizzo and Oswald 2001, 
Abbink and Herrmann et al 2010).  
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features of the game ruled out inequality aversion as the motivation for destructive 
behaviour in this experiment.  
 
The experiment had four treatments. The cost of destruction varies across treatments. In 
treatment 1, subjects simultaneously decide whether or not to reduce their co-
participant’s earnings. If they choose to reduce the other player’s earnings, they reduce 
their own endowment by 60 pence. This treatment worked as a baseline. Treatment 2 is 
similar to treatment 1, but destruction is free. Treatment 3 is similar to treatment 2, but 
if the subjects chose to reduce the other player’s earnings, they increase their payoff by 
60 pence. By comparing these three games, I tested the nastiness hypothesis. A treatment 
with one-sided destruction was also conducted. 
 
I found that nastiness is not a common trait on human behaviour. The results showed 
that nobody chose to reduce their co-participant’s earnings when destruction was costly. 
Only 10% of the subjects chose to reduce their co-participant’s earnings when 
destruction was costless. However, differences were not significant. By contrast, when 
destruction was monetarily beneficial, almost half of the subjects chose to reduce their 
co-participant’s earnings. This happened despite the fact that subjects were initially 
equal endowed. This finding suggests that people are not nasty for the sake of being 
nasty. Therefore, antisocial behaviour is contingent on the contextual environment. 
Nastiness alone cannot explain the data. The data is also consistent with Homo 
oeconomics.7 
 
This chapter addresses a number of open research questions that can be studied 
experimentally. For instance, how do individuals behave when they can decrease and 
increase their co-participant’s earnings? Do we find framing effects in antisocial 
preferences?  
 
The second chapter was motivated by the more recent evidence, which showed that 
giving in Dictator games can be strongly affected by the experimental choice set. The 
                                                          
7 The Homo oeconomicus is an abstract individual, whose actions are guided by selfishness and greedy 
motivations (Smith, 1776; Walras, 2014).  
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most common assumption in Economics is that people only care about maximizing their 
own income. Moreover, standard economic theory assumes that individuals are 
homogeneous in every respect, but in their economic assets (Smith, 1776).  
 
Nevertheless, a large body of research has shown that subjects are altruistic (Andreoni 
and Miller, 2002), inequality averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000), and reciprocal (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). In particular, the Dictator game has 
been used as a vehicle of research to study altruism. 
 
In a standard Dictator game, the Dictator has some money and decides upon how much 
of that money to give to the Recipient. The Recipient has to accept the Dictator’s decision 
(Forsythe et al., 1994). The sub-game Nash equilibrium is to transfer zero. However, in 
many Dictator games, the Dictator transfers a positive amount of money (Kahneman et 
al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994). As the assumption of self-interest has been proved to be 
too rigid, experiments have introduced the concept of other-regarding preferences.  
 
In a seminal paper, Andreoni and Miller (2002) used a within-subject design to examine 
whether altruism is rational and consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (GARP). The authors find that giving varied with the price of giving and the 
subjects’ endowment. Moreover, the authors find a substantial heterogeneity across 
subjects: some dictators do leave nothing, but others give away as much as 50% of the 
endowment.8 
 
Recent evidence, however, showed that a change in the experimental context affects 
Dictators’ preferences. For instance, List (2007) and Bardsley (2008) showed that 
generosity can be reversed by allowing the Dictators to take money from the Recipient. 
This evidence has implications for the external validity of the experimental results and 
for modelling behaviour with social preferences. 
 
                                                          
8 See also https://www.thirdsector.co.uk/uk-ranked-fourth-world-giving-percentage-gdp-says-
cafreport/fundraising/article/1381921 
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The second chapter explores the effects of the relative price and monetary stakes on the 
Dictators’ decision in three different contexts. The experimental set up employed 
variants of the Dictator game. Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of Dictator 
and Recipient. Both were given an initial endowment. According to the game, Dictators 
can transfer money to the Recipient, take money from the Recipient, and burn money 
from the Recipient, even though it is costly to themselves. The relative price or the trade-
off between own payoff and Recipient’s payoff, as well as the Dictator’s endowment, 
varied across games. Dictators engaged in up to eighteen allocation decisions. After 
Dictators made their decisions, one of the games was selected randomly for final payoffs.  
 
I found that Dictators’ decisions are affected by the relative price in the direction 
predicted by standard economic theory. The effect of the monetary stakes, however, 
differs by whether Dictators transfer or take money from the Recipient. The effect of the 
Dictator’s endowment is strong and significant on giving, but is weak and insignificant 
on taking. These findings contribute to the experimental literature which suggest that 
the experimental context matters. Chapter 2 concludes with a summary of results and 
discussion of open questions to be explored in future experimental work.  
 
The third chapter is concerned with information transmission in asymmetric situations. 
Asymmetric information is a characteristic in many social and economic situations, 
where one party to an exchange possesses important information, but the other party 
does not. These situations often provide incentives to deceive the less informed 
party.  For instance, in 2013, the International Council for Clean Transportation (ICCT) 
revealed that some of the major carmakers inserted special software to their cars to 
manipulate emissions tests.9 
 
Following the theoretical work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), behavioural economists 
have introduced Sender-Receiver games to investigate the factors affecting deception. 
The typical finding from many laboratory experiments is that subjects do not frequently 
lie (Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2005; Sutter, 2009). The results from these 
experiments have been interpreted as showing that people have lie aversion. The 
                                                          
9 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21759258 
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literature, however, has little to say about how deception is affected by the possibility 
that the Receiver learns about the payoffs. In the above studies, deception is totally 
disclosed to the experimenter, but the Receiver never learns about the payoffs. 
 
In the third chapter, I investigate the role of ex-post acquisition information on deceptive 
behaviour in Sender-Receiver games. The Receiver can ex-post, and at a cost, find out if 
the Sender’s message was true or not. I ask whether attitudes toward lying are affected 
by the possibility that the Receiver can find out, ex post, if they were lie to.  To the best 
of my knowledge, one study Behnk et al (2014), previous studies have not 
experimentally examined the role of ex-post information on deceptive behaviour. I aim 
to fill this gap. Behnk et al (2014). examines how costless ex post information about the 
payoffs affect deception. However, the authors are not able to study the demand for ex 
post information about the payoffs.  In this experiment, I do. 
 
I used a simple Sender-Receiver game and conducted five different treatments. In 
treatment 1, the Receiver never learns about the payoffs. In treatment 2, the Receiver, 
after choosing between option A and B, automatically learns about the payoffs. By 
comparing this treatment to the baseline, I study the role of ex-post information in 
reducing deception. In treatment 3, the Receiver, after choosing between option A and 
B, decides whether she wants to learn about the payoffs. If the Receiver chooses to learn 
about the payoff, he/she decreases his/her payoffs by £1. Treatment 4 is identical to 
treatment 3, but now information is free.  
 
Finally, treatment 5 is identical to treatment 3, except that if the Receiver chooses to learn 
about the payoff, he/she increases his/her payoff by £0.10. Across treatments 3, 4, and 
5, I examined whether and to what extent the Receiver is willing to acquire ex-post 
information about the payoffs. To examine whether the Receiver wishes to punish or 
reward the Sender’s behaviour, I allowed the Receiver, after learning or not about the 
payoffs, to send back a message to the Sender.  
 
The main results emerging from this study can be summarised as follows. First, the 
evidence show that providing ex post information, compared to non-information, can 
significantly reduce the probability to lie. This result is hard to reconcile with Senders 
7 
 
being exclusively motivated by lying aversion. The effect of ex post information about 
the payoffs on deception is consistent with models of guilt and shame aversion. Second, 
a significant minority of Receivers get ex post information about the payoffs even though 
it is costly to themselves. In the current design, there is not strategic reason to get 
information about the payoffs. Hence, the evidence contradicts the standard assumption 
that Receivers view information as merely a means for making better decisions, in which 
case no one should get information about the payoffs. 
 
I also move beyond the fixed messages and allow Senders to send a free text message to 
the Receiver. I found that many Senders instead of telling a direct lie, they prefer to send 
a partial truth or an ambiguous message. Moreover, Senders’ messages are effective even 
in the absence of strategic concerns. These results suggest that fixed message treatments 
fail to capture the large range of preferences for truth telling.  
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Chapter 1 
  
An Experimental Test of the Nastiness Hypothesis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Behavioural economists who are concerned with understanding antisocial behaviour 
have created a new variety of experimental games that allow people to make directly 
antisocial choices.1 This broad class of games includes money-burning games (Zizzo and 
Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003), joy-of-destruction games (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink 
and Hermmann, 2011) as well as first-strike games (Abbink and de Haan, 2014) and 
destructor games (Kessler, 2012). Results from these games have consistently revealed a 
significant proportion of subjects willing to reduce their co-participant’s earnings, even 
though such behaviour is costly to themselves.2  
 
The results, however, are in strong contrast to the vast evidence from laboratory 
experiments that have reported a substantial proportion of subjects behaving pro-
socially. Subjects are altruistic (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Andreoni et al., 2010), 
inequality averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), reciprocal (Falk 
and Fischbacher, 2006); or maximize social welfare (Charness and Rabin, 2002; 
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). 
 
                                                          
1 Real-life examples for antisocial behaviour include violence against others, vandalism, malicious computer 
virus, and vagrancy. 
2 In a money-burning game (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001), four players receive an unequal endowment and 
simultaneously choose whether to reduce the other player’s earnings. In a joy-of-destruction game (Abbink 
and Sadrieh, 2009), two players simultaneously choose whether to reduce the other player’s earnings over 
many rounds. In the first-strike game (Abbink and de Haan, 2014), two players accumulate earnings across 
rounds and choose whether to reduce the other player’s earnings in each round. In the destructor game 
(Kessler, 2012), only one player makes the decision whether to reduce the other player’s earnings.  
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In the joy-of-destruction game, Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) proposed nastiness, an 
intrinsic motivation to cause harm to others, as the main motivation for the observed 
antisocial behaviour. I will refer to this idea as the nastiness hypothesis. As Abbink and 
Sadrieh (2009) clearly state: ‘We interpret the hide destruction rates in the hidden 
treatment as an indication of the pleasure of being nasty’ (p.308).  
 
This study reports the results of an experiment specifically designed to test the empirical 
plausibility of the nastiness hypothesis. To the best of my knowledge, previous studies 
have not experimentally tested the nastiness hypothesis.3 I aim to fill this gap. I ask two 
important questions: Does nastiness drive destruction choices? If so, to what extent does 
nastiness influence antisocial behaviour?   
 
To elicit nastiness, I conducted a laboratory experiment using a destruction game. The 
destruction game is a variant of the joy-of-destruction game introduced in the 
experimental literature by Abbink and Sadrieh (2009). In the current experimental game, 
subjects were randomly matched in pairs and were initially endowed with the same 
amount of money. This feature of the game removed inequality aversion as a motivation 
for destructive behaviour. The subjects, who interact only once, can simultaneously 
reduce the other player’s endowment by half.  
 
I ran three treatments. The cost of destruction, that is, the amount of money that subjects 
pay to reduce their co-participant’s earnings, varied across treatments. In the first 
treatment (called 2S-Costly), destruction was costly, that is, if a subject chose to reduce 
the co-participant’s earnings, he/she had to reduce her/his own earnings by 60 pence. 
This treatment served as a baseline and provides evidence on the number of subjects 
who are intrinsically motivated by nastiness.  
 
In the second treatment (2S-Costless), destruction was costless: if a subject chose to 
reduce the co-participant’s earnings, he/she did not reduce her/his own earnings. In the 
                                                          
3 Straatman (2012) reviewed seven relevant experimental studies to examine evidence in support of the 
nastiness hypothesis. Based on these experimental studies, he argues that it would be premature to accept 
that nastiness plays an important role in the antisocial behaviour in the laboratory.  
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third treatment (2S-Benefit), subjects had the opportunity to increase their earnings by 
causing harm to others. If a subject chose to reduce the other player’s earnings, he/she 
earned 60 pence. This treatment is a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a stylized representation 
of situations in which an economic agent has the opportunity to increase his earnings by 
causing harm to others.4 By comparing the results across the three treatments, I 
examined the extent of nastiness in antisocial behaviour. If subjects were motivated by 
nastiness, the fraction of subjects willing to reduce the co-participant’s earnings should 
be higher in 2S-Costless than in 2S-Costly, and higher in 2S-Benefit than in 2S-Costless.  
 
Because the pairs play simultaneously, negative reciprocity (also called pre-emptive 
retaliation) may play a role in the decision to reduce the other player’s earnings (Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).5 In other words, subjects may have 
pessimistic expectations about how their co-participant will behave and can reduce the 
co-participant’s earnings based on the expectation that the co-participant will reduce 
her/his earnings (Abbink and de Haan, 2014; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001).6  
 
To investigate the effect of negative reciprocity on the behaviour of individuals who 
choose to reduce the co-participant’s earnings, I also ran a fourth treatment, which I 
called 1S-Benefit. This treatment was similar to 2S-Benefit; but where only one subject, 
randomly chosen, decided whether to reduce the co-participant’s earnings. The other 
player did not make any decision. By comparing 1S-Benefit with 2S-Benefit, I examined 
the effect of negative reciprocity when destruction entailed a small monetary gain.    
 
                                                          
4 This may resemble circumstances such as criminal damage, assaults, theft, and credit card fraud. Some 
experimental studies on crime employed a taking game (Eichenberger and Oberholzer–Gee, 1998; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2002) 
5 In addition, Cooper and Kagel (2009) review the economic models on reciprocity, and Meir (2006) review 
the experimental evidence from the field on reciprocity.  
6 Abbink and de Haan (2014) gave a good demonstration of how pre-emptive retaliation or fear of 
destruction may lead to destruction, even though the subject does not want to destroy: `but even if I do not 
believe that the opponent is malevolent, I may fear that he fears that I am, and thus strike against him.’ 
(p.191)  
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The data from this experiment showed that when destruction was costly (2S-Costly 
treatment), nobody was willing to reduce other player’s earnings; when destruction was 
costless (2S-Costles treatment), only 10% of all subjects chose to reduce the other player’s 
earnings. This increase, however, was not statistically significant. The data also showed 
that the fraction of subject willing to reduce the other’s earnings increased drastically 
when destruction entailed a small monetary gain. Around 45% of subjects chose to 
reduce their player’s earnings. Therefore, subjects become nastier when they benefit 
monetarily from it. I also found that negative reciprocity does not play a role on 
willingness to reduce the other player’s earnings, when the destruction entails a small 
monetary gain.  
 
The results suggest that people are not nasty for the sake of being nasty. Rather, 
destructive decisions seemed to be consistent with Homo oeconomicus.7 Nastiness is not 
the primary motivation for behavioural differences observed across treatments. The 
results from this study challenge the predictive power of the nastiness hypothesis. This 
hypothesis would be supported if, for example, subjects chose to reduce the other 
player’s earnings, whether such destruction was costly or costless. The results from this 
study do not support this proposition. Rather it suggests that it is necessary to reconsider 
the role of nastiness played in destruction games.  
 
This study makes two important contributions to the literature examining antisocial 
preferences. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first experiment to explore the 
extent of nastiness in the antisocial behaviour. Second, previous research has either 
examined costly destruction or costless destruction, but researchers have not used the 
same experimental setting. For instance, Abbink and Herrmann (2011) used a joy-of-
destruction game where destruction was costly, whereas Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) 
used a joy-of-destruction game where destruction was costless. Zizzo and Oswald (2001) 
and Zizzo (2003) varied the cost of burning in a money-burning game, which differed 
from the experimental setting used in this study. None of these experiments was able to 
test for nastiness. I use the same experimental game to systematically elicit nastiness. 
                                                          
7 The Homo oeconomicus is an abstract individual, whose actions are guided by selfishness and greedy 
motivations (Smith, 1776; Walras, 2014).  
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Third, I show that nastiness alone cannot explain the high prevalence of antisocial 
behaviour in the laboratory. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the key 
experimental studies on antisocial behaviour. Section 3 presents the experimental design 
and describe the procedures. Section 4 summarizes the experimental results. Section 5 
presents the answers to the post-experimental questionnaire. Section 6 presents a 
discussion of the results and concludes.  
 
2. Related literature 
 
This section reviews the literature that look for the occurrence of antisocial preferences.8 
I divide the related literature into two main groups. The first group included antisocial 
experiments involving bilateral destruction: two subjects simultaneously can reduce the 
co-participant’s earnings. The second included antisocial experiments involving 
unilateral destruction: only one of the subjects can reduce the co-participant’s earnings.9 
 
2.1. Bilateral destruction  
 
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) introduced a money-burning game. Four players were 
randomly matched and received an unequal number of tokens. They simultaneously 
choose how many tokens to reduce from the other player’s earnings. The price of 
burning, the number of tokens that a player must give up in order to reduce the other 
player’s endowment by one unit, varied across treatments. Zizzo and Oswald (2001) 
found that approximately 62.5% of players chose to reduce some part of other player’s 
                                                          
8 I use the term `antisocial preferences’ to refer to motives that induce people to hurt others even when it is 
personally costly to do so. This can include envy (Mui, 1995; Zizzo, 2003) and interdependent preferences 
(Levine 1998).  
9 For the purpose of this study, I focus only on experiments where subjects make individual antisocial 
choices. Other experimental studies allow subjects to make prosocial and antisocial choices. For instance, 
Sadrieh and Schröder, (2017) showed that pro-social and antisocial behaviour can be explained by the desire 
to influence others, while Zhang and Ortmann (2016) showed that prosocial and antisocial behaviour are 
correlated. 
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money. Each subject had on average 48.7% of their earnings burnt. Most of the money 
burning was aimed at subjects with higher number of tokens. Those who had less tokens 
burnt more money than those who had more tokens. The amount burnt was not sensitive 
to the price of burning. The authors suggest that unfair inequality lead to money 
burning. The current study differed from Zizzo and Oswald’s (2001) study in the 
experimental setting. I removed any destruction motivated by inequality aversion 
preferences.   
 
Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) introduced the joy-of-destruction game. Two subjects 
performed a task to earn money. They simultaneously decided how much money to 
reduce from the other player in multiple rounds. In this game, subjects did not have to 
reduce their own money to destroy the co-participant’s earnings (destruction was 
costless). In the open treatment, subjects knew how much destruction their co-
participant has caused them, whereas in the hidden treatment, they do not. Abbink and 
Sadrieh (2009) found that 8.5% of all decisions in the open treatment and 39.5% of all 
decisions in the hidden treatment were destructive. The researchers interpreted the high 
destruction rates in the hidden treatment as evidence of nastiness. In Abbink and Sadrieh 
(2009), players were not informed about income differences. In the current study, 
subjects know their co-participant’s initial endowment. 
 
Abbink and Herrmann (2011) modified the joy-of-destruction game (Abbink and 
Sadrieh, 2009). Players were equally endowed and interacted only once. Moreover, 
subjects simultaneously decided whether to reduce the other player’s endowment by 
half. Subjects paid to destroy the other player’s endowment. Similar to Abbink and 
Sadrieh (2009), Abbink and Herrmann (2011) found higher destruction rates in the 
hidden treatment than in the open treatment, but these percentages were lower than in 
the joy-of-destruction with multiple rounds. Specifically, 26% of subjects chose to reduce 
their co-participant’s earnings in the hidden treatment and 10.8% of subjects in the open 
treatment. However, Abbink and Herrmann (2011) were not able to make the 
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comparisons across treatments that I make in this study, so they did not test the nastiness 
hypothesis.10  
 
Karakostas and Zizzo (2016) extended the joy-of-destruction game used in Abbink and 
Hermmann (2011) to examine experimenter demand effects. Karakostas and Zizzo 
(2016) found experimenter demand effects: 60% of the players chose to reduce their co-
participant’s earnings when a `cue’ to destroy was given to them. The authors suggested 
that social image towards the authority appears to be the reason why people choose to 
behave antisocial. 
 
2.2. Unilateral destruction  
 
The experimental design in this study also bears some resemblance to other settings 
studied in the experimental literature where destruction is unilateral. Zizzo (2003) 
extends the experimental design in Zizzo and Oswald (2001) by introducing unilateral 
destruction. All subjects in a group make their decisions on how much to reduce from 
the other player’s earnings, but only the decision of one of the subjects selected randomly 
is implemented. He found that unilateral destruction leads to less destruction compared 
to multilateral burning. He also found that burning is also more sensitive to the price of 
burning compared to the simultaneous game. This study differs from Zizzo 2003 in that 
I randomly chose who made the decision first, so I eliminate negative reciprocity.  
 
Abbink et al (2011) used a unilateral burning game to study framing effects in antisocial 
preferences. Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of decider and victim. There 
are two frames. In the negative frame, the decider can reduce the victim’s payoff and 
destruction is costly. In the positive frame, the decider can increase the victim’s payoff 
and increasing the victim payoff increases the decider payoff. The antisocial choice in 
this frame is to not increase the other payoff. In both frames, the decider’s task is 
equivalent in terms of payoffs. Abbink et al (2011) found no framing effects on the total 
amount of money destroyed in both frames (25% of the subjects choose to burn). 
                                                          
10 Blackwell and Diamond (2016) examined the impact of hugs upon behaviour in the joy-of-destruction 
game. They found that hugging reduced spiteful behaviour. 
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However, destructive behaviour is affected by whether the decider has an initial 
endowment lower or higher than the victim’s endowment. In the negative destruction 
frame, deciders burn more money when inequality is advantageous than when it is 
disadvantageous. Equal distributions of money are also prone to destruction. However, 
this effect is reversed in the positive frame. This current study differs from Abbink et al 
(2011) in that I use a between-subject design. I also give each decider an equal 
endowment as the victim. In addition, I do not study framing effects. 
 
Kessler et al (2012) introduced the destructor game. Two subjects randomly matched are 
assigned to the roles of destructor and passive player. Subjects completed a task to earn 
money. The money earned is the same for both subjects. The destructor chose whether 
to reduce a determined share of the passive’s earnings. Destruction was costless for the 
destructor. In addition, nature could also destroy a share of the passive’s earnings. 
Kessler (2012) found that 15% of destructors chose to reduce their co-participant’s 
earnings. This current study differs from Kessler et al (2012) in that subjects cannot hide 
their destruction decision behind nature. 
 
Abbink and de Haan (2014) introduced the first-strike game.  Two players randomly 
matched perform an individual task over several rounds to accumulate earnings. In any 
round, subjects could simultaneously reduce the total earnings of her partner. The 
subject who chose to destroy other player’s earnings, reduced their own earnings. 
Abbink and de Haan (2014) found that fear of destruction considerably increased 
destruction: 77.8% of subjects inflicted significant damage on the other subject, but 
mutual trust decreased destructive behaviour (33.9% of the subjects choose to reduce). 
This current study differs from Abbink and de Haan (2014) in that players made a single 
decision instead of playing many rounds. In addition, subjects did not perform a task to 
earn their endowments.  
 
Fehr (2015) examined whether increasing inequality increases anti-social behaviour 
towards others. Subjects randomly matched into groups of four performed a task to earn 
money. They received information about their relative performance in their group. They 
could burn up to half of the income of a group member. The decision to burn incurred a 
cost to the perpetrator. After the decision, only the decision of one randomly selected 
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group member was implemented. Fehr (2015) found that unfair inequality increased 
anti-social behaviour.  
 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
 
The experimental set-up implemented a variant of the one-shot joy-of-destruction game 
(Abbink and Herrmann, 2011). Two subjects were randomly matched and assigned the 
role of either Player 1 or Player 2. Each player received an initial endowment of £6. They 
simultaneously chose whether to reduce the other player’s endowment by £3. The 
experiment had four treatments: the two-sided costly treatment (2S-Costly), the two-
sided costless treatment (2S-Costless), the two-sided benefit treatment (2S-Benefit), and 
the one-sided benefit treatment (1S-Benefit). The cost of destruction varies across 
treatments.  
 
3.1. The two-sided costly treatment (2S-Costly)  
 
This was the first treatment. Subjects decide whether or not to reduce the co-participant’s 
earnings. If a subject chose to reduce the other player’s earnings, she/he had to reduce 
her/his own endowment by 60 pence. This treatment worked as a baseline. I examined 
whether subjects were intrinsically motivated by nastiness. Hence, if subjects were nasty 
it is likely that they will choose to reduce other player’s earnings. 
 
The fact that destruction is costly, the subject has to reduce his/her own earnings by 60 
pence to reduce the co-participant’s earnings might have an effect on the decision to 
reduce the co-participant’s earnings. Destruction may be too costly, and consequently a 
nasty subject will not reduce the other player’s earnings. Therefore, failure to observe 
positive destruction choices should not be seen as a definitive rejection of pure nastiness 
hypothesis. This motivated the second treatment.  
 
3.2. The two-sided costless treatment (2S-Costless)  
 
This was the second treatment. This was identical to the 2S-Costly treatment, except that 
if a subject chose to reduce the co-participant’s earnings, he/she does not pay any money 
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to do it. By comparing 2S-Costly with 2S-Costles, I examined whether simply reducing 
the cost of destruction increases the amount of decisions motivated by nastiness. 
 
In the 2S-Costless, subjects who were intrinsically motivated to behave nastily and did 
not reduce the other subject’s earnings in the previous treatment, will do now because it 
is costless. 
 
3.3. The two-sided benefit treatment (2S-Benefit)  
 
This was the third treatment. This was identical to the 2S-Costless treatment; except that 
subjects had the opportunity to increase their own earnings by reducing the other 
player’s earnings. If a subject chose to reduce the other player’s earnings, he/she earned 
60 pence. By comparing, 2S-Benefit to the other two treatments, I examined whether a 
small economic gain can trigger nastiness.  
 
3.4. The one-sided benefit treatment (1S-Benefit)  
 
Given that the subjects played simultaneously, it is also possible that negative reciprocity 
or pre-emptive retaliation triggered destruction in 2S-Benefit. In other words, a subject 
may want to reduce the other player’s earnings because he/she has pessimistic 
expectations that the other player will reduce his/her monetary earnings (Fehr and 
Gächter 2000, Falk and Fischbacher 2006).  
 
Previous experiments have already pointed out the fact that destruction can be driven 
by negative reciprocity or pre-emptive retaliation. The subject thinks the other subject 
will destroy, so she destroys (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009, Zizzo and Oswald 2001).    
 
For this reason, I conducted a fourth treatment. I called this treatment 1S-Benefit. This 
treatment was identical to the 2S-Benefit treatment, except that those in the role of Player 
1 decided whether to reduce the other player's endowment by £3. Player 2 was passive. 
If Player 1 chose to reduce Player 2’s earnings, Player 1 earned 60 pence.  
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In this treatment, I removed the potential for negative reciprocity by removing 
uncertainty about Player 2’s decision. The difference of the fraction of destructive choices 
between 2S-Benefit treatment and 1S-Benefit treatment will provide a measure of the 
amount of destruction that would be attributable to nastiness in a setting where 
destruction entails a monetary gain.   
 
I expected Homo economicus not to destroy in 2S-Costly and to be indifferent in 2S-
Costless. However, he would destroy in 2S-Benefit. If nastiness is a motivation for 
destruction, I expected more destruction in 2S-Costless than in 2S-Costly, and more in 
2S-Benefit than in 2S-Costless. Moreover, comparison of decisions to reduce the other 
player’s earnings across games allows permitted to investigate how willingness to 
reduce other player’s earnings varied with the cost of destruction. Table 1 summarizes 
the experimental design. 
 
Table 1. Experimental treatments 
 
 
3.5. Procedures 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Arts Laboratory of the Centre for Behavioural and 
Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia (UEA) between 
January and July 2013. The subjects were undergraduate students recruited from diverse 
disciplines using the on-line recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). None of the 
subjects had previously taken part in or otherwise gained experience with a similar 
experiment. Subjects received a £2 participation fee, regardless of their decisions. The 
Treatment
Number of 
sessions
Number of 
subjects 
Player 1's 
endowment 
(£)
Player 2's 
endowment 
(£)
Amount to 
reduce from the 
co-participant's 
earnings (£)
Amount to pay if the 
subject chose to reduce 
the co-participant's 
earnings (£)
2S-Costly 2 20 6 6 3 0. 60
2S-Costless 2 20 6 6 3 0.00
2S-Benefit 2 20 6 6 3 -0.60
1S-Benefit 4 40 6 6 3 -0.60
19 
 
experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007).  
 
I ran two sessions per treatment, except for 1S-Benefit treatment, in which I ran four 
sessions. In each session, I had ten subjects. Subjects participated in only one of the 
sessions. In total, 100 subjects participated in the experiment: 20 each in 2S-Costly; 2S-
Costless; and 2S-Benefit treatment, and 40 subjects in 1S-Benefit treatment. In each 
session, subjects were given printed instructions, a blank sheet of paper, and a receipt 
form to hand to the experimenter at the end of the session for their final payments. 
Instructions for all the treatments can be found in this chapter’s Appendix A. 
Experimental instructions. 
  
The subjects were between 18 and 39 years old, with an average age of 22.32 and 
standard deviation of 3.64. In the sample, 56% of the subjects were female, 21% studied 
Economics, 17% Business and Management; 38% were born in China and 33% were born 
in the United Kingdom. Appendix C. Background of the participants of is chapter 
reports subjects’ characteristics.  
 
In all sessions subjects were, upon arrival, randomly seated at visually separated 
computer terminals in order to avoid facial or verbal communication between subjects. 
During a session, communication between subjects was prohibited.   
 
At the start of each session, the experimenter read the instructions aloud as the students 
followed along on their computer screens. The presentation of the experimental 
instructions was as neutral as possible avoiding terms such as ‘destruction’. 
Communication between subjects was prohibited. If a subject did not understand any 
part of the instructions, he/she raised his/her hand for clarification. All clarification was 
given privately by the experimenter. The experiment started when everybody indicated 
that they had fully understood the instructions.11 
                                                          
11 At the end of the experiment, all subjects gave feedback about the experiment. When subjects provided 
feedback on the experiment, they said that `it was easy to understand the instructions’; they also stated that 
`it is interesting and simple to play’; and they also wrote that `It was very quick and simple to follow’.  
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Subjects were randomly matched in pairs. Half were assigned to the role of Player 1 and 
the other half to the role of Player 2. The subjects did not know who their counterpart 
was, before and after the session. Anonymity was preserved throughout the experiment.  
 
Figure 1 shows the subject’s decision screen for all treatments. A subject made her 
decision by pressing one of the two buttons to indicate their choice. Each subject received 
a show up fee of £2, which he/she could keep regardless of his/her decision and his/her 
co-participant’s decision made in the experiment. 
 
Figure 1. Decision screen
 
 
A post-experimental questionnaire was administered asking all subjects to state the 
reason for their actions (see Figure 2). Answers to this question provided an insight into 
their main motivations for their behaviour.  
 
In 1S-Benefit treatment, subjects in the role of Player 2, who did not make any decision, 
were also asked to state their expectations about their co-participant’s behaviour (see 
Figure 3). Note that these subjects had to state their expectations about Player 1’s 
behaviour without receiving any feedback during the experiment. Answers to this 
question were not monetarily incentivized.  
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Figure 2. Questionnaire screen for bilateral destruction treatments
 
 
Figure 3. Questionnaire screen for unilateral destruction treatment 
 
 
22 
 
After all the subjects answered the post-experimental questionnaire, they were told on 
their own screens what they had earned (in British pounds), but not what their co-
participant had earned (for an example of the payoff screen see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Payoff screen for 2S-Costly treatment
 
 
After the experiment was over, I also asked each subject to complete a socio-
demographic questionnaire designed to gather data on gender, field of study, country 
of origin, and language. Players also provided feedback on the experiment. 
Questionnaire screenshots are provided in the Appendix E. Post-experimental 
questionnaire at the end of this chapter. All the questionnaires were computerized using 
z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).  
 
Each session lasted around 45 minutes, including reading the instructions and filling in 
the questionnaires. On average, subjects earned £7.48 (including the £2 participation fee); 
the standard deviation was 1.04; the minimum payoff was £5; and the maximum £8.60. 
At the end of a session, the subjects were called individually to be paid in cash. Subjects 
were never told about their partner’s earnings.  
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4. Results 
 
Table 2 summarizes the main results across treatments. The results are also displayed in 
Figure 5. This figure shows the fraction of subjects who chose to reduce the co-
participant’s earnings for each treatment. The data from the experiment are provided in 
Appendix H. Data of this chapter.  
 
I also examined differences by gender and country of origin across treatments. The 
additional statistical analysis is shown in Appendix F. Gender differences in antisocial 
behaviour and Appendix G. Cultural differences in antisocial behaviour of this 
chapter. For the statistical analysis, I pooled the data across sessions in each treatment. 
 
4.1. Bilateral destruction  
 
In treatment 2S-Costly, where destruction was costly, none of the participants chose to 
reduce their co-participant's endowment. The fact that we do not observe destruction 
does not mean that subjects do not have nastiness preferences. Destruction may be too 
costly, so that even a nasty subject is not willing to reduce his co-participant’s earnings. 
 
In 2S-Costless, where destruction was costless, 10% of subjects (2 of 20) chose to reduce 
the co-participant's earnings. In 2S-Benefit, where destruction had a monetary payoff, 
45% of the subjects (9 of 20) chose to reduce the co-participant's earnings. There were 
significant differences across treatments (one-sided Fisher's exact test, p= 0.001).12 
                                                          
12 Though the presentation of the experimental instructions was as neutral as possible (as discussed in 
Section 3.5), the antisocial features of the experimental game used in this study could have influenced the 
choices made by the subjects. For this reason, I ran an additional treatment and compared the results from 
this treatment with 2S-Costly. In this additional treatment, subjects played a single one-shot simultaneous 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. There were two options: Option A and Option B. There were two players 
randomly matched who simultaneously chose one of these options. If both players choose option A, each 
received £2.40. If both players choose option B, each received £6. If Player 1 chooses option A, but Player 2 
chooses option B, Player 1 earns £5.40 and Player 2 earns £3. If player 1 chooses option B and Player 2 chooses 
option A, Player 1 earns £3 and Player 2 earns £5.40. Note that the payoff structure remained essentially the 
same as for 2S-Costly. In this sense, the present experimental treatment also provides a test of the robustness 
of the results presented in 2S-Costly. The instructions are presented in Appendix B. Experimental 
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The difference between the results of 2S-Costly and 2S-Costless was not statistically 
significant (one-sided Fisher's exact test, p= 0.244).  Hence, a decrease in the price of 
destruction did not affect the player’s willingness to reduce their partner’s endowment. 
However, the difference between the results of 2S-Costly and 2S-Benefit was statistically 
significant (one-sided Fisher's exact test, p= 0.001). Similarly, the difference between the 
results of 2S-Costless and 2S-Benefit was statistically significant (one-sided Fisher's exact 
test, p= 0.015). Hence, a monetary gain from destruction did increase the player’s 
willingness to reduce their partner’s endowment. 
 
4.2. Unilateral destruction  
 
I also examined the role of negative reciprocity when destruction entailed a monetary 
benefit. Subjects may have chosen to reduce the other player’s endowment because they 
thought that the other player would do the same. Destruction was, therefore, a pre-
emptive retaliation (Gächter and Herrmann, 2009).  
 
In 1S-Benefit treatment, around 50% of subjects chose to reduce their co-participant’s 
endowment. However, comparing 1S-Benefit and 2S-Benefit, I did not find statistically 
significant differences in the percentage of subjects willing to do this (one-sided Fisher's 
exact test, p=0.102). Thus, negative reciprocity did not play a role when destruction was 
economically beneficial.13 Thus, when destruction was profitable, beliefs about what the 
opponent would do did not matter.  
                                                          
instructions for the neutral treatment. I ran 3 sessions in June 2013. In each session, I had 10 subjects. The 
experimental protocol in each session was exactly the same as for 2S-Costly. Sessions were also run at the 
Arts Laboratory of the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of 
East Anglia (UEA) to guarantee the same local environment for the individuals. Sessions were conducted 
and programmed using z-TREE (Fischbacher, 2007). Data showed that only 6% of subjects chose option B 
(which was equivalent to reducing the co-participant’s earnings). No significant differences were detected 
between 2S-Costly treatment and this treatment (one-sided Fisher's exact test, p=0.355). This evidence shows 
no framing effects when reducing the co-participant’s earnings was costly.  
13 Player 2’s Belief in 1S-Benefit Treatment. In our 1S-Benefit treatment, I asked Player 2 in order to elicit 
subject’s expectations towards their partner’s behaviour. I find that subjects in the role of player 2 have no 
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Table 2. Experimental results 
 
 
Figure 5. Destruction choices 
 
 
 
                                                          
pessimistic expectations about their partner’s behaviour did not fear destruction. Overall, 75% of subjects 
15 out of 20 in the role of Player 2 did not expect Player 1 would burn. 
Frequency Percent
2S-Costly (T1) 20 0 0.00
2S-Costless (T2) 20 2 10.00
2S-Benefit (T3) 20 9 45.00
1S-Benefit (T4) 20 10 50.00
Total 80 21 59.00
Number of 
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Treatment
Subjects who chose to reduce their 
co-participant's endowment
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5. Post-experimental questionnaire 
 
In this section, I used the results from the post experimental questionnaire to investigate 
more closely the motives subjects chose to reduce the co-participant’s earnings.14 It seems 
that concern for maximizing their own money was the main motivation for the 
destructive behaviour of the subjects. 
 
5.1. Bilateral destruction  
 
In the 2S-Costly treatment, where nobody reduced the other’s earnings, subjects seemed 
to maximize their payoff. For instance, one stated: ` I don't mind what my partner choose, 
and I can't control him/her, I just keep my own money in the lowest probability of 
losing.’  
 
In the 2S-Costless treatment, in which 10 percent of subjects decided to reduce other’s 
earnings, the cost of destruction and expectations about the co-participants behaviour 
seemed to play an important role.  For instance, one subject wrote: `I will consider the 
cost if i decide to reduce my co-participant earnings. However, in this case, it won't cost 
me any and it means i can keep my earnings if my co-participant decide not to reduce 
my earnings. And i believe that he/she will not reduce my earnings in normal situation’. 
Another subject wrote: `There was no benefit to reducing my co-participant earnings for 
me.’  
 
In the 2S-Benefit treatment, in which 45 percent of subjects decided to reduce the other 
player’s earnings, pre-emptive retaliation or negative expectations about the co-
participant’s behaviour again seemed to play an important role. For instance, one subject 
wrote: ` I considered not reducing my co-participants amount because it'd be fair to both 
of us to earn £6 but then I changed my mind because I figured s/he would most likely 
reduce my amount and I made the decision firstly as a defence mechanism and secondly 
to make it fair.’  
 
                                                          
14 Subject’s statements were not edited. Additional comments are available upon request. 
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5.2. Unilateral destruction 
 
In 1S-Benefit, in which 50 percent of subjects decided to reduce the other player’s 
earnings, monetary gain seemed to be the main determinant.15 For instance, one subject 
in the role of Player 1 stated: `Because I want to more earn £0.06, so I chose to reduce my 
co-participant’s £3.’  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
A broad observation from the literature on experimental games shows a significant 
proportion of people willing to reduce other’s income. In this chapter, I experimentally 
tested the nastiness hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge, previous studies have not 
yet done that. The nastiness hypothesis states that people have a genuine pleasure from 
causing harm to others (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009). I proposed a clear experimental 
design that systematically elicited nastiness isolated from inequity aversion and concern 
for fairness.  
 
The principal result of the experiment is that nastiness alone cannot explain the high 
prevalence of the antisocial behaviour observed in the previous laboratory experiments. 
By comparing behaviour across these treatments with varied costs of destruction, I am 
able to show that people are not nasty for the sake of being nasty. The data are consistent 
with destructive selfishness. In other words, the data are not consistent with the 
nastiness hypothesis.  
 
The data revealed that nobody was willing to reduce the co-participant’s earnings when 
destruction is costly 2S-Costly, whereas only 10% of all subjects were willing to reduce 
the co-participant’s earnings when destruction is costless 2S-Costless. This difference 
was not statistically significant. By contrast, when subjects can make gains from 
                                                          
15 In 1S-Benefit treatment, I also elicited expectations of Player 2 subjects about their co-participant’s 
behaviour. Most in the role of Player 2 did not fear destruction from the co-participant. Overall, 75% (15 of 
20) of subjects in the role of Player 2 did not expect Player 1 to reduce their earnings, despite destruction 
entailed an economic gain.   
28 
 
destruction, nearly half of the subjects chose to reduce their co-participant’s earnings: 
45% of all subjects chose to reduce their co-participant’s earnings. This is a significant 
increase relatively to 2S-Costly and relatively to 2S-Costless.  
 
The results from 2S-Benefit are consistent with nastiness, but the data from 2S-Costly 
and 2S-Costless alone are not. Therefore, this evidence demonstrates that subjects are 
not nasty for the sake of being nasty. If subjects were nasty, there would have been 
significant destruction in 2S-Costless, and (although perhaps a lot less) in 2S-Costly. I 
did not find support for the nastiness hypothesis. However, the data is consistent with 
Homo oeconomicus. This can explain why destructive decisions jumped when reducing 
the co-participant’s earnings entailed an economic benefit. This evidence poses a 
challenge for the predictive power of the nastiness hypothesis. The evidence from this 
study suggest that the observed antisocial behaviour is not exclusively driven by spiteful 
or antisocial preferences. The evidence is consistent with the Homo economics.  
 
Previous experiments that have examined antisocial preferences have found a high 
fraction of subjects willing to reduce a partner’s earnings, but they have not isolated 
nastiness from other confounding factors. For instance, in Zizzo and Oswald (2001), 
subjects chose to burn another player’s money motivated by inequality aversion and 
unfairness. The evidence from this experiment is not consistent with this previous work. 
However, evidence in this experiment is consistent with Müller et al (2016) who suggest 
that antisocial behaviour highly depends on the environment that individuals are facing. 
 
The results from 2S-Costly can be compared with Abbink and Hermann (2001)’s 
findings. They conducted a mini-joy of destruction game in which subjects received an 
equal endowment from the experimenter, without performing any task. In the open 
treatment, subjects can simultaneously reduce the partner’s earnings by half. Abbink 
and Hermann (2001) found that approximately 8% of the subjects were willing to reduce 
the other’s earnings. This result does not appear at odds with the results from 2S-Costly. 
However, Abbink and Herrmann (2011) did not run the other treatments, so they were 
not able to elicit nastiness. 
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The results from the experiment raised concerns about the possibility of framing effects. 
The literature on framing effects on antisocial preferences is not abundant. Abbink et al 
(2011) showed no framing effects on anti-social preferences. It would be interesting to 
investigate the relevance of framing effects in anti-social experiments further.16  
 
The simultaneous play opens up the possibility that subjects expect other to destroy thus 
they destroy. Subjects may also destroy for negative reciprocity. This can lead to 
destruction. The reason is that subjects may expect the other will reduce their earnings 
so that they chose to reduce for this reason. To understand whether reciprocity in a 
simultaneous game plays any role in destruction, I ran a one-sided treatment (1S-Benefit) 
where destruction is beneficial but now only one of the subject destroy.  
 
The comparison between 2S-Benefit and 1S-Benefit shows that, when destruction is 
profitable, beliefs about the opponent’s action do not matter. This can be interpreted as 
showing that people are not very reciprocal. Other experimental games have shown that 
negative reciprocity is important in economic decisions. It will be important to see if no 
reciprocal consideration extend to the other environments.  
 
The results have two important implications. First, the results emphasize the importance 
of monetary incentives for the correct understanding of nastiness preferences. This 
suggests that experiments should pay more attention to selfish motivations as an 
important incentive to behave nasty. I believe that this framework is crucial in 
understanding anti-social behaviour in destruction games. Secondly, I also observed that 
when destruction entails a monetary gain, negative reciprocity does not matter for 
destruction. Whether or not it matters for other settings can be investigated in future 
research. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 For a review of the experimental evidence on framing effects in pro-social and anti-social experiments, see 
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006).  
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Appendix to Chapter 1: An Experimental Test of the Nastiness Hypothesis 
 
A. Experimental instructions  
B. Experimental instructions for neutral treatment 
C. Background of the participants  
D. Background of the participants for neutral treatment 
E. Post-experimental questionnaire 
F. Gender differences in antisocial behaviour 
G. Cultural differences in antisocial behaviour 
H. Data 
I. Decision screen for multinomial choice treatment  
 
Appendix A. Experimental instructions 
 
Note: All treatments (beginning of the experiment) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment, you can earn money. 
What you earn will depend upon your decision, and on the decision of another 
participant in the room. No data that you provide can be associated with your person; 
all data will be treated confidentially. Please follow the instructions carefully. These 
instructions explain how the experiment works. If any of the instructions are unclear, or 
if you have any questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you. Please do not 
communicate with any other participant until the experiment is over. 
 
You will be randomly matched with one of the other participants (I call him/her your 
co-participant). Note that you will not learn who your co-participant is, neither during 
nor after the session. Likewise, your co-participant will not learn who you are. You will 
receive £6. Your co-participant will also receive £6.  
 
A.1. Instructions for the 2S-Costlly treatment: 
 
You will have to decide whether or not to reduce £3 from your co-participant's earnings. 
If you decide to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will cost you £0.60. If you 
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decide not to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will cost you nothing. Your co-
participant will make the same decision at the same time. In other words, he/she will 
have to decide whether or not to reduce £3 from your earnings. If he/she decides to 
reduce your earnings, this will cost him/her £0.60. If he/she decides not to reduce your 
earnings, this will cost him/her nothing. 
 
After you make a decision, you will not interact with your co-participant again in today's 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your money earnings, and £2 
for showing up. Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand. 
 
A.2. Instructions for the 2S-Costless treatment: 
 
You will have to decide whether or not to reduce £3 from your co-participant's earnings. 
If you decide to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will cost you nothing. If you 
decide not to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will cost you nothing either. 
Your co-participant will make the same decision at the same time. In other words, 
he/she will have to decide whether or not to reduce £3 from your earnings. If he/she 
decides to reduce your earnings, this will cost him/her nothing. If he/she decides not to 
reduce your earnings, this will cost him/her nothing either. 
 
After you make a decision, you will not interact with your co-participant again in today's 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your money earnings, and £2 
for showing up. Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand. 
 
A.3. Instructions for the 2S-Benefit treatment:  
 
You will have to decide whether or not to reduce £3 from your co-participant's earnings. 
If you decide to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will increase your earnings 
by £0.60. If you decide not to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will increase 
your earnings by £0. Your co-participant will make the same decision at the same time. 
In other words, he/she will have to decide whether or not to reduce $3 from your 
earnings. If he/she decides to reduce your earnings, this will increase his/her earnings 
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by £0.60. If he/she decides not to reduce your earnings, this will increase his/her 
earnings by £0.  
 
After you make a decision, you will not interact with your co-participant again in today's 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your money earnings, and £2 
for showing up. Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand. 
 
A.4. Instructions for the 1S-Benefit treatment:  
 
Specific Instructions for Player 1: You will be Player 1 and your co-participant will be 
Player 2. You will have to decide whether or not to reduce £3 from your co-participant's 
earnings. If you decide to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will increase your 
earnings by £0.60. If you decide not to reduce your co-participant's earnings, this will 
increase your earnings by £0. Your co-participant Player 2 will not make any decision. 
 
Specific Instructions for Player 2: You will be Player 2 and your co-participant will be 
Player 1. You will not make any decision. Your co-participant Player 1 will have to 
decide whether or not to reduce £3 from your earnings. If he decides to reduce your 
earnings, this will increase his earnings by £0.60. If he decides not to reduce your 
earnings, this will increase his/her earnings by £0. 
 
After you make a decision, you will not interact with your co-participant again in today's 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your money earnings, and £2 
for showing up. Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand. 
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Appendix B. Experimental instructions for the neutral treatment  
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment, you can earn money. 
What you earn will depend upon your decision, and on the decision of another 
participant in the room. No data that you provide can be associated with your person; 
all data will be treated confidentially. Please follow the instructions carefully. These 
instructions explain how the experiment works. If any of the instructions are unclear, or 
if you have any questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you. Please do not 
communicate with any other participant until the experiment is over. 
 
You will be randomly matched with one of the other participants (I call him/her your 
co-participant). Note that you will not learn who your co-participant is, neither during 
nor after the session. Likewise, your co-participant will not learn who you are. You will 
receive £6. Your co-participant will also receive £6. 
 
You will be choosing between two options: Option A and Option B. Your co-participant 
will make the same decision at the same time. In other words, he/she will be choosing 
between two options: Option A and Option B.  
 
If you choose Option A and your co-participant chooses Option A, then you will earn 
£2.40 and your co-participant will earn £2.40. If you choose Option A and your co-
participant chooses Option B, then you will earn £5.40 and your co-participant will earn 
£3. If you choose Option B and your co-participant chooses Option A, then you will earn 
£3 and your co-participant will earn £5.40. If you choose Option B and your co-
participant chooses Option B, then you will earn £6 and your co-participant will earn £6.  
 
After you make a decision, you will not interact with your co-participant again in today's 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your money earnings, and £2 
for showing up. Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand. 
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Appendix C. Background of the participants  
 
 
Table 3. Percentage of male and female subjects by treatment
 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of subjects by country 
 
 
 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
2S-Costly (T1) 12 60.00 8 40.00
2S-Costless (T2) 8 40.00 12 60.00
2S-Benefit (T3) 12 60.00 8 40.00
1S-Benefit (T4) 24 60.00 16 40.00
Total 56 56.00 44 44.00
Treatment
Female Male
Country Frequency Percent
Austria 1 1.00
China 38 38.00
Cyprus 1 1.00
Hong Kong 5 5.00
India 1 1.00
Japan 1 1.00
Korea, Republic of 1 1.00
Malaysia 2 2.00
Mauritius 1 1.00
Netherlands 1 1.00
Nigeria 3 3.00
Phillipines 1 1.00
Pakistan 1 1.00
Sri Lanka 1 1.00
Taiwan 1 1.00
Turkey 1 1.00
UK 33 33.00
United States 1 1.00
Vietnam 6 6.00
Total 100 100.00
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Table 5. Percentage of subjects by field of study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Field of Study Frequency Percent
Accounting and Finance 9 9.00
Actuarial Sciences 4 4.00
Biology 1 1.00
Business and Management 17 17.00
Chemistry 1 1.00
Computer Sciences 1 1.00
Creative Writing 2 2.00
Economics 21 21.00
Education 2 2.00
Engineering 1 1.00
Environmental Sciences 6 6.00
Geophysics 1 1.00
History 4 4.00
Human Resources 1 1.00
International Development 7 7.00
Journalism 1 1.00
Languages 1 1.00
Law 3 3.00
Marketing 1 1.00
Mathematics 2 2.00
Media 4 4.00
Medicine 2 2.00
Meteorology & Oceanography 1 1.00
Music 1 1.00
Natural Science 1 1.00
Pharmacy 1 1.00
Politics 2 2.00
Social Science 1 1.00
Statistics 1 1.00
Total 100 100.00
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for age by treatment 
 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for experimental earnings by treatment 
 
 
 
  
Treatment Observations
Mean Median S.D Min Max
2S-Costly (T1) 20 21.15 22.00 1.93 18 24
2S-Costless (T2) 20 23.20 21.50 4.84 19 39
2S-Benefit (T3) 20 23.05 22.00 4.42 18 35
1S-Benefit (T4) 40 22.10 22.50 2.25 18 27
Total 100 22.32 22.00 3.40 18 39
Age (years)
Treatment Observations
Mean Median S.D Min Max
2S-Costly (T1) 20 8.00 8.00 0.00 8.00 8.00
2S-Costless (T2) 20 7.70 8.00 0.92 5.00 8.00
2S-Benefit (T3) 20 6.92 8.00 1.56 5.00 8.60
1S-Benefit (T4) 40 7.40 8.00 1.43 5.00 8.60
Total 100 7.48 8.00 1.25 5.00 8.60
Note: Experimental earnings include the participation fee of £2
                    Experimental Earnings (in British Pounds)
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Appendix D. Background of the participants in the neutral treatment 
 
 
Table 8. Percentage of subjects by gender 
 
 
 
Table 9. Percentage of subjects by country 
 
 
 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for age and experimental earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender Frequency Percent
Female 19 63.33
Male 11 36.67
Total 30 100.00
Country Frequency Percent
China 12 40.00
Kenya 1 3.33
Korea, Republic of 1 3.33
Saudi Arabia 1 3.33
Taiwan 1 3.33
UK 13 43.33
United States 1 3.33
Total 30 100.00
Observations Mean Median S.D Min Max
Age (years) 30 23.67 23 6.79 18 57
Earnings (£) 30 7.80 8 0.76 5 8
Note: Experimental earnings include the participation fee of £2
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Table 11. Percentage of subjects by field of study 
 
 
 
  
Field of Study Frequency Percent
Accounting and Finance 1 3.33
Actuarial Sciences 1 3.33
Brand Leadership 2 6.67
Business and Management 4 13.33
Creative Writing 1 3.33
Economics 9 30.00
Education 1 3.33
Environmental Sciences 2 6.67
Geophysics 1 3.33
Human Resources 1 3.33
International Development 1 3.33
Law 1 3.33
Mathematics 1 3.33
Media 2 6.67
Medicine 1 3.33
Politics 1 3.33
Total 30 100.00
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Appendix E. Post-experimental questionnaire (all treatments) 
 
Figure 6. Post experimental questionnaire’s screens
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Appendix F. Gender differences in antisocial behaviour 
 
In this section, I examine the data to test for gender differences in antisocial behaviour. 
This analysis is motivated by the experimental evidence, which suggest that gender is 
an important determinant of a variety of economic and strategic decisions (Eckel and 
Grossman, 1998; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and on subjects’ beliefs about the altruistic 
behaviour of men and women (Aguiar et al, 2009). 
 
There are only a few experimental economics studies dealing with gender differences in 
antisocial behaviour.  Abbink and Hermann (2011) and Kessler et al (2012) found no 
evidence for gender effects in antisocial behaviour, however, in a non-experimental 
study, Ghiglieri (1999) showed evidence that males are far more aggressive than females. 
 
Table 12 and Figure 7. Destruction choices across gender and treatment show the 
percentage of male and female subjects who chose to reduce their co-participant’s 
earnings by treatment. Overall, 26 percent of males chose to reduce their co-participant’s 
earnings and 27 percent of females chose to reduce their co-participant’s earnings. There 
was not statistically significant difference across gender.  
 
Within each treatment, I did not find any gender effect. In 2S-Costly, when destruction 
is costly, no one chose to reduce the other partner’s earnings. In 2S-Costless, males were 
more likely to reduce their co-participant’s earnings than females. The difference, 
however, was not statistically significant. In 2S-Benefit, more females chose to reduce 
their co-participant’s earnings than males. The difference however was not statistically 
significant. Therefore, male and female subjects acted remarkably similarly with respect 
to the decision to reduce their co-participant’s earnings.  
 
Across treatments, more males were willing to decrease their co-participant’s earning 
when destruction was costly, and even more when they earned from destruction. In 
contrast, more women were willing to decrease their co-participant’s earning when they 
earned from destruction.  
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Table 12. Fraction of subjects who chose to reduce by treatment and gender 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Destruction choices across gender and treatment 
 
 
Treatments Male Female
Fisher's exact (Male vs. 
Female)
Total 0.26 0.27 No difference (p=0.565)
2S-Costly (T1) 0.00 0.00 -
2S-Costless (T2) 0.17 0.00 No difference (p=0.347)
2S-Benefit (T3) 0.38 0.50 No difference (p=0.465)
1S-Benefit (T4) 0.57 0.46 No difference (p=0.500)
Fisher's exact
Difference at 5% 
(p=0.048)
Difference at 1% 
(p=0.002)
-
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Appendix G. Cultural differences in antisocial behaviour 
 
The experiment in this chapter was conducted in the United Kingdom with subjects with 
different cultural backgrounds. In this section, I examine the data to test for cultural 
differences in antisocial behaviour. Previous experimental evidence showed that 
economic decisions might also vary across cultures (e.g. Gächter and Herrmann, 2009).  
 
Table 13 and Figure 8 display the fraction of UK and non-UK subjects who chose to 
reduce their co-participant’s earnings in each treatment. Overall, non-UK subjects are 
more likely to reduce their co-participant’s earnings than UK subjects are.  
 
I found differences between UK and non-UK students in antisocial behaviour in 1S-
Benefit. Non-UK subjects displayed statistically significantly higher rates of destruction 
than UK subjects did (1-sided Fisher’s test, p = 0.085).  Future research may wish to 
explore the extent to which these findings hold across other different nationalities. 
 
Table 13. Fraction of subjects who chose to reduce by treatment and nationality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatments UK student non-UK student
Fisher's exact                 
(UK vs. non-UK student)
Total 0.15 0.32
Different at 10% 
(p=0.080)
2S-Costly (T1) 0.00 0.00 -
2S-Costless (T2) 0.11 0.091
No difference      
(p=0.711)
2S-Benefit (T3) 0.20 0.53
No difference     
(p=0.221)
1S-Benefit (T4) 0.25 0.67
Different at 10% 
(p=0.085)
Fisher's exact             
No difference 
(p=0.733)
Different at 1% 
(p=0.000)
-
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Figure 8. Destruction choices across culture and treatment 
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Appendix H. Data 
 
Table 14. Data for 2S-Costly treatment 
 
 
 
Table 15. Data for 2S-Costless treatment 
 
 
 
 
Subject Session 1 Subject Session 2
1 0 1 0
2 0 2 0
3 0 3 0
4 0 4 0
5 0 5 0
6 0 6 0
7 0 7 0
8 0 8 0
9 0 9 0
10 0 10 0
2S-Costly treatment (T1)
Note: 1 = Subject chooses to reduce the other
subject's earnings; 0 = Subject chooses to do not
reduce the other subject's earnings.
Subject Session 1 Subject Session 2
1 1 1 0
2 0 2 1
3 0 3 0
4 0 4 0
5 0 5 0
6 0 6 0
7 0 7 0
8 0 8 0
9 0 9 0
10 0 10 0
2S-Costless treatment (T2)
Note: 1 = Subject chooses to reduce the other
subject's earnings; 0 = Subject chooses to do not
reduce the other subject's earnings.
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Table 16. Data for 2S-Benefit treatment 
 
 
 
Table 17. Data for 1S-Benefit treatment 
 
  
Subject Session 1 Subject Session 2
1 1 1 1
2 0 2 0
3 1 3 0
4 0 4 1
5 0 5 1
6 0 6 0
7 1 7 1
8 0 8 1
9 0 9 0
10 0 10 1
2S-Benefit treatment (T3)
Note: 1 = Subject chooses to reduce the other
subject's earnings; 0 = Subject chooses to do not
reduce the other subject's earnings.
Subject Session 1 Subject Session 2 Subject Session 3 Subject Session 4
1 - 1 - 1 1 1 -
2 - 2 0 2 - 2 0
3 - 3 1 3 - 3 -
4 0 4 1 4 - 4 0
5 - 5 - 5 - 5 0
6 1 6 - 6 0 6 1
7 - 7 - 7 - 7 0
8 0 8 - 8 1 8 -
9 1 9 0 9 0 9 -
10 0 10 1 10 1 10 -
1S-Benefit treatment (T4)
Note: `-' indicates that the subject was Player 2. Hence, no decision was made.  1 = Subject chooses to reduce 
the other subject's earnings; 0 = Subject chooses to do not reduce the other subject's earnings.
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Table 18. Data for Neutral treatment 
 
 
  
Subject Session 1 Subject Session 2 Subject Session 3
1 B 1 B 1 B
2 B 2 B 2 A
3 B 3 B 3 B
4 B 4 B 4 B
5 B 5 B 5 B
6 B 6 B 6 B
7 B 7 B 7 B
8 B 8 B 8 A
9 B 9 B 9 B
10 B 10 B 10 B
Neutral treatment
Note: A indicates subject chooses Option A ("reduce the other subjects's
earnings"); B indicates subject chooses Option B ("do not reduce the other
subject's earnings"). 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Effects of the Relative Price and Monetary Stakes 
on the Dictator’s Behaviour in Giving, Taking and 
Burning 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Dictator games have been used as a vehicle for studying unselfish behaviour. In a 
standard Dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994) two subjects are 
randomly matched and assigned either to the role of Dictator or Recipient. The Dictator 
receives an endowment and chooses the amount of his/her endowment to transfer to 
the Recipient. The Recipient must accept the division. The sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the Dictator game is for the Dictator to transfer zero. 
 
A large body of research has shown that many Dictators are willing to allocate a non-
trivial amount of money to the Recipient.17 Several possible explanations have been 
offered to explain this behaviour. For instance, models of inequality aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), altruism (Andreoni and Miller 2002) and 
Rawlsian `social welfare’ preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002).  
 
In a seminal paper, Andreoni and Miller (2002, earlier version 1998) introduced modified 
Dictator games. Subjects played a series of Dictator games where the amount to divide 
and the relative price of giving varied across games. Andreoni and Miller (2002) found 
that altruism is rational. Moreover, there is substantial heterogeneity across subjects: 
                                                          
17 See Camerer (2011), Guala and Mittone (2010), and Engel (2011) for excellent surveys on experimental 
evidence. 
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some dictators do leave nothing, but others give away as much as 50% of the pie.18 In 
this experiment, altruism was highly sensitive to the price of giving.19 
 
More recently, researchers (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen, 2013) have showed that 
the introduction of additional taking options in a dictator game decreased the amount 
transferred to the Recipient. For instance, Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998), List 
(2007), and Bardsley (2008) showed that Dictators are less willing to share money when 
the choice set also includes the option to take money.20  This finding holds, even though 
there is no-uncertainty about the origin of the endowment (Cappelen et al. 2013). This 
evidence is not consistent with previous models of social preferences.21 Possible 
explanations for this behaviour include experimenter demand effect (Oechssler, 2010; 
Zizzo, 2010), procedural preferences (Chlaß and Moffatt, 2012), social norms (Krupka 
and Weber, 2013), and context-dependence (Schotter et al., 1996). 
 
This chapter explores the effects of the relative price and monetary stakes on the 
Dictators’ decision in three different contexts. More specifically, I ask whether and to 
what extent Dictators are willing to transfer, take, and burn money, even at cost to 
                                                          
18 A series of experimental studies has employed Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) game. Fisman et al (2007) 
allowed for non-linear budget constraints, and analysed three-person dictator games. Andreoni and 
Vesterlund (2001), and Visser and Roelofs (2011) investigated the demand for altruism by gender. Harrison 
and Johnson (2006) examined whether altruism depends upon who is specified as the residual claimant.   
19 Eckel and Grossmann (1998) showed that the demand for fairness was elastic for women, but inelastic for 
men. The effect of the monetary stakes on the amount transferred has also been investigated. For instance, 
Telser (1993) argued that if the monetary stake raises, the amount offered decreases because the price of 
fairness increases. Hoffman et al. (1996), however, did not find such an effect. Brañas-Garza (2006) found 
that if the Dictator has information about the Recipient’s wealth, the amount transferred increases.  
20 In addition, Engel (2011) ran a meta-analysis and found no effect of `taking’ in dictators’ allocations. On 
the contrary, Zhang and Ortmann (2014) used Engel (2011)’s data and found that take options have negative 
and significant effect on giving.  
21 In a similar vein, other experimental studies showed significant behavioural changes in Dictator games. 
For instance, Dana et al. (2006), Broberg et al (2007) and Lazear et al (2012) showed that Dictators are willing 
to sacrifice their own payoffs to avoid an opportunity to be generous. Furthermore, Dana et al. (2007) 
revealed that when Dictators are given the opportunity to remain ignorant of how their choices affect others, 
many altruistic Dictators revert to selfish choices.  
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themselves, and how the individuals’ decisions in these situations depend on the initial 
endowment and the relative price.22 
 
The experimental set up employed variants of the Dictator game. Subjects were 
randomly divided into two groups. Half were assigned to the role of Dictator and the 
other half to the role of Recipient. Both Dictators and Recipients received an initial 
endowment. Roles remained fixed throughout the whole experiment. Each Dictator 
played in eighteen scenarios. For each Dictator, scenarios were shown in random order. 
In each scenario, Dictators were required to allocate a `self’ and `other’ payoff. The 
relative price or the trade-off between own payoff and Recipient’s payoff, as well as the 
Dictator’s initial endowment, varied across decisions.23 Furthermore, Dictators made 
decisions in three separate contexts. Dictators can increase the Recipient’s payoff by 
decreasing their own payoff (giving), decrease the Recipient’s payoff by increasing his 
own payoff (taking), or decrease the Recipient’s payoff by decreasing their own payoff 
(burning). Dictators did not received any feedback between decisions. After making 
their decisions, one of the games was randomly chosen and the payoffs were 
implemented in accordance with the decision made in the chosen game. 
 
The data showed that approximately 68% of our Dictators made stable choices across 
giving and 48% of Dictators made stable choices across taking. In addition, the effect of 
the monetary stake, however, depends on the experimental context. The monetary stake 
effect is strong and significant on giving, but weak and insignificant on taking. In the 
case of burning, the picture is ambiguous: an increase in the price of burning, not 
necessarily decreased burning; and a decrease in the Dictator’s endowment, no 
necessarily encouraged burning as posited by inequality aversion models. 
 
                                                          
22 Experimental evidence also shows that a significant proportion of subjects are willing to harm others, even 
though it is costly to themselves (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink and Herrmann, 
2011; Sadrieh and Schröder, 2017).  
23 In this chapter, the set of payoff possibilities available to the Dictator changed across tasks, thus the 
experiment was not designed to test for framing effects. See Cookson (2008) for framing effects in public 
goods and Abbink et al (2011) for framing effects in antisocial preferences. 
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Similar to what has been reported by Fehr and Smith (1999), Dictators appear to be 
primarily concerned with inequality aversion in giving, but this concern disappears 
when the Dictator can take money from the Recipient to themselves. I interpret this result 
as implying that the experimental context has an important effect on the variation of the 
Dictator’s endowment. The context changed from dividing the Dictator’s endowment to 
dividing the Recipient’s endowment.  
 
This study contributes to the experimental literature in two important aspects. First, I 
extend the analysis of the choice set effect by introducing burning options. Existing 
literature on the choice set rarely confront subjects with burning decisions.24 Thus, this 
study provides a broad picture of individuals’ decisions. Second, in terms of the analysis 
of the choice set at individual level, most existing research on this area does not separate 
the effect of ` give’ and ` take’ options.25 This study isolate the effect of the variation of the 
choice set.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design and the procedures. Section 4 
presents the theoretical predictions based on the models of social preferences. Section 5 
presents the experimental results. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.  
 
2. Related literature 
 
This study is related to an influential line of research that examines other-regarding 
preferences across different contexts, but rely on individual-level analysis. For instance, 
Suvoy (2003) implemented modified dictator games to investigate framing effects in 
social preferences. In one frame, the Dictator chooses how much to transfer to the 
                                                          
24 In one session, Andreoni and Miller (2002) elicited antisocial preferences, but subjects chose the value of 
a token for herself and for another player.  
25 Bardsley (2008) ran a third experiment where he separate giving and taking. He found that the average 
Recipient’s payoff decreased when Dictators only take. However, he used a between-subject design. Zizzo 
(2004) allowed subjects to burn money or take money from another player. He found that when stealing was 
allowed burning rates decreased significantly compared to burning alone. In the stealing condition, subjects 
were rewarded for their actions.  
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Recipient. In the other frame, the Dictator chooses how much to take from the Recipient’s 
endowment. Suvoy (2003) found no framing effects on allocations. In the current study, 
I do not study framing effects, so I varied the payoffs possibilities across choice sets.   
 
Brosig et al (2007) used modified dictator games to investigate the consistency of 
individual behaviour. Dictators made decision in two frames. In one frame, Dictators 
could increase the Recipient’s payoff by decreasing their own payoff. In another frame, 
Dictators could increase their own payoff by decreasing the Recipient’s payoffs. Brosig 
et al. (2007) found that social preferences were not stable across frames nor across time, 
but behaviour was stable across the same games. In the current study, Dictators played 
a series of games only once. I also randomised the sequence of the games at individual 
level. 
 
Heinrich et al (2009) used modified dictator games to investigate framing effects. 
Dictators played in two different frames. The relative price of giving varies across games. 
Dictators chose a payoff distribution, while the Recipients made choices by selecting a 
game. Heinrich et al (2009) found that Dictators did not respond to the price of giving 
neither in the frame of taking nor in the frame of giving, but they were affected by 
whether the Recipient chose the game. The main difference between Heinrich et al (2009) 
and the current study is that Heinrich et al (2009) used the strategy method and the 
sequence of the games was predetermined. 
 
Blanco et al (2011) used a within-subject design and examined other-regarding 
preferences across different contexts. Subjects played an ultimatum game, a dictator 
game, a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, and a public good game. Blanco et al (2011) 
found that that the inequality aversion model explained choices at the aggregate level, 
but performed less well at the individual level. In the current study, I used only modified 
dictator games. 
 
Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) used a within-subject design to investigate the role of role 
uncertainty in Dictator games. All subjects made decisions in 16 scenarios. In each 
scenario, Deciders chose among three actions: a selﬁsh action, an altruistic costly 
behaviour and a spiteful costly behaviour. The order of the options varied across games. 
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In one session, subjects knew whether they were Deciders or Receivers, whereas in 
another session, they did not have this information. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) found 
that altruistic choices were more frequent in role uncertainty than in role certainty, 
selfish choices were the same in both treatments, and spiteful choices were not relevant.  
 
Chlaß and Moffatt (2012) used a within-subject design, where the same subject played a 
Dictator giving, and a Dictator taking. They found that giving was lower when subjects 
played a Dictator taking compared to the case when subjects played a Dictator giving. 
However, subjects in the Dictator taking could also give money to the Recipient.  
 
Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2013) examined whether altruistic behaviour is affected by the 
belief on the altruistic behaviour of other dictators.  Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2013) found 
that subjects’ responses to information about other Dictators’ giving varied 
systematically across social preference types. Social information had little effect on 
‘selfish’ types and tended to affect those with interdependent preferences in the direction 
of fostering more selfishness. 
 
Jakiela (2013) implemented a within-subject design and examined responses to price 
changes in two frames. In one stage, Dictators performed a task to earn money. In 
another stage, both subjects chose how to divide the money. Jakiela (2013) found that 
changing the source of the budget set, changed preferences for altruism (subjects 
transferred more of their budget set in the taking frame than in the giving frame), but it 
did not change willingness to trade-off equity and efficiency. Jakiela (2013) did not 
separate Dictators and Recipients nor control for the subject’s initial endowment.  
 
Korenok et al (2014) examined whether no taking is equivalent to giving. Subjects played 
in nine scenarios. Depending on the scenario, subjects chose how much to give or to take. 
The amounts of Dictator’s endowment and the amount of the Recipient’s endowment 
that the Dictator may take varies across scenario. In all scenarios, the sum of final payoffs 
was $20. The minimum payoff to the Recipient varied across scenarios. Korenok et al 
(2014) found that giving was not equivalent to not taking: the average payoff to the 
Recipient increased with the introduction of the taking option. They suggested that the 
`cold prickle’ of taking was stronger than the `warm glow’ of giving.  
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Brandts el al (2015) examined the impact of the relative position and the price of 
sacrificing money. They ran an experiment using a binary version of the Dictator game. 
Subjects were given a list of 21 pairs of payoff vectors, and they had to choose one of the 
two payoff vectors in all 21 cases. In some cases, the Dictator increased the other’s payoff. 
In other cases, the Dictator decreased the other’s payoff.  The cost of increasing and 
decreasing varied across games. At the end of the experiment, one of the 21 payoff vector 
pairs was randomly chosen. Brandts el al (2015) found that subjects were influenced by 
the price of sacrificing money and by whether they chose from a strong or from a weak 
position. In these games, the initial endowment did not change. 
 
Zhang and Ortmann (2016) examined whether pro-social and anti-social behaviour was 
context-dependent. There were three different treatments.  In the baseline, subjects made 
decisions in a Dictator game and in a joy-of destruction game. In the other two 
treatments, subjects made decisions in a Dictator game with taking options and in a joy 
of destruction game with giving options. The amounts to take varied across treatments. 
Zhang and Ortmann (2016) found that fewer subjects chose to destroy money in the joy 
of destruction games when the choice set includes the option of adding money to 
Recipients’ endowment. The current study differs from this paper in that destruction 
choices were costly. I also separate contexts and randomised the order of the games. 
 
Sadrieh and Schröder (2016) examined the relationship between anti-social and pro-
social behaviour on an individual level in a money burning game. Each Dictator made 
two decisions: he/she decided how much to give and how much to destroy. Dictators 
could neither give nor destroy. After both decisions were made, a random draw 
determines which decision is payoff relevant for the Dictator and the Receiver. Sadrieh 
and Schröder (2016) found that within very similar games, individuals behaved both 
pro- and antisocially towards the same individuals, where the extent of giving was 
generally higher than the extent of destruction.  
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3. Experimental design and procedures 
 
The experimental design employed a series of variants of Dictator games. Subjects were 
randomly divided into two groups. Half were assigned to the role of Dictator and the 
other half to the role of Recipient. Both Dictators and Recipients received an initial 
endowment. Roles remained fixed throughout the whole experiment.  
 
Each dictator engaged in up to eighteen allocation decisions. Dictators were required to 
allocate a `self’ and `other’ payoff. The Dictator’s initial endowment varied across 
decisions. To isolate the effect of the choice set, Dictators made decisions in three 
separate contexts. Dictators can increase the Recipient’s payoff by decreasing their own 
payoff, decrease the Recipient’s payoff by increasing his own payoff, or decrease the 
Recipient’s payoff by decreasing their own payoff. The set of payoff possibilities 
available to the Dictator changed across tasks.  
 
After making their decisions, Dictators were matched with a Recipient. Only one of the 
eighteen decisions was randomly chosen for the final payoffs. I describe the 
experimental design in more detail below.26  
 
3.1. Dictator giving 
 
Dictators can transfer to the Recipient any amount of their own endowment in 
increments of 50 pence. (ED) is the Dictator’s endowment and (ER) is the Recipient’s 
endowment. The amount transferred g was multiplied by a transfer rate 𝑝. Hence, the 
Recipient earned g × p. The transfer rate and the Dictator’s initial endowment varied. 
The Dictator’s payoff and the Recipient’s payoff function, πD and πR, were respectively: 
 
πD = ED − g                                                                                                                              (1) 
πR = ER + g × p 
 
                                                          
26 It is noteworthy that the manipulation of the parameters for the relative price and the size of the Dictator’s 
endowment was identical across domains 
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The relative price of giving indicates the amount of money that the Dictator must give 
up in order to increase by one unit of money the Recipient’s payoff. Dictators made 
allocations in nine games. Table 1 shows a summary of the games. Consider for example 
Game 1, where the Dictator’s endowment is £3 and the Recipient’s endowment is £6. The 
transfer rate is two. If the Dictator chooses to transfer £1.5, the Dictator’s payoff is £1.5 
and the Recipient’s payoff is £9.27  
 
Table 1. Dictator games giving 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the payoff possibilities in each game. The X-axis shows the Dictator’s 
payoff and the Y-axis shows the Recipient’s payoff. The set of payoff possibilities 
differed across games. Each game represents a downward sloping `budget line’. These 
games are presented in random order to each Dictator.  
                                                          
27 In a standard dictator game, the dictator’s endowment is fixed and the relative price of giving, that is, the 
amount the dictator has to give up to increase by one unit the recipient’s payoff, is one. Thus, the recipient’s 
payoff is completely determined by the amount passed to the recipient 
Max Min Max Min
1 Giving 69 3 6 0.50 2 0.50 3.00 0.00 12.00 6.00
2 Giving 69 3 6 0.50 1 1.00 3.00 0.00 9.00 6.00
3 Giving 69 6 6 0.50 2 0.50 6.00 0.00 18.00 6.00
4 Giving 69 6 6 0.50 1 1.00 6.00 0.00 12.00 6.00
5 Giving 69 10 6 0.50 2 0.50 10.00 0.00 26.00 6.00
6 Giving 69 10 6 0.50 1 1.00 10.00 0.00 16.00 6.00
Dictator's 
endowment  
(£)
Recipient's 
endowment 
(£)
Minimum 
transfer (£)
Transfer 
rate
Relative price of 
giving
Game
Number of 
dictators
Domain
Dictator's payoff (£) Recipient's payoff (£)
Note: Dictator's payoffs and Recipient's payoffs do not include the show-up fee. 
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Figure 1. Payoffs available to the Dictator for each Dictator giving 
 
 
3.2. Dictator taking 
 
Dictators can take any amount from the Recipient’s endowment in increments of 50 
pence. (ED) is the Dictator’s endowment and (ER) is the Recipient’s endowment. The 
amount taken t was multiplied by a take rate h. Hence, the Dictator earned t × h. The 
take rate and the Dictator’s initial endowment varied. The Dictator’s payoff and the 
Recipient’s payoff functions, πD and πR, were respectively: 
 
πD = ED +  t × h                                                                                                                (2)  
πR = ER − t 
 
The relative price of taking indicates the amount of money that the Dictator must take 
from the Recipient to increase by one unit of money his/her own payoff. The inverse of 
the relative price of taking indicates the relative price of giving. Dictators made 
allocations in nine games. Table 2 shows a summary of the games. Consider for example 
Game 11, the Dictator’s endowment is £3, the Recipient’s endowment is £6, and the take 
rate is one. If the Dictator chooses to take £1.5, the Dictator’s payoff is £4.5 and the 
Recipient’s payoff is £4.5.  
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Table 2. Dictator games taking 
 
 
Figure 2 displays the payoff possibilities available to the Dictator for each game (in 
British pounds). The X-axis represents the Dictator’s payoff and the Y-axis represents the 
Recipient’s payoff. The Dictator chooses a payoff to self and a payoff to the Recipient 
along this line. These games are presented in random order to each Dictator.  
 
Figure 2. Payoffs available to the Dictator for each Dictator taking 
 
 
 
Max Min Max Min
7 Taking 69 3 6 0.50 1 1.00 9.00 3.00 6.00 0.00
8 Taking 69 3 6 0.50 2 0.50 15.00 3.00 6.00 0.00
9 Taking 69 6 6 0.50 1 1.00 12.00 6.00 6.00 0.00
10 Taking 69 6 6 0.50 2 0.50 18.00 6.00 6.00 0.00
11 Taking 69 10 6 0.50 1 1.00 16.00 10.00 6.00 0.00
12 Taking 69 10 6 0.50 2 0.50 22.00 10.00 6.00 0.00
Game Domain
Number of 
dictators
Recipient's 
endowment 
(£)
Minimum 
take (£)
Take rate
Relative price of 
taking
Dictator's payoff (£) Recipient's payoff (£)
Note: Dictator's payoffs and Recipient's payoffs do not include the show-up fee. 
Dictator's 
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3.3. Dictator burning 
 
Dictators can reduce (burn) any amount from the Recipient’s endowment in increments 
of 50 pence. (ED) is the Dictator’s endowment and (ER) is the Recipient’s endowment. 
The amount burnt b was multiplied by a burn rate 𝑞. Hence, the recipient lost b × q. The 
burn rate and the Dictator’s initial endowment varied. Burning also decreased the 
Dictator’s payoff. The Dictator’s payoff and the Recipient’s payoff functions, πD and πR, 
were respectively: 
 
πD = ED − b                                                                                                                                 (3) 
πR = ER − b × q 
 
The relative price of burning indicates the amount of money that the Dictator must give 
up in order to decrease by one unit of money the Recipient’s payoff. Dictators made 
allocations in nine games. Table 3 shows a summary of the games.  
 
Table 3. Dictator games burning
 
 
Figure 3 displays the payoff possibilities available to the Dictator for each game in the 
domain of burning. The X-axis represents the Dictator’s payoff and the Y-axis represents 
the Recipient’s payoff. Each set of payoff possibilities differs across games. Each game 
Max Min Max Min
13 Burning 69 3 6 0.50 2 0.50 3.00 0.00 6.00 0.00
14 Burning 69 3 6 0.50 0.5 2.00 3.00 0.00 6.00 4.50
15 Burning 69 6 6 0.50 2 0.50 6.00 3.00 6.00 0.00
16 Burning 69 6 6 0.50 0.5 2.00 6.00 0.00 6.00 3.00
17 Burning 69 10 6 0.50 2 0.50 10.00 7.00 6.00 0.00
18 Burning 69 10 6 0.50 0.5 2.00 10.00 4.00 6.00 1.00
Note: Dictator's payoffs and Recipient's payoffs do not include the show-up fee. 
Minimum 
burn (£)
Burn rate
Relative price of 
burning
Dictator's payoff (£) Recipient's payoff (£)
Game Domain
Number of 
dictators
Dictator's 
endowment  
(£)
Recipient's 
endowment 
(£)
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represents an upward sloping `budget line’. The Dictator chooses a payoff to self and a 
payoff to the Recipient along this line. These games are presented in random order to 
each Dictator.  
 
Figure 3. Payoffs available to the Dictator for each Dictator burning  
 
 
3.4. Procedures 
 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Science (CBESS) computerized laboratory at the University of East Anglia (UEA) 
between May and June 2014.28 The participants were undergraduate students recruited 
from a wide range of disciplines using the ORSEE on-line recruitment system (Greiner, 
2015). None of the subjects had previously participated in a similar experiment. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007).  
 
The experiment took place over seven experimental sessions, six with 20 subjects and 
one session with 18 subjects. In total, 138 subjects participated in the experiment. Each 
                                                          
28 Sessions 1 and 2 were run in May 2014, and sessions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were run in June 2014. 
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subject participated in only one session. All subjects received a participation fee of £3, 
regardless of their decisions. 
 
For each session, subjects were assembled in a single room. Upon arrival, subjects were 
randomly seated at visually separated computer terminals in order to avoid facial or 
verbal communication between subjects. Subjects were given printed instruction, a blank 
sheet of paper, a receipt form, and a calculator. A copy of these instructions can be found 
in this chapter’s Appendix A. Experimental instructions.  
 
The presentation of the experimental instructions was as neutral as possible avoiding 
terms such as `giving’, `taking’, `burning’, or `game’. The experimenter read the 
instructions aloud as the students followed along on their own computer’s screens. After 
reading the instructions, subjects were given an opportunity to ask questions. 
Communication between subjects was prohibited. The experimenter answered the 
questions about the experiment individually. 
 
Among the participants, 15 studied Economics and 7 studied Business and Management. 
The average age of the subjects was 23.42 years (Std. Dev. 5. 79, min 18 max 66). The 
percentage of women was 61.59%, and 38.41% of the subjects speak English as their first 
language. Appendix B. Background of the participants of this chapter provides the 
characteristics of the subjects.  
 
Before the experiment began, all subjects were required to answer a series of control 
questions to verify subjects’ understanding of the instructions. Four of the eight 
questions were intended to test whether subjects could correctly calculate payoffs.  
Subjects were encouraged to use their calculators and the blank paper to make any 
calculation. If a subject answered a question incorrectly or forgot to answer a question, 
a pop-up window came out on the subject's screen instructing the subject to revise 
her/his choice or complete the question. None of the subjects failed to answer all the 
required questions. Figure 4 shows the control questions’ screens. 
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Figure 4. Control questions’ screens
 
 
 
 
After all questions were answered correctly, subjects were randomly divided by the 
computer into two groups. Anonymity was preserved throughout the experiment. 
Players 1 did not learn who Players 2 were, neither during nor after the session. 
Likewise, Players 2 did not learn who Players 1 were. 
 
The computer presented to each Dictator the scenarios in random order. Player 2 never 
made any decision throughout the session, but they knew about the procedures in 
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advance.29 In each scenario, Dictators were asked to choose a payoff to self and a payoff 
to the recipient.  
 
Figure 5 shows a sample screenshot of one of the scenarios faced by a Dictator. In each 
scenario, Dictators had information about the recipient’s wealth.  In addition, Dictators 
were shown a list of different payoffs distributions associated to their decision. This 
made it easy for the Dictators to know the outcome of his/her decision. All payoff 
earnings were shown in British pounds. Dictators made their decisions by selecting one 
of the radio buttons. 
 
Figure 5. Dictator task’s screen for game 2
 
 
After making his decision, a pop up window came out on Player 1’s screen to confirm 
his/her decision. Once Player 1 confirmed his decision, the next scenario was shown and 
Player 1 was not able to go back to her previous decision. All decisions were to be made 
without any information on the decision of the other Dictators. 
 
Only when all participants had made their decisions in the eighteen games, the computer 
randomly paired one players in the first group with a player in the second group, then 
                                                          
29 Recipients were given a quiz to reduce the boredom recipients may face while waiting for dictators to 
make their choices.  
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the computer chose randomly one of games. The decision made by the Dictator in this 
game determined the final payoffs.30  
 
At the end of the experiment, all subjects were privately informed about the random 
chosen game and the relevant decision in that game. This information was shown on the 
subject’s screen. At no point were subjects told their partner’s payoffs nor other subjects’ 
earnings.  
 
I also asked subjects to complete a socio-demographic questionnaire, which had no 
influence on their payoffs. The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix C. Post-
experimental questionnaire at the end of the chapter. The questionnaire was designed 
to gather data on gender, field of study, country of origin, and language. Players also 
provided feedback on the experiment. The questionnaire was also computerized using 
z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).  
 
Subjects were called out individually to receive their payment in cash.  They left the 
room one at a time. The subjects were paid according to the payoffs in the randomly 
selected scenario. An experimental session lasted about an hour (including reading the 
instructions and filling out questionnaires). On average, a subject earned approximately 
was £6.59 (this amount does not include the participation fee).  
 
4. Theoretical predictions 
 
In this section, I present three models social preferences, which can be relevant to the 
experimental design in this study. The first model is altruism; the second model is 
spitefulness; and the third model is inequity aversion. I derive theoretical predictions.  
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Hey and Lee (2005) found no differences between subjects being paid for one randomly chosen decisions 
and paid for all the decisions.  
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4.1. Narrow self-interest  
 
Before introducing the models of social preferences, I present the narrow self-interest 
model, which will be used as a benchmark. The self-interest model is based on the 
assumption that individual i = 1, 2, . . n only cares about his/her own monetary payoff. 
Therefore, individual’s preferences can be represented by the following utility function: 
 
                                    U1 = π1                                                                           (1) 
 
where π1, indicates the monetary payoff to the Dictator. It follows from (1) that  
dU1
dπ1
 = 1. 
The higher the individual’s monetary payoff, the higher the individual’s utility. The 
model of self-interest makes the following propositions:   
 
Proposition 1: A self-interested Dictator will choose to transfer zero. 
 
An increase in the amount transfer to the Recipient will always decrease the Dictator’s 
payoff and, consequently, will decrease the Dictator’s utility. A rational self-interested 
Dictator who cares solely about his/her own monetary payoff will choose to transfer 
zero.  
 
Proposition 2: A self-interested Dictator will choose to take £6.  
  
An increase in the amount taken from the Recipient’s endowment will always increase 
the Dictator’s payoff and, consequently, will increase the Dictator’s utility. A rational 
self-interested Dictator who cares solely about his/her own monetary payoff will choose 
to take the maximum amount from the Recipient, which is £6. 
 
Proposition 3: A self-interested Dictator will choose to burn zero. 
 
Since burning is costly, an increase in the amount burnt from the Recipient’s endowment 
will always decrease the Dictator’s payoff and hence will decrease the Dictator’s utility. 
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A rational self-interested Dictator who cares solely about his/her own monetary payoff 
will therefore burn zero.   
 
4.2. Altruism 
 
The model of altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002, Andreoni 2010) is based on the 
assumption that individual i = 1, 2, . . n cares not only about his/her own monetary 
payoff, but also cares positively about the monetary payoff of the other. Therefore, in the 
two-individual version, an individual’s preferences can be represented by the following 
utility function: 
 
                             U1(π1, π2) = π1 + γ1π2               (2) 
 
where π1, indicates the monetary payoff to the Dictator; π2 indicates the monetary payoff 
to the Recipient; and γ1 is a parameter of altruism. It is assumed that 0 < γ1 ≤ 1.  The 
larger the parameter γ1, the more the Dictator cares about the monetary payoff to other.  
If γ1 = 1, the Dictator cares about the monetary payoff of other as much as he cares about 
his own monetary payoff. The model of altruism makes the following propositions:  
 
Proposition 4: An altruistic Dictator will choose to transfer the entire endowment if and only if 
the degree of altruism (𝛾1) exceeds the relative price of giving. However, if 𝛾1is lower than the 
relative price of giving, he will choose to transfer zero. 
 
An increase in the amount transferred to the Recipient will increase the Recipient’s 
monetary payoff and will decrease the Dictator’s monetary payoff.  Depending on the 
altruism parameter γ1, an altruistic Dictator will choose either to transfer zero or the 
entire endowment.  
If γ1 is greater than the relative price of giving, the monetary loss from transferring a 
positive amount of money to the Recipient will be relatively small to the degree of 
altruism. Therefore, an altruistic Dictator will always transfer the entire endowment.  
 
If γ1 is lower than the relative price of giving, the monetary loss from transferring a 
positive amount of money to the Recipient will be relatively high to the degree of 
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altruism. Therefore, an altruistic Dictator will always choose to transfer zero. If γ1 is 
equal to the relative price of giving, an altruistic Dictator will be indifferent between 
transferring zero and transferring the entire endowment.  
 
Proposition 5: An altruistic Dictator will choose to take zero if and only if the degree of altruism 
𝛾1 exceeds the relative price of giving. However, if 𝛾1is lower than the relative price of giving, 
he/she will choose to take £6. 
 
An increase in the amount taken will decrease the Recipient’s monetary payoff and will 
increase the Dictator’s monetary payoff.  Depending on the altruism parameter γ1, an 
altruistic Dictator will choose either to take zero or take everything.  
 
If γ1 is greater than the relative price of giving, the monetary gain from taking money 
will be relatively small to the degree of altruism. Therefore, an altruistic Dictator will 
always choose to take zero.  
 
If γ1 is smaller than the relative price of giving, an altruistic Dictator will always choose 
to take everything. If γ1 is equal to the relative price of giving, an altruistic Dictator will 
be indifferent between taking zero and taking everything.  
 
Proposition 6: An altruistic Dictator will choose to burn zero 
 
Burning is costly; hence, an increase in the amount burnt from the Recipient’s 
endowment will decrease the Dictator’s payoff and will decrease the Recipient’s 
endowment. Therefore, an altruistic Dictator will always choose to burn zero. 
 
4.3. Spitefulness 
 
The model of spitefulness is based on the assumption that individual i = 1, 2, . . n cares 
positively about his/her own monetary payoff, but dislikes being worse off than the 
other. If the monetary payoff of other is larger than his/her own monetary payoff, the 
individual will be willing to decrease other’s monetary payoff to reduce the 
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disadvantageous inequality. Therefore, in the two-individual version, an individual’s 
preferences can be represented by the following utility function: 
 
                         U1(π1, π2) = π1 − δ1 (π2 − π1)                                       (3) 
 
where π1, indicates the monetary payoff to the Dictator; π2 indicates the monetary payoff 
to the Recipient; and δ1 is a measure of spite. It is assumed that 0 < δ1 ≤ 1. The larger 
δ1, the more Dictator dislikes the disadvantageous inequality. If δ1 = 1, the Dictator 
cares about the disadvantageous inequality as much as he cares about his/her own 
monetary payoff. The model of spitefulness predicts that:  
 
Proposition 7: A spiteful Dictator will choose to transfer zero 
 
An increase in the amount given to the Recipient will decrease the Dictator’s monetary 
payoff and will increase the disadvantageous inequality. Therefore, a spiteful Dictator 
will always choose to give zero.   
 
Proposition 8: A spiteful Dictator will choose to take £6. 
 
An increase in the amount taken will increase the Dictator’s payoffs and will decrease 
the disadvantageous inequality. Therefore, a spiteful Dictator will always choose to take 
the maximum amount from the Recipient, which is £6. 
 
Proposition 9: A spiteful Dictator will choose to burn the entire Recipient’s endowment if and 
only if the degree of spite 𝛿1 is greater than the relative price of burning. Otherwise, he will choose 
to burn zero. 
 
Burning is costly. Thus, an increase in the amount burnt from the Recipient’s endowment 
will decrease the Recipient’s payoff and will decrease the Dictator’ payoff. Depending 
on the relative price of burning and the spite parameter δ1, a spiteful Dictator will, 
therefore, choose either to burn zero or to burn everything.  
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If δ1 is greater than the relative price of burning or δ1 is sufficiently high, the monetary 
loss from burning money to the Recipient will be relatively small to the degree of spite. 
Therefore, a spiteful Dictator will burn the entire Recipient’s endowment. If δ1 is lower 
than the relative price of burning, or δ1 is sufficiently low, the monetary loss from 
burning money to the Recipient will be relatively high in relation to the degree of spite. 
Therefore, a spiteful Dictator will burn zero. If δ1 is equal to the relative price of burning, 
the Dictator cares negatively about the other as much as he/she cares about his/her own 
monetary payoff. Therefore, a spiteful Dictator will be indifferent between burning zero 
and burning the entire Recipient’s endowment 
 
4.4. Inequality aversion 
 
The model of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) is based on the assumption 
that individual i = 1, 2, . . n cares positively about his/her own payoff and negatively 
about the difference between his/her own monetary payoff and the monetary payoff of 
the other individual. Thus, an individual who dislikes inequality may be willing to 
decrease his own monetary payoff to reach an egalitarian outcome. In the two-individual 
version, an individual’s preferences can be represented by the following utility 
function:31  
 
       U1(π1, π2) = π1 − α1 max{π2 −  π1, 0} −   β1 max {π1 −  π2, 0},                 (4) 
 
where π1, indicates the monetary payoff to the Dictator; π2, indicates the monetary 
payoff to the Recipient. The second term of equation (4) measures the loss of utility from 
disadvantageous inequality. The larger the parameter α1, the more the Dictator dislikes 
disadvantageous inequality. The third term of the equation (4) measures the loss of 
utility from advantageous inequality. The larger the parameter β1, the more the Dictator 
dislikes advantageous inequality. In this model, it is assumed that α1  ≥  β1. This 
assumption means that individual dislikes disadvantageous inequality more than 
advantageous inequality. It is also assumed that 0 ≤ β1 < 1. Individuals do not burn 
                                                          
31 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) developed a similar model of inequality version, but utility is no lineal. 
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their own money to reduce advantage inequality nor do they enjoy advantageous 
inequality. The model predicts that:  
 
Proposition 10: An inequity averse Dictator will choose to transfer zero if the value of the 
Dictator’s endowment is lower or equal than the Recipient’s endowment. However, if the value 
of the Dictator’s endowment is greater than the Recipient’s endowment, an inequity averse 
Dictator will give either zero or the amount that equals the payoffs. If 𝛽1 is high, an inequity 
averse Dictator will give the amount that makes payoffs equals. Otherwise, he will give zero.  
 
If the value of the Dictator’s endowment is lower or equal to the Recipient’s endowment, 
there will be a disadvantageous inequality. An increase in the amount given will increase 
the Recipient’s payoff and will decrease the Dictator’s payoff. Disadvantageous 
inequality will increase. An inequity averse Dictator will, therefore, choose to give zero.  
 
Inequality aversion implies that the optimal amount transferred exceeds zero whenever 
the Dictator’s endowment exceeds the Recipient’s, and that the optimal amount 
transferred falls to zero when the two endowments are equal. 
 
If the value of the Dictator’s endowment is greater than the Recipient’s endowment, 
there will be advantage inequality. An increase in the amount given will increase the 
Recipient’s payoff and will decrease the Dictator’s payoff. Advantageous inequality will 
decrease. The amount given will depend on the parameter β1, an inequity averse 
Dictator will, therefore, choose either to give zero or to give the amount that equals the 
monetary payoffs.  
 
If β1 is sufficiently high, the psychological loss of being in an advantage position will be 
greater than the monetary loss from transferring money to the Recipient, the Dictator 
will decrease his/her monetary payoff to achieve a more equal outcome. The Dictator 
will, therefore, choose to give the amount that equal payoffs. Otherwise, Dictator will 
give zero. 
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If  β1 is equal, the Dictator cares about advantageous inequality as much as he cares 
about his own monetary payoff. Therefore, an altruistic Dictator will be indifferent 
between giving zero and giving the amount that equals payoffs. 
 
Proposition 11: An inequity averse Dictator will choose to take everything if the value of the 
Recipient’s endowment is lower or equal than the Dictator’s endowment (advantageous 
inequality). If the value of the Recipient’s endowment is greater than the Dictator’s endowment 
(disadvantageous inequality), depending on 𝛽1, an inequity averse Dictator either will take £6 or 
will take the amount that makes payoffs equals.  
 
In the taking domain, if the value of the Recipient’s endowment is higher or equal than 
the Dictator’s endowment (disadvantageous inequality), an increase in the amount taken 
from the Recipient’s endowment will decrease the Recipient’s payoff and will decrease 
the disadvantageous inequality. Depending on the parameter β1, an inequity averse 
Dictator will, therefore, choose either to take everything or take the amount that equals 
payoffs. 
 
If β1 is sufficiently high, the psychological loss of being in a disadvantage position will 
be greater than the monetary loss from taken money from the Recipient, the Dictator will 
increase his monetary payoff to achieve more equal outcome. Therefore, a Dictator will 
choose to take the amount that equal payoffs. Otherwise, a Dictator will choose to take 
everything. 
 
If  β1 is equal, the Dictator cares about disadvantageous inequality as much as he cares 
about his own monetary payoff. Therefore, an inequity averse Dictator will be indifferent 
between taking everything and taking the amount that equals payoffs. 
 
If the value of the Recipient’s endowment is lower than the Dictator’s endowment 
(advantageous inequality), an increase in the amount taken from the Recipient’s 
endowment will decrease the Recipient’s payoff and will increase the Dictator’s payoff 
and will decrease the disadvantageous inequality. Depending on the parameter β1, an 
inequity averse Dictator will, therefore, choose either to take everything or take the 
amount that equals payoffs. If β1 is sufficiently large, the Dictator will choose to take the 
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amount that equals payoffs. Otherwise, the Dictator will choose to take the maximum 
amount, which is £6. 
 
Proposition 12: A Dictator with inequality aversion will choose to burn zero, if the value of the 
Dictator’s endowment is greater or equal than the value of the Recipient’s endowment. If the 
value of the Dictator’s endowment is lower than the value of the Recipient’s endowment, 
depending on 𝛽1, a Dictator with inequality aversion either will burn £6 or will burn that makes 
payoffs equals.  
 
In the burning domain if the value of the Recipient’s endowment is higher than the value 
of the Dictator’s endowment (disadvantageous inequality), an increase in the amount 
burnt from the Recipient’s endowment will decrease the Recipient’s payoff. Because 
burning is costly, it will also decrease the Dictator’s payoff and will increase 
disadvantageous inequality. Therefore, the Dictator will burn zero. 
 
If the value of the Recipient’s endowment is lower than the value of the Dictator’s 
endowment (advantageous inequality), an increase in the amount burnt from the 
Recipient’s endowment will decrease the Recipient’s payoff.  
 
Because burning is costly, it will also decrease the Dictator’s payoff and will increase 
advantageous inequality. Depending on β1 the Dictator either will burn the maximum 
amount from the Recipient or will burn the amount that makes payoffs equals. If β1 is 
sufficiently large, the Dictator will, therefore, choose to burn the amount that equals 
payoffs. Otherwise, the Dictator will choose to burn the maximum amount, which is £6. 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Description of the data 
 
Figure 6 shows a histogram of the amount transferred to the Recipient. In total, I had 414 
independent observations. The distribution was right-skewed. Dictators transferred 
zero in 88% of the cases, and £1 in 5% of the cases. In 0.2% of the cases, the amount 
transferred was £10.  
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On average, Dictators transferred 21 pence (approximately 4% of their endowment) and 
the corresponding median was zero. The amount of money transferred is significantly 
greater than zero (z=5.5574, p=0.0000). The average Dictator’s payoff was £6.12, while 
the Recipient’s payoff was £6.32.32  
 
The difference between the Dictator’s payoff and the Recipient’s payoff was not 
statistically significant (Wilcoxon test, z=-1.279, p=0.2009). The standard deviation was 
£0.76. The maximum amount transferred was £10. 
 
Figure 6. Histogram of the amount transferred (n=414) 
 
 
Moving on to the dictator games taking, the behavior of the Dictators looks quite 
different if we compare the Dictators’ behaviour across giving and taking. Figure 7 
shows a histogram of the amount taken from the Recipient’s endowment. In sum, I had 
414 independent observations. The distribution was left-skewed. There is more 
behaviour variability in the dictator games taking than in the dictator games giving. 
Dictators took £6 in 60% of the cases and zero in 8% of the cases. In 3% of the cases, 
Dictators took half of the Recipient’s endowment. The percentage of amount left to the 
Recipient increases above the amount transferred. 
                                                          
32 Note that the average payoffs do not include the £3 participation fee. The data from the experiment can 
be found in Appendix E of this chapter. 
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Dictators on average took £4.69 (approximately 78% of the recipient’s endowment) and 
the corresponding median was six. As a result, the average Dictator’s payoff was £13.40 
whereas the average Recipient’s payoff was £1.31. The difference between the Dictator’s 
payoff and the Recipient’s payoff was statistically significant (Wilcoxon test, z=-17.537, 
p=0.0000). The standard deviation was £2.03. The maximum amount taken was £6 
(where dictators took the entire recipient’s endowment) and the minimum was zero. 
 
Figure 7. Histogram of the amount taken (n=414) 
 
 
Figure 8 shows a histogram of the amount burnt from the Recipient’s endowment. In 
sum, I had 414 independent observations. Dictators burnt zero in 80% of the cases, and 
never burnt more than half of the Recipient’s endowment. In 0.2% of the cases, Dictators 
burnt half of the endowment. 
 
Dictators burnt on average 5 pence (0.8% of the recipient’s endowment) and the 
corresponding median was zero. As a result, the average Recipient’s payoff was £5.90, 
while the average Dictator’s payoff was £6.27. The difference between the Dictator’s 
payoff and the Recipient’s payoff was not statistically significant (Wilcoxon test, z=-
4.922, p=0.0000). The standard deviation was 33 pence and the maximum amount burnt 
was £5. 
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Figure 8. Histogram of the amount burnt (n=414) 
 
 
5.2. Comparison across games 
 
Table 4 shows the average amount transferred to the Recipient disaggregated by game. 
Dictators transferred on average 5 pence in Game 1, 3 pence in Game 2, 17 pence in Game 
3, 11 pence in Game 4, 43 pence in Game 5, and 47 pence in Game 6. A non-parametric 
test suggests that the difference between average amounts transferred across games was 
significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2(5)=28.596, p=0.0001). Hence, the average amount 
transferred changed across games (there is some variation in the amounts transferred to 
the Recipient).  
 
The amount transferred rises as the Dictator’s endowment increases. This evidence 
suggest that giving is a `normal good’. The Spearman non-parametric correlation 
coefficient between the amount transferred and the Dictator’s endowment was 0.255 and 
significant at the 1%level (p=0.000).  On the other hand, the Recipient’s payoff falls as 
the price of giving increases. The Spearman non-parametric correlation coefficient 
between the amount transferred and relative price of giving was −0.041, but not 
significant (p=0.410). 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics: amount transferred to the Recipient (£) 
Game Observations Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
1 69 0.05 0.00 0.27 0.00 2.00 
2 69 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 
3 69 0.17 0.00 0.50 0.00 3.00 
4 69 0.11 0.00 0.42 0.00 3.00 
5 69 0.43 0.00 1.02 0.00 7.00 
6 69 0.47 0.00 1.35 0.00 10.00 
Total 414 0.21 0.00 0.76 0.00 10.00 
 
 
Table 5 shows the average amount taken from the Recipient disaggregated by game. 
Dictators took on average £4.97 in Game 7, £4.87 in Game 8, £4.49 in Game 9, £4.78 in 
Game 10, £4.39 in Game 11, and £4.63 in Game 12. A non-parametric test suggests that 
the difference between average amounts taken across games was not significant 
(Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2(5)=2.511, p=0.7749). There is a lot of variation in the amounts 
taken from the Recipient.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics: amount taken from the Recipient (£) 
Game Observations Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
7 69 4.97 6.00 1.58 0.00 6.00 
8 69 4.87 6.00 1.83 0.00 6.00 
9 69 4.49 6.00 2.25 0.00 6.00 
10 69 4.78 6.00 2.03 0.00 6.00 
11 69 4.39 6.00 2.29 0.00 6.00 
12 69 4.63 6.00 2.13 0.00 6.00 
Total 414 4.69 6.00 2.03 0.00 6.00 
 
 
Table 6 shows the average amount burnt from the Recipient disaggregated by game. 
Dictators burnt on average 8 pence in Game 13, 3 pence in Game 14, 1 pence in Game 15, 
1 pence in Game 16, 14 pence in Game 17, and 9 pence in Game 18. A non-parametric 
test suggests that the difference between average amounts burnt across games was not 
significant (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2(5)=4.418, p=0.4909).  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics: amount burnt from the Recipient (£) 
 
Game Observations Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max 
13 69 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.00 3.00 
14 69 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.50 
15 69 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.50 
16 69 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.50 
17 69 0.14 0.00 0.53 0.00 3.00 
18 69 0.09 0.00 0.61 0.00 5.00 
Total 414 0.06 0.00 0.38 0.00 5.00 
 
 
To investigate more formally the proportion of Dictators transferring a positive amount 
to the Recipient, I plot the distribution of the amount transferred by game in Figure 9. 
Histogram of the amount transferred by game (n=69 in each game) The proportion of 
Dictators who transferred a positive amount to the Recipient turned out to be 
significantly different across games (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.000). Many Dictators chose 
to transfer zero.  
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Figure 9. Histogram of the amount transferred by game (n=69 in each game)  
 
 
Figure 10 depicts graphically the distribution of the amount taken for each game. The 
proportion of Dictators taking £6 across games turned out to be significantly different 
across games (Pearson χ2(55) = 105.8825, p = 0.000). The Spearman non-parametric 
correlation coefficient between the amount taken and the Dictator’s endowment was -
0.049 and not significant (p=0.316). Likewise, the Spearman non-parametric correlation 
coefficient between the amount taken and relative price of taking was −0.059 and not 
significant (p=0.232). Many Dictators chose to take the maximum amount of £6. 
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Figure 10. Histogram of the amount taken by game (n=69 in each game) 
 
 
Figure 11 depicts graphically the distribution of the amount burnt for each game. The 
differences in the proportion of Dictators burning £0 across games were not statistically 
significant (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.906). It is difficult to depict a clear-cut pattern 
between amount burnt and the Dictator’s initial endowment. The Spearman non-
parametric correlation coefficient between amount burnt and the Dictator’s endowment 
was 0.043 and not significant (p=0.381). Likewise, the Spearman non-parametric 
correlation coefficient between amount burnt and relative price of burning was −0.058 
and not significant (p=0.237). Many Dictators chose to burn zero. There is very little 
variation in the amounts burnt from the Recipient’s endowment.  
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Figure 11. Histogram of the amount burnt by game (n=69 in each game) 
 
 
5.3. Regression analysis 
 
To examine the relative price effect and the effect of the size of the Dictator’s endowment, 
I run a series of OLS regressions. Table 7 reports the results from an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression.33 The dependent variable was the amount transferred to the 
Recipient (in British pounds) over all Dictator giving, and the independent variables 
were the relative price of giving and the Dictator’s endowment.  
 
The coefficient of the relative price of giving was negative and not statistically 
significant, after controlling for the Dictator’s endowment. The coefficient of the 
Dictator’s endowment was positive and statistically significant, even after controlling 
for the relative price of giving. Therefore, an increase in the Dictator’s endowment by 
one unit, ceteris paribus, increased the amount transferred by 0.06 units. Hence, giving is 
a `normal good’. These findings are in line with the results from the non-parametric test. 
 
                                                          
33 I ran a Tobit model with clustering at the subject level, with the amount transferred as the dependent 
variable. I found that the significance of the coefficients does not change in the Tobit model. 
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Table 7. OLS regression on the amount transferred 
 
Table 8 reports the results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The 
dependent variable was the amount taken from the Recipient’s endowment (in British 
pounds) over all Dictator taking, while the independent variables were the relative price 
of taking and the Dictator’s endowment. The coefficient of the relative price of taking 
was negative and not significant. Similarly, the coefficient of the Dictator’s endowment 
was negative and not significant. The results suggest that an increase in the monetary 
stakes does not automatically lead to other-regarding behaviour. Rather, it depends on 
the experimental context. 
  
Table 8. OLS regression on the amount taken 
 
Coefficient Standard error p-value
Relative price of giving -0.024 0.147 0.870
Dictator's endowment 0.060 0.013 0.000
Constant -0.150 0.142 0.290
Observations 414
Prob>F 0.000
Adj R-square 0.045
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
Coefficient Standard error p-value
Relative price of taking -0.280 0.399 0.483
Dictator's endowment -0.057 0.035 0.102
Constant 5.259 0.384 0.000
Observations 414
Prob>F 0.205
Adj R-square 0.003
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9 reports the results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The 
dependent variable was the amount burnt from the Recipient’s endowment (in British 
pounds) over all Dictator burning, and the independent variables were the relative price 
of burning and the Dictator’s endowment. The coefficient of the relative price of burning 
was negative and not statistically significant. The coefficient of the Dictator’s 
endowment was positive and not statistically significant. 
 
Table 9. OLS regression on the amount burnt 
 
 
5.4. Individual preferences 
 
Now I turn to the individual level data and examine stability of behaviour across 
decision contexts. Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14 show bubble plots for each game 
in the giving domain, taking and burning respectively. The X-axis shows the Dictator’s 
payoff and the Y-axis shows the Recipient’s payoff. The size of the bubbles corresponds 
to the number of Dictators making each possible choice about the payoff to self and the 
payoff to the Recipient for each game. The bigger the bubble, the higher the number of 
Dictators on the corresponding choice. These payoffs do not include the participation’s 
fee.  
 
The plots reveal some heterogeneity between subjects in Dictator taking games and 
Dictator giving games. I found that 47 out of 69 Dictators (approximately 68%) made 
stable choices across Dictator giving. Dictators consistently chose to transfer the same 
Coefficient Standard error p-value
Relative price of burning -0.063 0.075 0.403
Dictator's endowment 0.010 0.007 0.139
Constant 0.047 0.072 0.513
Observations 621
Prob>F 0.0472
Adj R-square 0.0066
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. 
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amount of money: 46 Dictators always chose to transfer zero and only one Dictator 
always chose to transfer £0.5.  For instance, Subject 12 always transfers zero in all the 
Dictator games giving. Subject 40 always transfers £0.5 in all the Dictator games giving.  
 
In the Dictator taking, I found 33 out of 69 Dictators (approximately 48%) made stable 
choices across Dictator taking games: 30 Dictators always chose to take the maximum 
amount of money (£6), one Dictator always chose to take zero, one Dictator always chose 
to take £4 and one Dictator always chose to take £5. These Dictators made stable choices. 
I also found that 12 Dictators never took the maximum amount of £6. 
 
In the Dictator burning, 61 out of 69 Dictators (approximately 88%) made stable choices 
across Dictator burning games: 60 Dictators always chose to burn zero and one Dictator 
always chose to burn £0.5.  
 
Figure 12. Bubble plots for each Dictator game giving (n=69 in each game)
 
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
Game 1 Game 2
Game 3 Game 4
Game 5 Game 6
R
e
c
ip
ie
n
t's
 p
a
y
o
ff
 (
£
)
Dictator's payoff (£)
89 
 
Figure 13. Bubble plots for each Dictator game taking (n=69 in each game)
 
 
 
Figure 14. Bubble plots for each Dictator game burning (n=69 in each game) 
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Taken all games together, 24 out of 69 Dictators (approximately 35%) transferred zero, 
took £6 and burnt zero. For instance, Subject 1 is a clear example of a Dictator making 
consistent choices. He/she always transfers zero in all the Dictator giving; takes the 
maximum amount £6 in all the Dictator taking; and burnt zero in all the Dictator burning. 
Therefore, Player 1’s behaviour is consistent with self-interest. In addition, one Dictator 
always transferred zero, took £5, and burnt zero.  
 
I also found that Dictators who transferred money in Dictator giving also burnt money 
in the Dictator burning games. For instance, Subject 40 always gives £0.5 in the Dictator 
giving; takes £5.5 in the Dictator taking; and burn £0.5 in some of the Dictator burning. 
Therefore, the behaviour of subject 40 is consistent with pro-social and anti-social 
behaviour. This is consistent with the results in Sadrieh and Schröder (2016), who found 
a large fraction of the subjects who exhibited pro-social and anti-social behaviour. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The main aim of this study was to explore the interplay of the experimental context, the 
relative price, and the size of the Dictator’s endowment. I used a within-subject design, 
where Dictators make allocation decisions in three separate contexts. Dictators can 
transfer any part of the endowment to the Recipient, take any amount of the Recipient’s 
endowment, and burn any amount from the Recipient’s endowment. In each context, 
Dictators played in nine different scenarios. In total, Dictators played in eighteen 
scenarios. The eighteen scenarios were given to each dictator in random order.  
 
Based on the results reported from this experiment, it seems fair to say that some 
Dictators are willing to transfer money to the Recipient. This is consistent with the results 
from previous Dictator games. Many Dictators are also willing to take money from the 
Recipient’s endowment. However, Dictators are not willing to burn money from the 
Recipient’s endowment. 
 
Before interpreting the results, several features of the experimental design need to be 
considered. First, Recipient’s has an initial endowment. Providing an initial endowment 
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to the recipient might discourage altruistic behaviour (Engel, 2011; Korenok et al 2013). 
Second, the size of the Dictator’s endowment varied, and consequently the Dictator’s 
endowment was higher, equal, or lower than the Recipient’s endowment, thus poor 
Dictators were expected to transfer zero. The difference between Dictator’s endowment 
and Recipient’s endowment also implied that transferring zero could lead to equal 
payoffs.  
 
Third, the Dictator was informed about the Recipient’s wealth before making his/her 
decision. This could affect giving, which was consistent with the ` poverty effect’ (Brañas-
Garza, 2006). Brañas-Garza (2006) found that when information about the Recipient’s 
wealth is provided, the amount transferred was significantly higher than when the 
Dictator does not have information about the Recipient’s wealth. He, therefore, 
suggested that Dictators become more generous under the `poverty effect’. 
 
The results from the current experiment showed that many Dictators chose to transfer 
zero to the Recipient. Previous studies on Dictator games (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; 
Fisman et al 2007; Cappelen et al., 2007; Jakiela, 2013) have dealt with zero observations 
by using two-limit Tobit regression models.34 Moffatt (2016) assumed a Stone-Geary 
utility function over own payoff and other payoff and use data from Andreoni and 
Miller (2002) to estimate the parameters of a utility function that incorporates zero 
observations as corner solutions in the Dictator’s constrained utility maximisation 
problem. These models assumed heterogeneity between subjects.  
 
The asymmetric effect of the monetary stake serves as a warning against generalizations 
of conclusions derived from Dictator games giving. Behaviour changed when the context 
changed from dividing the Dictator’s endowment (giving) to dividing the Recipient’s 
endowment (taking). This finding is in line with previous studies that reported the 
change of preferences across different situations (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008). One might 
ask whether and to what extent decision in one game correlates with the decision in 
another game. Can we use individuals’ decisions to predict behaviour in different 
settings? Future research could try to answer these questions.  
                                                          
34 Breitmoser (2013) showed how these `structural models’ account for noise in the choice process.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2: The Effects of the Relative Price and Monetary Stakes on the 
Dictator’s Behaviour in Giving, Taking and Burning  
 
A. Experimental instructions  
B. Background of the participants 
C. Post-experimental questionnaire 
D. Proofs of propositions 
E. Additional analysis 
F. Data 
 
Appendix A. Experimental instructions 
 
Note: Instructions specific to Player 1 and to Player 2 were shown separately to Player 1 and 
Player 2, respectively, on their computer screens. 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment, you can earn money. 
What you earn will depend upon your decision, and on the decision of another 
participant in the room. No data that you provide can be associated with your person; 
all data will be treated confidentially. Please follow the instructions carefully. These 
instructions explain how the experiment works. If any of the instructions are unclear, or 
if you have any questions, please raise your hand and I will come to you. Please do not 
communicate with any other participant until the experiment is over. 
 
In this experiment, half of the participants in the room will be randomly assigned to the 
role of Player 1 and the other half of participants will be assigned to the role of Player 2. 
You will hold this role throughout the experiment. Note that Player 1 will not learn who 
Player 2 is, neither during nor after the session. Likewise, Player 2 will not learn who 
Player 1 is. The experiment is expected to last no more than an hour.  
 
Instructions for Player 1:  
 
You will be Player 1 and another participant will be Player 2. You will be asked to make 
a series of decisions in 18 scenarios shown in random order.   
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In each scenario, you will have to decide whether to increase Player 2’s earnings by 
decreasing your earnings, or whether to decrease Player 2’s earnings either by increasing 
or decreasing your earnings. If you decide neither to increase nor to decrease Player 2’s 
earnings, your earnings and Player 2’s earnings will remain unchanged. Player 2 will 
not make any decisions.  
 
Your payment will depend on your decisions alone. You will have 60 seconds to make a 
decision in each scenario. After you make your decisions in the 18 scenarios, you will be 
randomly matched with one of the participants in the Player 2 role.  
 
The computer will randomly choose one of your 18 decisions. You will be paid what you 
chose as your earnings and Player 2 will be paid what you chose as Player 2’s earnings 
in the random selected scenario. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your 
money earnings plus £2 for showing up. You will not interact with Player 2 again in 
today’s experiment.  
 
Instructions for Player 2: 
 
You will be Player 2 and another participant will be Player 1. You will not make any 
decisions. Player 1 will be asked to make a series of decisions in 18 scenarios shown in 
random order.  
 
In each scenario Player 1 will have to decide whether to increase your earnings by 
decreasing his/her earnings, or whether to decrease your earnings either by increasing 
or decreasing his/her earnings. If Player 1 decides neither to increase nor to decrease 
your earnings, your earnings and Player 1’s earnings will remain unchanged. 
 
After each Player 1 makes his/her decisions in the 18 scenarios, you will be randomly 
matched with one of the participants in the Player 1 role 
 
The computer will randomly choose one of the Player 1’s decisions. You will be paid 
what Player 1 chose as your earnings and Player 1 will be paid what he/she chose as 
103 
 
his/her earnings in the random selected scenario. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be paid your money earnings plus £2 for showing up.  
 
Before the experiment begins:  
 
You will have to correctly answer 8 questions. These questions check your 
understanding of the experimental instructions. 
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Appendix B. Background of the participants  
 
 
Table 10. Percentage of male and female subjects by session 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics for age by session 
 
 
  
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 13 72.22 5 27.78
2 15 75.00 5 25.00
3 13 65.00 7 35.00
4 12 60.00 8 40.00
5 9 45.00 11 55.00
6 14 70.00 6 30.00
7 9 45.00 11 55.00
Total 85 61.59 53 38.41
Female Male
Session
Mean Median S.D Min Max
1 18 21.67 21.50 2.30 18 27
2 20 22.25 21.50 2.75 19 29
3 20 21.35 21.00 1.84 19 25
4 20 25.80 22.00 10.76 19 66
5 20 23.95 23.00 5.62 19 41
6 20 25.60 22.00 5.92 20 38
7 20 23.15 22.00 4.83 19 39
Total 138 23.42 22.00 5.79 18 66
Age (years)Number of 
subjects
Session
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Table 12. Percentage of subjects by field of study 
 
 
  
Field of study Frequency Percent
Accounting and Finance 19 13.77
Biological science 1 0.72
Biology 4 2.90
Biomedicine 6 4.35
Branding 2 1.45
Business and Management 7 5.07
Chemistry 5 3.62
Computer Science 3 2.17
Computing Science 1 0.72
Creative Writing 2 1.45
Drama 1 0.72
Ecology 2 1.45
Economics 15 10.87
Education 1 0.72
Environmental Sciences 18 13.04
History 3 2.17
International Development 7 5.07
International Relations and Politics 2 1.45
Law 12 8.70
Linguistics & Philosophy 1 0.72
Mathematics 4 2.90
Media, Society and Culture 5 3.62
Medicine 1 0.72
Natural Sciences 1 0.72
Occupational Therapy 1 0.72
Pharmacy 7 5.07
Psychology 3 2.17
Public Policy 2 1.45
Speech and Language Therapy 2 1.45
Total 138 100.00
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Table 13. Percentage of subjects by country 
 
 
  
Country Frequency Percent
Azerbaijan 1 0.72
Bangladesh 1 0.72
Brazil 1 0.72
Bulgaria 6 4.35
China 22 15.94
Germany 1 0.72
Hong Kong 14 10.14
Hungary 1 0.72
India 2 1.45
Indonesia 2 1.45
Japan 3 2.17
Kuwait 1 0.72
Latvia 1 0.72
Lithuania 1 0.72
Malawi 1 0.72
Malaysia 4 2.90
Nigeria 6 4.35
Philippines 2 1.45
Poland 2 1.45
ROC 1 0.72
ROU 1 0.72
Russia 2 1.45
Slovakia 1 0.72
South Africa 1 0.72
South Korea 1 0.72
Sri Lanka 1 0.72
Thailand 2 1.45
UK 40 28.99
USA 3 2.17
Ukraine 2 1.45
Venezuela 1 0.72
Vietnam 10 7.25
Total 138 100.00
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Table 14. Descriptive statistics for experimental earnings by session 
 
 
 
  
Mean Median S.D Min Max
1 18 6.33 6.00 5.17 0.00 22.00
2 20 6.85 6.00 3.99 0.00 20.00
3 20 6.55 6.00 3.32 0.00 14.00
4 20 6.65 6.00 3.80 0.00 16.00
5 20 6.38 6.00 3.94 0.00 18.00
6 20 7.30 6.00 6.65 0.00 22.00
7 20 6.08 6.00 4.22 0.00 18.00
Total 138 6.59 6.00 4.47 0.00 22.00
Session
Number of 
subjects
Experimental earnings (£)
Note: Experimental earnings do not include the participation fee of £3
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Appendix C. Post-experimental questionnaire (all treatments) 
 
Figure 15. Post-experimental questionnaire’s screens
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Appendix D. Additional analysis 
 
In this section, I examined the effect of the choice set on the proportion of selfish choices 
in Dictator games giving and Dictator games taking. I compared three different pairs of 
games: Game 2 and Game 7, Game 4 and Game 9, and Game 6 and Game 11. In all these 
games, the relative price of giving (or taking) was one, and the Dictator can make 
transfers from the Recipient to self and from self to the Recipient in increments of 50 
pence.  
 
Table 15 summarises the results. The proportion of dictators transferring zero falls from 
89.86% in Game 5 to 59.42% in Game 14. In addition, the proportion of dictators 
transferring zero falls from 76.81% in Game 4 to 55.07% in Game 9. The difference in 
proportions was statistically significant.  
 
The proportion of dictators transferring zero falls from 89.86% in Game 5 to 59.42% in 
Game. In these games, the Dictator’s initial endowment was £10 and the Recipient’s 
initial endowment was £6. The difference in proportions was statistically significant at 
the 1% (One-sided Fisher's exact test, p= 0.006). Therefore, taking decreases the 
proportion of Dictators transferring zero. 
 
Table 15. Summary of the results 
 
 
  
2 69 Give 3 6 1.00 0.03 - 95.65 - Different at 1%
7 69 Take 3 6 1.00 - 4.97 - 55.07 (p=0.000)
4 69 Give 6 6 1.00 0.11 - 89.86 - Different at 1%
9 69 Take 6 6 1.00 - 4.49 - 59.42 (p=0.000)
6 69 Give 10 6 1.00 0.47 - 76.81 - Different at 1%
11 69 Take 10 6 1.00 - 4.39 - 55.07 (p=0.006)
Game
Number of 
observations
Task
Dictator's 
endowment  
  (£)
Relative 
price 
Recipient's 
endowment  
  (£)
Average 
amount 
transferred (£)
Average 
amount 
taken (£)
Percentage 
of Dictators 
transferring 
zero
Fisher's exact test 
(transfer zero vs. 
take £6)
Percentage 
of 
Dictators 
taking £6
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Appendix E. Data 
 
  
Session Subject Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 6 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 9 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 10 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 12 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 13 0 0 0 0.5 1.5 1.5
2 14 0 0 0 0 1 10
2 15 0 1 1 1 1 2
2 16 0 0 0 0 1 2
2 17 0 0 3 3 7 2
2 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 19 0 0 0 1 1 0
3 20 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 21 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 22 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 23 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 25 0 0 0 0 1 2
3 26 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 27 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 28 1 0 0 0 1 0
3 29 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 30 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
4 31 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 32 0 0 0 0 2 0
4 33 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 34 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 35 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 36 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 37 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 38 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 39 0 0 1 0 1 2
5 40 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
5 41 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 42 0 0 1 0 1 0
5 43 0 0 1 1 2 1
5 44 2 0 0 0 0 0
5 45 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 46 0 0 0 0 1.5 2
5 47 0 0 2 0 3 1
5 48 0 0 0 0 1 2
5 49 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 51 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 52 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 53 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 54 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 55 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 56 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 57 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 58 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 59 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 60 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 61 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5
7 62 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 63 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 64 0 0 1 0 0 0
7 65 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 66 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 68 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 69 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Session Subject Game 7 Game 8 Game 9 Game 10 Game 11 Game 12
1 1 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 2 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 3 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 4 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 6 5 6 6 6 6 6
1 7 6 5.5 6 6 5 0
1 8 6 6 6 6 6 6
1 9 3 2 1 2 0 1
2 10 2 1.5 6 2 1 3
2 11 6 6 6 6 6 5
2 12 5 3.5 4 6 4 6
2 13 5.5 6 6 4 4 5
2 14 1.5 1 0 0 0 0
2 15 6 6 0 1 0 6
2 16 6 3.5 2 2 1 1
2 17 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 18 6 6 6 6 6 5
2 19 5 3.5 4 4.5 4 1
3 20 6 6 6 6 6 6
3 21 6 6 6 6 6 6
3 22 4 3 6 6 4 4
3 23 6 6 6 6 6 6
3 24 5 1 1 6 0 1.5
3 25 1.5 1 0 0 0 0
3 26 6 6 6 6 6 6
3 27 5 5 0 5 5 5
3 28 4 4 4 4 4 4
3 29 4 3.5 3 3 2 2.5
4 30 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 31 5 6 5 5 5 5
4 32 1.5 1 0 2 0 0
4 33 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 34 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 35 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 36 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 37 6 6 6 6 6 6
4 38 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 39 5 6 6 6 5 6
5 40 5.5 5.5 0 5.5 5.5 5
5 41 6 6 6 6 6 6
5 42 2 6 0 6 6 6
5 43 4 3.5 3 3 4 3
5 44 6 6 6 6 6 6
5 45 5 6 5 6 5 6
5 46 2 1 0 0 0 2
5 47 4 3.5 3 2.5 3 2.5
5 48 1.5 1 0 0 0 0
5 49 6 6 6 6 0 6
6 50 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 51 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 52 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 53 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 54 5.5 6 5.5 6 6 6
6 55 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 56 5 6 5 5 5 5
6 57 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 58 6 6 6 6 6 6
6 59 6 3 6 6 6 6
7 60 5 3.5 3.5 3 1.5 0
7 61 2 1 2 6 1 2
7 62 6 6 6 6 6 6
7 63 6 6 6 6 6 6
7 64 6 6 4 1 1 6
7 65 6 6 6 6 6 6
7 66 6 6 6 6 6 6
7 67 5 6 4 0 6 6
7 68 1.5 6 6 6 6 6
7 69 6 6 6 6 6 6
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Session Subject Game 13 Game 14 Game 15 Game 16 Game 17 Game 18
1 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 12 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 13 0 1.5 0 0 0 5
2 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 15 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 17 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 19 0 0 0 0.5 0 1
3 20 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 21 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 22 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 23 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 26 0 0 0 0 2 0
3 27 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 28 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 29 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 30 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 31 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 32 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 33 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 34 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 35 0 0 0 0 3 0
4 36 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 37 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 38 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 39 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 40 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
5 41 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 42 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 43 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 44 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 45 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 46 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 47 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 48 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 49 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 51 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 52 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 53 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 54 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 55 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 56 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 57 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 58 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 59 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 60 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 61 3 0 0.5 0 1 0
7 62 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 63 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 64 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 65 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 66 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 67 1 0 0 0 2.5 0
7 68 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 69 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Chapter 3 
 
The Effect of Ex-Post Information Acquisition in Sender 
Receiver Games: Experimental Evidence 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Behavioural economists have used Sender-Receiver games (Gneezy, 2005) to investigate 
factors affecting information transmission in asymmetric information situations where 
one party to an exchange possesses important information, but the other party does not.  
 
In a simple Sender-Receiver game, two players randomly matched are assigned to the 
role of Sender and to the role of Receiver. There are two options, A and B. Each option 
specifies a monetary payoff for the Sender and for the Receiver. Incentives to deceive 
exist. The Sender knows how much money each of the players gets from each option, 
but the Receiver has no information at all. There are two messages. The Sender sends 
one of the two messages to the Receiver. The Receiver reads the message and choose one 
of the two options. Each player is awarded a monetary payoff from the chosen option.1 
In a seminal paper, Crawford and Sobel (1982) showed that, in situations in which 
monetary incentives to deceive exist, the amount of information transmitted is related to 
the similarity of the individuals' interests. The more similar the individuals' interests, the 
more information is transmitted.2 
 
However, many laboratory experiments on Sender-Receiver games have demonstrated 
that subjects do not frequently lie (see Gneezy (2005); Cai and Wang (2006); Dreber and 
                                                          
1 Other experimental studies have studied unobserved lying behaviour by tracing its distribution from 
subjects’ reported results of a dice roll, coin flip or matrix task (e.g. Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Hao 
and Houser, 2012, Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Mazar and Ariely, 2006). 
2 Subsequent researchers have applied variants of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. For instance, 
Austen-Smith and Banks (1987) allowed the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. 
114 
 
Johannesson (2008); Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2009); Hurkens and Kartik (2009); Rode 
(2010)). Sutter (2009) found that some Senders do not lie because they expect others not 
to follow the Sender’s message. Erat and Gneezy (2012) found that many subjects are 
also unwilling to tell Pareto improving white lies.3 The results from these experiment 
have been interpreted as showing that people have lie aversion. 
 
The literature, however, has little to say about how deception is affected by the 
possibility that the Receiver learns about the payoffs. In the above studies, deception is 
totally disclosed to the experimenter, but the Receiver never learns about the payoffs. 
Except for Behnk et al (2014), there is no much research on the role of ex post information 
about the payoffs. In this study, I aim to fill this gap.  
 
This study investigates the role of ex-post information about the payoffs in simple 
Sender Receiver games. The Receiver, after making his/her decision, can find out 
whether he has been lied to. I ask three important questions: does the possibility of 
obtaining information decrease the propensity to lie? Will the Receiver be more likely to 
follow the Sender’s message because he believes that the Sender will be more likely to 
tell the truth? How many subjects would pay to know the truth?  
 
To the best of my knowledge, previous studies have not investigated willingness to 
acquire ex post information in sender receiver games. Eliaz and Schotter (2010) studied 
the demand for non-instrumental information and showed that when people are about 
to make a decision under risk, they are willing to acquire information even if this 
information does not affect their decision. There are also experimental studies of social 
learning in which a significant proportion of subjects acquire non-informative signals 
(Kübler and Weizsäcker, 2004). 
 
To gain insight into these questions I conducted five different treatments. Treatment 1, 
called NoInfo, is a standard Sender-Receiver game, where the Receiver never learns 
                                                          
3 Rosaz and Villeval (2010) examined deception in a field experiment. In their experiment, supervisors report 
workers performance to the experimenter. They found that more than one third of supervisors engaged in 
deception. 
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about the payoffs. It is the baseline. In treatment 2 called ExoInfo the Receiver, after 
choosing between option A and B, automatically learns about the payoffs. By comparing 
this treatment to the baseline, I study the effect of (automatic) ex-post information in 
reducing deception.  
 
In treatment 3, the Receiver, after choosing between option A and B, decides whether 
she wants to learn about the payoffs. The Receiver pays £1 to get this information. 
Treatment 4 is identical to treatment 3, but now information is free. Treatment 5 is also 
identical to treatment 3, except that the Receiver earns £0.10 if she decides to learn about 
the payoffs. Across treatments 3, 4, and 5, I examined whether and to what extent the 
Receiver is willing to acquire ex-post information about the payoffs. 
 
I also examine the Receiver’s respond to the Sender’s message. To investigate this 
behaviour, I allowed Receivers to send a message back to the Senders, regardless of 
whether or not they learn the payoffs, and recorded these messages.4 I asked whether 
Receivers wanted to punish/reward the Sender by sending a harsh/kind message. 
Previous studies have showed that people are willing to punish or reward others’ action 
even though punish or reward does not have any monetary consequences (e.g. Xiao and 
Houser, 2009) 
 
In this study, I also elicit the Sender’s belief about the Receiver’ behaviour and the 
Receiver’s belief about the Sender’s message. For instance, does the Sender believes the 
Receiver will follow the message? Do Senders believe the Receiver will learn about the 
payoffs? Do Receivers believe the Sender will send the true message? 
 
The main results emerging from this study can be summarised as follows. First, 
providing ex post information, compared to non-information, can significantly reduce 
the amount of deception. More specifically, the probability to lie decreases by 20%. This 
result is hard to reconcile with Senders being exclusively motivated by lying aversion, 
but it is consistent with guilt and shame aversion. Second, a significant minority of 
                                                          
4 There is an extensive literature on emotions that show that people react emotionally when treated 
unfairly/fairly (see Phelps, 2009 for a review of the literature) 
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Receivers get ex post information about the payoffs even though it is costly to 
themselves. This finding contradicts the standard assumption that Receivers view 
information as merely a means for making better decisions, in which case no one should 
get ex post information about the payoffs.  
 
Moreover, the analysis of the Receivers’ messages sent back to the Senders suggests that 
most of the Receivers do not get angry to the Sender, but they sent a sarcasm if they 
know the Sender has lied, and they send a thankful message if they know the Sender has 
told the truth. Note that in the current study, strategic reasons to punish/reward the 
Sender do not exist because the game is a one-shot game.  
 
Finally, I move beyond the case of fixed messages and study how the possibility to write 
a free message affects deception. For instance, how many Senders lie in this case? Will 
they tell the truth or a straight lie? Will they send ambiguous messages that are not lies, 
but still intended to make the other person make the choice that the message Senders 
would like? To the best of my knowledge, no previous studies have explored free text 
message in Sender-Receiver games. The analysis of the Senders’ messages reveals that 
free form communication leads to a range of messages. For instance, some Senders make 
a recommendation or leave it up to the Receiver. This result calls for considering free 
text messages when studying deception. 
 
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the experiment in 
this paper provides new evidence on the effect of ex-post information in promoting truth 
telling in environments with asymmetric information. Apart from Behnk et al (2014), no 
previous study has experimentally examined the role of ex-post acquisition information 
in Sender-Receiver games. Second, the data supports economic models incorporating 
psychological factors such as guilt and shame aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2013; 
López-Pérez 2010). Third, I extend the analysis of experimentalists who have looked at 
the demand for non-instrumental information by collecting data on costly, costless and 
beneficial information. Furthermore, I add to the analysis of non-monetary punishment 
by examining Receivers’ messages in a context where punishment has not strategic 
implications for deception. Fourth, I provide evidence that many Senders are not willing 
to tell straight lies. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the related 
literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 4 
introduces the theory and the experimental hypotheses. Section 5 presents the 
experimental results. Section 6 reports on a free-form message experiment. Section 7 
discusses and Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Related literature 
 
This study is closely related to three strands of literature. First, this study is related to 
the literature that investigates the role of ex-post information about the payoffs. To the 
best of my knowledge, except for one paper, the role of ex-post information about the 
payoffs in Sender-Receiver games has not been a focus of extant systematic 
investigation. The closest paper to the current study is that by Behnk et al (2014).  
 
These authors investigated how costless ex-post information about the payoffs affects 
decision making in a Sender-Receiver game. There were three scenarios. Each of the 
scenarios contained three options. Every option consisted of a payoff for the Sender and 
a payoff for the Receiver. The Sender chose one message in each scenario. The computer 
randomly selected one of the three scenarios. The Receiver could “accept” or “reject” the 
message. If the Receiver accepted the message, the option in the message determined the 
final payoffs for both players. If she rejected the message, one of the other two remaining 
options was randomly chosen by the computer to determine the final payoffs for both 
players. Behnk et al (2014) found that lying decreased when information about the 
payoffs was disclosed. This finding is robust in the situation when the Sender obtained 
a small gain at the expense of a comparatively big loss for the Receiver. In addition, the 
Receivers did not anticipate an increase in honest messages when it took place. Behnk et 
al (2014) interpret the decrease in lying as motivated by social image concern.  
 
The experimental design in the current study differs in several aspects from Behnk et al 
(2014). First, Behnk et al (2014) used a within-subject design. In the current setup, by 
contrast, I use a between-subject design. Second, in the current study, the Sender chooses 
between two messages; however, in Behnk et al (2014) the Sender chose between three 
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messages. Third, Behnk et al 2014 did not vary the cost of ex post information. Hence, 
they are not able to study the demand for ex post information about the payoffs. Despite 
the differences in the design, Behnk et al’s (2014) main findings were broadly confirmed 
in the current study. 
 
In another paper, Greenberg et al (2016) examined the role of ex-post disclosure 
information in a modified version of a Sender Receiver game. Greenberg et al (2016) 
found that Senders send the truthful message approximately twice as often in the 
treatment in which Receivers can detect whether the Senders lied compared to a 
treatment without ex post information. However, Greenberg et al (2016) used a different 
experimental set up. The Sender can lie about the result of a six-sided die roll. In 
addition, the Sender sends two messages. Furthermore, Greenberg et al (2016) used the 
strategy method to elicit choices for both players.  
 
This study is also related to the literature that demonstrates that telling the truth is 
driven by guilt and shame aversion. Senders showed apparently concern for not letting 
others down another. If the Sender believed the Receiver expected an honest message, 
the Sender will tell the truth. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) found that the second 
mover's promise often promotes the frequencies of the first mover's trustful actions and 
the second mover's trustworthy actions. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) concluded 
that guilt aversion makes people keep their promises. If the Sender believed the Receiver 
believed him/her, the Sender would wish to keep his/her promise. Battigali and 
Dufwenberg (2013) showed that that people feel guilty when they betray another 
person's expectation.  
 
Lundquist et al (2009) showed that some people would experience a disutility from lying 
that exceeds the corresponding expected monetary gains. Batigalli et al (2013) showed 
that guilt aversion can explain Gneezy’s (2005) data. Vanberg (2008) showed that people 
have preferences for keeping their promises per se.  
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3. Experimental design and procedures 
 
The experimental set up builds on the classical Sender-Receive game introduced in 
Gneezy (2005). There are two players, the Sender and the Receiver. I sometimes refer to 
these as Player 1 and 2, respectively.  There are two exogenously given options, A and 
B. Each option specifies a monetary payoff for the Sender and for the Receiver. The 
Sender knows how much money each of them gets from each option. The Receiver has 
no information at all. There are two messages. The Sender sends one of the two message 
to the Receiver. The Receiver reads the message, and then chooses an option, A or B. 
Each player receives his or her money earnings from the chosen option, and this 
terminates the game. The messages were: 
 
Message 1: “Option A will earn you more money than option B.” 
Message 2: “Option B will earn you more money than option A.” 
 
Table 1 shows the monetary payoff for Option A and Option B for the Sender and for 
the Receiver. According to the payoff matrix, Message 1 tells the truth, whereas Message 
2 tells a lie. It is noteworthy that unlike Gneezy (2005), one of the options (option A) 
provides the same payoff for both players. In addition, the total payoff from Option A 
equalled the total payoff from Option B, so I ruled out efficiency concerns. The 
experiment encompassed five different treatments (NoInfo, ExoInfo, EndoInfo-Costly, 
EndoInfo-Free, and EndoInfo-Gain). Table 2 summarized the experimental treatments. 
 
 
Table 1. The payoff matrix 
 
 
 
Sender's 
payoff (£)
Receiver's 
payoff (£)
Option A 10 10
Option B 14 6
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In treatment 1 (henceforth called NoInfo), after choosing between options A and B, the 
Receiver learns about his own payoff, but never learns about the Sender’s payoff. This 
served as a baseline treatment. I examined how truthful will the Sender’s message be 
and to what extent will it be believed.  
 
Treatment 2 (henceforth called ExoInfo) was identical to the NoInfo treatment, except 
that now the Receiver, after choosing between options A and B, automatically learns 
about all the payoffs. I investigated whether disclosing ex-post information would have 
an effect on deceptive behaviour. As a further dimension to the experimental design, I 
allowed Receivers to send back a text message to the Sender.  
 
The Receiver had 120 seconds to write one or several text messages and send them to the 
Sender. She could also decide not to write anything. The Sender read the message. Since 
this task was administered after the Receiver got ex-post information in ExoInfo, the 
messages sent by the Receiver cannot have any strategic implications for the Receiver. 
Instead, the messages can provide an opportunity for the Receiver to punish/reward the 
Sender’s behaviour if the Sender has lied/told the truth by sending a harsh/kind 
message. 
 
Treatment 3 (henceforth called EndoInfo-Costly) was identical to ExoInfo, except that 
now the Receiver, after choosing between options A and B, decides whether or not learn 
about the payoffs. If the Receiver chooses to learn about the payoffs, she pays £1. 
Regardless whether or not the Receiver learns about the payoffs, the Receiver can still 
send a message back to the Sender. A rational Receiver should never, regardless of his 
or her social preferences, pay a positive sum of money for such information.  
 
Treatment 4 (henceforth called EndoInfo-Free), was identical to EndoInfo-Costly except 
that now information is free. Treatment 5 (henceforth called EndoInfo-Gain) was 
identical to EndoInfo-Costly, except that now if the Receiver chooses to learn about the 
payoffs, she earns £0.10. Using data in EndoInfo-Costly, EndoInfo-Free, and EndoInfo-
Costly, I study whether and to what extent the Receiver is willing to acquire ex-post 
information about the payoffs.  
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Table 2. Experimental treatments 
 
 
3.1. Elicitation of beliefs  
 
After making his/her decision, I asked the Sender to state which option he/she expected 
his/her counterpart to choose. I also asked Senders to estimate the total percentage of 
Receivers in the session who decided to follow the Sender’s message. Likewise, after the 
Receiver made her decision, I asked Receivers to state their expectations about the 
Sender’s message.  
 
I also elicited the Sender’s beliefs about the Receiver’s information decision by asking 
whether she expected her counterpart to learn about the payoffs. In addition, I asked 
Senders to estimate the total percentage of Receivers in the session who decided to learn 
about the payoffs. None of the answers to these questions were monetary incentivised.  
 
All elicitations of beliefs were made before feedback on final payoffs were given. A 
sample screenshot of the questions faced by the Sender and a screenshot of the questions 
faced by the Receiver can be found in this chapter’s Appendix E. Belief elicitation’s 
questionnaires.5 
                                                          
5 Note that question 1 was shown for all treatments, question 2 was shown for all treatments with fixed 
messages NoInfo, ExoInfo, EndoInfo-Costly, EndoInfo-Free, EndoInfo-Gain, and question 3 and question 4 
were shown for all treatments with endogenous ex-post information about the payoff EndoInfo-Costly, 
EndoInfo-Free, EndoInfo-Gain, and FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly.  
Treatment
Number 
of 
sessions
Number 
of 
subjects
Receiver gets ex-
post information 
about the payoffs
Ex-post 
information about 
the payoffs
Amount paid by the Receiver 
to get ex-post information 
about the payoffs (£)
Receiver sends a 
message back to 
the Sender
NoInfo (T1) 2 44 No - No
ExoInfo (T2) 2 40 Yes Exogenous - Yes
EndoInfo-Costly (T3) 4 40 Yes Endogenous 1.00 Yes
EndoInfo-Free (T4) 2 36 Yes Endogenous 0.00 Yes
EndoInfo-Gain (T5) 2 28 Yes Endogenous -0.10 Yes
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3.2. Procedures  
 
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Science (CBESS) computerized laboratory at the University of East between November 
2015 and June 2016.6 Subjects were undergraduate students, randomly recruited from a 
variety of disciplines using the on-line recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The 
experiment was fully programmed and conducted using z-Tree package (Fischbacher, 
2007).  
  
Each treatment had two sessions; except for EndoInfo-Costly treatment, which had four 
sessions. In total, I had 272 subjects: 188 (94 Senders and 94 Receivers) subjects for the 
fixed messages treatments. None of the subjects participated in more than one session. 
The average age was approximately 20.14 years (S.D. 2.03, min. 18, max. 31), 48.40% of 
the subjects were female, 87.77% were from United Kingdom, 19% studied Economics 
and 4% studied Business Management. Details of the socio-economic background of the 
experimental participants are available in Appendix C. Background of the participants 
in fixed messages.  
 
On arrival, subjects were immediately sent in pairs to the lab with had visually separated 
computer terminals to ensure anonymity. Each computer terminal had a number.7 I 
placed next to each computer a blank paper, a pen, and a receipt form. Before entering 
the lab, each subject drew a numbered ball without replacement from a cotton bag; the 
number on the ball indicated their seat in the computer laboratory. Communication 
between subjects was prohibited.    
 
At the start of each session, all subjects received computerized common instructions on 
their screen. The experimenter read the instructions aloud as the students followed along 
                                                          
6 Treatment NoInfo was run November 2015, ExoInfo was run in December 2015, EndoInfo-Costly was run 
in January 2016, EndoInfo-Free in May 2016, EndoInfo-Gain was run in February 2016.  
7 As soon as subjects arrived, they were immediately sent to the laboratory in pairs in order to minimise the 
likelihood of subjects interacting with each other. I also decided to pay a turn-away fee of £3 to the subjects 
who signed up and arrived on time but were not able to participate; such a payment was pre-announced 
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on their computer screens. Instructions were as neutral as possible. A sample of the 
experimental instructions is included in Appendix A. Experimental instructions for fixed 
messages of this chapter.8  
 
Once the common instructions were read by the experimenter, instructions specific to 
role Player 1 or 2 were shown on the respective screens. Subjects read instructions 
specific to their role in silence. If a subject did not understand any part of the instructions, 
he/she raised his/her hand for clarification. All clarifications were given privately by 
the experimenter. The experiment started when everybody indicated they had fully 
understood the instructions. 
 
In each session, subjects were randomly matched in pairs by the computer. One of them 
was assigned to the role of Player 1 (the Sender) and the other to the role of Player 2 (the 
Receiver). They held their roles throughout the experiment. Anonymity was preserved 
at all times during or after the experiment: Player 1 did not know the identity of Player 
2 and vice versa.  
 
Figure 1. Sender’s decision screen shows a screenshot of the task faced by the Sender. 
There are two buttons. One button reading: “I choose to send Message 1” and another 
button reading “I choose to send Message 2”. The Sender makes her decision by clicking 
on one of the two buttons.  
 
                                                          
8 The complete experimental screenshots, the instructions specific to Sender and to Receiver, and the 
complete data set is available on request.   
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Figure 1. Sender’s decision screen
 
 
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the task faced by the Receiver. There are two buttons. 
One button reads “I choose option A” and another button reads “I choose option B.” The 
Receiver makes her decision by clicking on one of the two buttons. The Receiver can read 
the message sent by the Sender.   
 
Figure 2. Receiver’s decision screen 
 
125 
 
 
Figure 3 shows a screenshot for the task faced by the Receiver, when the Receiver has to 
choose whether to learn the payoffs or not. There are two buttons. One button reads 
“Yes” and another button reads “No.” I randomized the order of the appearance of the 
buttons at the individual level. The Receiver makes her decision by pressing on one of 
the buttons.  
 
I also gathered information about receiver’s motivation to learn the payoffs by asking all 
receivers to state their reasons for choosing or not to learn about the payoffs. Answers 
to this question uncover motivations for learning or not the payoffs. 
 
After stating their reasons, subjects received information about their payoffs on their 
own screen. Receivers who did not choose to learn about the payoffs were not informed 
about the Sender’s payoffs. At the end of the experiment, each participant filled a 
demographic questionnaire (see Appendix F. Post-experimental questionnaire), which 
gathered data on gender, field of study, country of origin and feedback about the 
experiment. The questionnaire was also computerized using programme z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). 
 
Each session lasted on average 45 minutes. The average earnings across sessions was 
£11.57 for Senders (S.D. 1.96, min.10, and max. 14) and £8.40 for Receivers (S.D.1.98, min. 
£5, and max £10.1). Each participant individually signed and dated a payment receipt 
form and received payment. Subjects were called out one by one to receive their 
payment. 
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Figure 3. Receiver’s screen for ex-post information decision about the payoffs
 
 
4. Theoretical predictions 
 
4.1. Self-interest and risk neutrality  
 
In this experiment, the Sender has information about all the payoffs, but the Receiver 
knows nothing about the payoffs. I do not know the Receiver’s prior beliefs regarding 
these payoffs. Suppose the Receiver is self-interested and only cares about her own 
monetary payoff. In assessing the truthfulness of the messages, she will ask the following 
questions: How much conflict do I think there is between us – do I prefer the same, or a 
different, option? I do not know the Receiver’s beliefs about the extent of conflict 
between the two players.  
 
In order to develop predictions, I assume that the Receiver is equally likely to think that 
there are divergent as common interests. I say the Receiver ‘follows the message’ if she 
chooses the option that the received message says is best. As a benchmark, I assume that 
both the Sender and Receiver are self-interested and risk neutral, and that this is common 
knowledge. Therefore, I hypothesized that:  
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Hypothesis 1. (Self-interest and risk-neutrality): The Sender sends the message that maximizes 
his expected monetary payoff, given his beliefs about the Receiver’s likelihood of following the 
message.  
 
Hypothesis 2. (Self-interest and risk-neutrality): The Receiver follows the message if she believes 
that the message is sufficiently likely to be true. 
 
Under self-interest, the Sender sends the false message if he believes the Receiver is 
sufficiently likely to follow the message. Otherwise, the Senders sends the true message. 
In this experiment, I ask Senders and Receivers for their beliefs (about whether the 
Receiver will follow the message or not, and whether the Sender’s message is true, 
respectively). I use the data to assess the specific predictions based on self-interest and 
risk neutrality. Regarding ex post information acquisition, I hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 3. (Self-interest and risk-neutrality): The Receiver avoids information in Endo-Info 
Costly, is indifferent between getting info in Endo-Info Free, and obtains information in Endo-
info Gain 
 
4.2. Inequality aversion  
 
Existing experimental evidence show that individuals might also hold preferences for 
fairness or inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). 
Suppose then the Sender and the Receiver are sufficiently inequity averse, such that the 
Sender prefers payoffs (10, 10) to (14, 6).  Therefore, I hypothesized that:  
 
Hypothesis 4. (Inequity averse): The Sender sends the true message if he believes the Receiver 
is sufficiently likely to follow the message. Otherwise, he sends the false message. 
 
Note that if the Sender is sufficiently likely to believe that the Receiver will follow the 
message, then the message sent will reveal whether the Sender is driven by self-interest 
preferences or inequity aversion. Consider, for example, a Sender who assigns low 
probability to the Receiver following the message. A self-interested Sender will send the 
true message, while an inequity averse Sender will send the false message.  
128 
 
 
4.3. Lying aversion  
 
Existing laboratory studies on sender receiver games have also suggested that people 
are averse to lying. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Vanberg (2008) developed 
models to capture the role of lying aversion in Sender-Receiver games. According to 
these models, people experience some disutility when they tell a lie, regardless of other 
people's expectations. Suppose the Sender expects not to be followed, but is averse to 
lying. He would prefer (10, 10) to (14, 6). Now, suppose the Sender expect to be followed. 
He would still prefer (10, 10) to (14, 6). Therefore, I hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 5. (Lying averse): The Sender sends the true message, regardless of whether he 
believes the Receiver is sufficiently likely to follow the message or not.  
 
4.4. Guilt and shame aversion  
 
An important feature of the design is that the Receiver can learn about the payoffs.9 
López-Pérez (2010) offered a formal analysis of how guilt and shame affect preferences 
and concluded that people experience some utility loss (feel guilty) if they believe that 
they have failed to meet another person’s expectations. Hence, if the Sender feels guilt 
and shame, the possibility of revealing the payoffs can influence the Sender’s 
behaviour.10 
 
Suppose the Sender is self-interested that he will prefer (14, 6) to (10, 10). Suppose that 
the Sender expects the Receiver to follow the message. Then, he will send the false 
                                                          
9 Others models of guilt aversion include Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
(2013), and Reuben et al (2009). Usually guilt is ‘internal’ or ‘private’ while shame is ‘external’ or ‘public’. 
None of the models includes ex-post information about the payoffs as a variable in the analysis. Guilt and 
shame are considered in the psychological literature as self-conscious emotions. 
10 However, guilt aversion and shame aversion have been studied separately. Shame is an external, a social 
or `public’ matter, while guilt is a personal, an internal or `private’ matter. López-Pérez (2010) reviewed the 
most recent psychological literature on guilt and shame aversion and showed that the literature does not 
support the view that there is a difference between guilt and shame aversion. 
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message. Would he choose to lie if he knew the Receiver will know the truth? If the 
Sender does not have any feeling of guilt and shame, and cares only about material 
outcomes, then his behaviour should stay the same over the treatments. Therefore, the 
Sender’s message is not affected by whether the Receiver is informed or not (ExoInfo 
and NoInfo) or by whether the Receiver can get ex-post information or not (NoInfo and 
EndoInfo-Free, NoInfo and EndoInfo-Costly, NoInfo and EndoInfo-Gain).  
 
Suppose then the Sender is sufficiently guilt and shame averse, such that the Sender 
cares how the Receiver will think about him. Then, it should be more costly for him to 
lie if the Sender believes that the Receiver will get ex-post information about the payoffs. 
If the sender feels guilt and shame, he will not be comfortable lying, expecting that the 
Receiver will find out the truth. Therefore, the Sender will send the true message.  
 
Hypothesis 6. (Guilt and shame averse): The Sender sends the true message if she believes that 
the Receiver is sufficiently likely to learn about all the payoffs.  
 
Under guilt and shame aversion, more Senders will send the true message in ExoInfo 
than in NoInfo. In this experiment, I ask Senders for their beliefs about whether the 
Receiver will get ex-post information about the payoffs or not. If Senders suffer from 
guilt and shame aversion, then this hypothesis will explain why people tell the truth 
even though they have a monetary incentive to lie. I use the data to assess the specific 
predictions based on guilt and shame aversion.  
 
In addition, the Sender’s beliefs about whether the Receiver gets ex-post information 
about the payoffs can also be affected by the cost of information. For instance, guilt and 
shame aversion can become stronger with an increase in the probability that the payoffs 
will be revealed to the Receiver. The higher the cost of the information, the lower the 
probability to get ex-post information, the higher the probability to send a false message. 
Therefore, I hypothesized that: 
 
Hypothesis 7. (Guilt and shame averse): More Senders will send the true message in EndoInfo-
Gain and EndoInfo-Free than in EndoInfo-Costly.   
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The probability to follow the Sender’s message can also be affected by the availability of 
ex post information about the payoffs. If the Receiver anticipates an increase in the 
probability of receiving a true message, more receivers will follow the message in 
ExoInfo than in NoInfo. Similarly, more Receivers will follow the message in EndoInfo-
Gain and EndoInfo-Free than in EndoInfo-Costly. The higher the cost of ex-post 
information, the lower the probability to get ex-post information, and higher the 
probability of receiving a false message.  
 
Hypothesis 8. (Guilt and shame averse): More Receivers will follow the message in ExoInfo than 
in NoInfo. 
 
5. Results  
 
This section is organised as follows. First, I begin by establishing that the results are 
consistent with the results obtained in previous standard Sender-Receiver games. 
Second, I conduct a descriptive analysis characterising the Sender and Receiver’s 
behaviour. Then, I conduct a regression analysis to test the main hypotheses. 
Afterwards, I present an analysis of the content of the Receiver’s message sent back to 
the Sender. 
 
Table 3 reports the result of the experiment. There were 22 sender receiver pairs in 
NoInfo, 20 sender receiver pairs in ExoInfo, 20 sender receiver pairs EndoInfo-Costly, 18 
sender receiver pairs in EndoInfo-Free treatment, and 14 sender receiver pairs in 
EndoInfo-Gain.  
 
5.1. External validity 
 
Finding 1: The results in NoInfo are consistent with the results generally reported from previous 
Sender Receiver games 
 
NoInfo corresponds to the standard Sender-Receiver game without ex post information 
about the payoffs. The results in NoInfo are consistent with the results generally 
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reported from previous Sender-Receiver games. As expected, a majority of Senders send 
Message 1. Further, a high proportion of Receivers follow the Sender’s message.  
  
5.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Finding 2: Ex-post information about the payoffs leads to higher frequency of truthful messages 
than without ex post information about the payoffs. 
 
Row (1) of Table 3 indicates the relative frequency of sending Message 2. Overall, 
Senders chose Message 2 in 31% of cases. The frequency of sending Message 2 was lower 
in the treatments with ex post information compared to the baseline NoInfo (41%). 
However, the frequencies of sending Message 2 were not statistically different across 
treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.674). This preliminary evidence will be 
verified later in the regression analysis. 
 
Finding 3: The proportion of Receivers who follow the Sender’s message does not change 
significantly across treatments.  
 
Row (3) of Table 3 indicates the relative frequency of Receivers following the Sender’s 
message. The Receiver follows the message if she chooses the option that the Sender says 
is the best. Overall, Receivers followed the Sender’s message in 87% of the cases. The fact 
that a vast majority of Receivers followed the Sender’s message suggested that messages 
were not cheap talk.  
 
Considering all treatments, the frequencies of following the Sender’s message were not 
statistically different across treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.963). Therefore, 
the Receiver’s decision to follow the Sender’s message was not affected by the 
experimental treatment.  
 
Finding 4: The proportion of Senders who expect the Receiver to follow the chosen message does 
not change across treatments. 
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Row (4) of Table 3 shows the relative frequency of Senders expecting the Receiver to 
follow the chosen message. The Sender expected the receiver to follow the message if 
he/she expects the Receiver to implement the option that was indicated in the chosen 
message. Overall, Senders expected the Receiver to follow the chosen message in 87% of 
cases.  
 
Considering all treatments, the frequencies of expecting that the Receiver will follow the 
chosen message were not significantly different across treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p-
value=0.338). Therefore, Sender’s expectations were not affected by ex post information. 
 
Finding 5: Ex-post information about the payoffs leads to higher frequency of Receivers expecting 
truthful messages than without ex post information about the payoffs. 
 
Row (6) of Table 3 indicates the relative frequency of Receivers expecting the Sender to 
send Message 1. Overall, Receivers expect the Sender to send Message 1 in 78% of the 
cases. The proportion of Receivers expecting the Sender to send Message 1 is lower in 
treatments with ex post information than in the baseline with no information. This 
evidence suggests that the Receiver anticipated the Sender to tell the truth when 
information about the payoffs was available. However, considering all these treatments, 
there were not significant differences across treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p-
value=0.249).   
 
Finding 6: Senders have correct expectations about how likely the Receiver will follow the chosen 
message, except in EndoInfo-Costly and EndoInfo-Gain.   
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the relative frequency of Senders expecting the Receiver to 
follow the chosen message mirrored the relative frequency of Receivers actually 
following the chosen message in each of the five treatments. However, a test of 
proportion showed that the two frequencies are statistically different at the 5% level in 
EndoInfo-Costly (p= 0.0285) and at the 10% level in EndoInfo-Gain (p = 0.0943).  
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It is also important to note that Senders expect on average 60% of the Receiver 
population to implement the Sender’s message, and these expectations do not seem to 
change across treatments (see Row (9) of Table 3).  
 
Figure 4. Fraction of Senders who expect the Receiver to follow the chosen message 
and Receivers who actually follow the Sender’s message 
 
 
Finding 7: Receivers do not necessarily anticipate an increase in the number of truthful messages 
by the Sender 
 
Figure 5 shows how similar the relative frequency of Receivers expecting the Sender to 
send Message 1 was to the relative frequency of Sender actually sending Message 1 in 
each of the five treatments. The figure shows that Receiver’s expectations does not 
change drastically across treatments. These results suggest that several Receivers did not 
anticipate an increase in the number of truthful messages in the treatments with ex post 
information.  
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Figure 5. Fraction of Receivers who expect the truth and Senders who actually send 
Message 1 
 
 
Finding 8: The frequency of Receivers learning about the payoffs changed across treatments.  
 
Row (7) Table 3 indicates the relative frequency of Receivers choosing to learn about the 
payoffs. More Receivers are willing to learn about the payoffs in EndoInfo-Free (90% of 
the Receivers), and EndoInfo-Gain (86% of the Receivers) than in EndoInfo-Costly (20% 
of the Receivers) where ex post information was costly 
 
Considering all treatments, the frequency of Receivers learning about the payoffs was 
significantly different across treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.000). Hence, the 
Receiver’s decision to learn about the payoffs depended on how costly it was to be 
informed. Behnk et al (2014) studied the role of ex-post information about the payoffs in 
a Sender-Receiver game, but the Receiver did not choose whether to get ex-post 
information about the payoffs, hence they are not able to study the demand for ex post 
information about the payoffs. 
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To test whether the proportion of Receivers choosing to get ex-post information about 
the payoffs in EndoInfo-Costly was significantly different from zero, I performed a one-
sample t-test of proportion. I found that the proportion is statistically significantly 
different from zero at 5% of significance level (two tailed t-test (19) = 2.1794, p-
value=0.042). This finding provided evidence that a significant minority of subjects 
chose to learn about the payoffs, even though this information was costly to the 
Receivers.  
 
Finding 9: Senders are less likely to expect the Receivers will learn about the payoffs in EndoInfo-
Costly than in EndoInfo-Free and EndoInfo-Gain. 
 
Row (8) of Table 3 shows the relative frequency of Senders expecting the Receiver to get 
ex-post information about the payoffs. Overall, Senders expect the Receiver to learn 
about the payoffs in 65% of cases. Considering all treatments, there are significant 
differences in these expectations across treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p-value=0.338). 
Therefore, Sender’s expectations are affected by the experimental treatment. 
 
Finding 10: Senders have correct beliefs about how likely the Receivers will learn about the 
payoffs 
 
It is also noteworthy that the relative frequency of Senders expecting the Receiver to 
learn about the payoffs was very similar to the relative frequency of Receivers actually 
learning the payoffs. This can be seen in Figure 6. Both relative frequencies were very 
close in each of the three treatments. Moreover, Senders expected on average 64% of the 
Receiver population to learn about the payoffs (see Row (10) of Table 3). 
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Figure 6. Relative frequency of Senders who expect the Receiver to learn about the 
payoffs and Receivers who actually learn about the payoffs 
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5.3. Regression analysis 
 
In this section, I further estimate several probit models to test the main experimental 
hypotheses.11 Table 25 in the Appendix H. Regression variables shows the definitions 
of all regression variables used in the analysis.  
 
5.3.1. Sender’s message decision 
 
To investigate the factors that result in the Sender choosing Message 2, I estimated two 
probit models. The dependent variable was a dummy variable (p1m2), which takes the 
value of 1 if Sender sends Message 2, and 0 otherwise.  
 
In Model I, the independent variables included a dummy variable for each experimental 
treatment (NoInfo, ExoInfo, EndoInfo-Costly, EndoInfo-Free, EndoInfo-Gain) and a 
dummy variable (p1expfoll) which takes the value of 1 if the Sender expects the Receiver 
to follow the Sender’s message. I also included age and a dummy variable (female) that 
equals 1 if Sender is female and 0 otherwise to control for individual’s characteristics.  
 
Model II excluded the dummy variables NoInfo and ExoInfo, but included a dummy 
variable (P1exinfo) which takes the value of 1 if Sender expects the Receiver to get 
information, and 0 otherwise. Table 4 reports the results of the estimation for the two 
models. 
 
Finding 11: The Sender’s honesty depends on the Sender’s belief the Receiver is sufficiently likely 
to follow the chosen message. 
 
The coefficient for p1expfoll in Model I and in Model II is negative and strongly 
significant. In other words, Senders are less likely to send Message 2 when they expect 
the Receiver will follow the Sender’s message. The marginal effect indicates that the 
                                                          
11 I also ran the regressions without considering the variables age and gender. The results do not change 
qualitatively if age and gender were not included among the explanatory variables.  
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probability to lie decreased by 30.1% in Model I and by 49.1% in Model II, while the other 
variables are at their mean. This finding supports Hypothesis 4.  
 
A self-interest Sender will lie if he/she believes the Receiver will follow the message. 
However, a Sender with inequity aversion preferences will tell the true if he/she believes 
the Receiver will follow the message. This behaviour is consistent with any theory of 
fairness (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).  
 
Finding 12: An automatically disclosure of information affects the Sender’s decision to lie. 
 
The fact that the Receiver learns automatically about the payoff has a negative and 
significant impact on the decision to send Message 2. Senders are more likely to tell the 
truth when they know that the Receiver will learn automatically about the payoffs 
(ExoInfo) than in NoInfo. The marginal effect indicates that the probability to tell the 
truth increases by 20.4%, while the other variables are at their mean. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 6. Note that the probability to lie is significantly lower in ExoInfo 
relative to NoInfo, even though the non-parametric test was not significant. 
 
An explanation for this result is that Sender’s behaviour is driven by guilt and shame 
aversion. Previous studies (López-Pérez 2010, Charness and Dufwenberg 2006) have 
shown that people feel guilty and shame, if they let others down. If subjects were guided 
by lying aversion, regardless of whether the Receiver learn about the payoffs or not, 
Senders will tell the truth. This finding suggests that aversion to lying cannot explain the 
decrease in the relative frequency of lying. This finding also corroborates previous 
findings in Behnk et al (2014) 
 
Finding 13: In the EndoInfo treatments, the Sender’s honesty depends on the Sender’s belief that 
the Receiver is sufficiently likely to learn about all the payoffs.  
 
The Sender’s belief about whether the Receiver will learn the payoffs has a negative and 
significant impact on the decision to send Message 2. The coefficient for P1exinfo was 
negative and statistically significant. The more likely the Senders believes the Receiver 
will follow the Message, the more likely the Sender will tell the truth. The marginal effect 
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indicates that the probability to lie decreases by 34.4%, while the other variables are kept 
at their means. This finding also supports Hypothesis 6. 
 
Finding 14: More Senders send Message 1 in EndoInfo-Cotly than in EndoInfo-Free  
 
The cost to be informed has an impact on the decision to send Message 2. The coefficient 
for EndoInfo-Free in Model II was positive and significant, meaning that Senders in 
EndoInfo-Free are more likely to tell send Message 1 than in EndoInfo-Costly. The 
marginal effect indicates that the probability to send Message 1 increases by 35.4%, while 
the other variables are at their mean. This result supports Hypothesis 7. 
 
Table 4. Determinants of sending Message 2
 
 
Coefficient Marginal effects Coefficient Marginal effects
ExoInfo -0.685 -0.204*
(0.438)
EndoInfo-Costly -0.568 -0.174  
(0.428)
EndoInfo-Free -0.346 -0.111   1.014** 0.354**
(0.421) (0.578)
EndoInfo-Gain -0.354 -0.112  0.660 0.234  
(0.420) (0.536)
-0.987 * -0.344*
(0.505)
-0.829*** -0.301*** -1.409 *** -0.491***
(0.317) (0.462)
Female -0.042 -0.014      0.286 0.095   
(0.286) (0.438)
Age 0.150 ** 0.051** 0.111 0.037   
(0.074) (0.088)
Constant -2.576 * -1.922
(1.501) (1.941)
N° Observations 
Prob > χ
2 
Pseudo R-Square
Log-likelihood
Note: The dependent variable was a dummy variable (P1m2 = 1 if the Sender sends Message 2, P1m2 = 0
otherwise). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values for the
independent variables.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
0.0630 0.0237
0.1181 0.2393
-51.2249 -24.4147
94 52
Sender sends Message 2 (P1m2) Sender sends Message 2 (P1m2)Independent variables
Model I Model II
Sender expects the Receiver to learn about the 
payoffs (P1expinfo)
Sender expects the Receiver to follow the 
message (P1expfoll)
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5.3.2. Receiver’s option decision 
 
To investigate the factors that result in the Receiver to follow the Sender’s message I 
estimated a probit model, where the dependent variable was a dummy variable (P2foll) 
which takes the value of 1 if the Receiver followed the Sender’s message and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variables included a dummy variable for each experimental treatment 
(NoInfo, ExoInfo, EndoInfo-Costly, EndoInfo-Free, and EndoInfo-Gain) and a dummy 
variable (P2exptruth) which takes the value of 1 if the Receiver expects the Sender 
message true. Moreover, I included age and a dummy variable for gender. Table 5 
reports the results. 
 
Finding 15: The Receiver’s decision to follow the message depends on the Receiver’s belief that 
the Sender’s message is sufficiently likely to be true. 
 
The coefficient for the p2exptruth was positive and significant, meaning that Receivers 
are more likely to follow the message when they expect the Sender to tell the truth. The 
marginal effect indicates that the probability to follow increases by 50.3%, while other 
variables are at their mean. A probit model with only endogenous treatments confirms 
the positive relationship between the decision to follow the chosen message and the 
Receiver’s expectations about the truthful of the Sender’s message. This evidence 
provides support for the Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 5. Determinants of following the Sender’s message
 
 
5.3.3. Receiver’s information decision 
 
To examine the factors that result in the Receiver learning about the payoffs, I estimated 
a probit model Model V. The dependent variable was the Receiver’s information 
decision (p2info) which takes value 1 when the Receiver learns about the payoffs, and 0 
otherwise.  
 
The independent variables included a dummy variable for each experimental treatment 
(EndoInfo-Free and EndoInfo-Gain), a dummy variable for the Receiver’s belief 
(P1expfoll) which takes the value of 1 if the Sender expects the Receiver to follow the 
Sender’s message, and a dummy variable for gender (Female) that equals 1 if Sender is 
female and 0 otherwise.  I also included age. The results of the estimation are reported 
in Table 6. 
Coefficient Marginal effects Coefficient Marginal effects
ExoInfo -0.221      -0.024    
(0.653)      
EndoInfo-Costly -0.477      -0.059    
(0.559)       
EndoInfo-Free -0.806     -0.119 -0.320    -0.039   
(0.681)       (0.584)    
EndoInfo-Gain -0.708       -0.104    -0.133   -0.016   
(0.710)        (0.565)   
Receiver expects the truth (P2exptruth) 2.217*** 0.503*** 1.926*** 0.472**
(0.497)       (0.611)    
Female 0.234     0.023    -0.125   -0.014  
(0.445)     (0.495)   
Age 0.205** 0.020* 0.372** 0.042**
(0.088)    (0.177)   
Constant -3.877**   -7.572**   
(1.881)   (3.585)  
N° Observations 
Prob > χ
2 
Pseudo R-Square
Log-likelihood
0.4276 0.3936
-20.5507 -12.4581
Note: The dependent variable was a dummy variable (P2foll = 1 if the Receiver follows Sender's message, P2foll = 0
otherwise). Robust Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values for the independent
variables.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
94 52
0.0001 0.0069
Independent variables
Model III Model IV
Receiver follows the message (P2foll) Receiver follows the message (P2foll)
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Finding 16: Receivers are more likely to learn about the payoffs in In EndoInfo-Free and 
EndoInfo-Gain than in EndoInfo-Costly. 
 
The coefficients for EndoInfo-Free and EndoInfo-Gain were positive and significant. 
Receivers in EndoInfo-Costly are less likely to learn about the payoffs than in EndoInfo-
Free and EndoInfo-Gain. The probability to learn about the payoffs increased by 61.5% 
and 47% in EndoInfo-Free and EndoInfo-Gain, respectively, while the other variables 
are at their means. This is partially consistent with Hypothesis 3. Therefore, the cost of 
information affects the decision to learn the payoffs. 
 
In a post-experimental questionnaire, I asked the Receivers to explain why they had 
chosen to learn or not about the payoffs. According to the post-experimental 
questionnaire, there were three potential reasons for why subjects did not want to learn 
about the payoffs: fear to find out that he/she had been cheated, trust, and the cost of 
information.12 For instance, one subject wrote: `the information might make me feel 
robbed if it turns out that the distribution of money wasn’t equal’; and another subject 
wrote: `If I'd have found out another choice would have given me more money, it would 
have been upsetting.’  
 
In addition, one subject also stated `I'm giving player 1 the benefit of the doubt. The 
money that we earn is not our money to start with. I have nothing to lose by trusting the 
other person in the room.’ Receivers also wrote: `To find out how player 1 had chosen’; 
another subject wrote: ` I was curious to see if I was ripped off or not. I wanted to see 
how honest my partner was’. Finally, one subject said: `I was intrigued, can't trust 
anyone! 
 
                                                          
12 Subject’s statements were not edited. Additional answers are available upon request. 
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Table 6. Determinants of learning about the payoffs
 
 
5.3.4. Receiver’s belief about the truthfulness of the Sender’s message 
 
To investigate further the factors affecting the Receiver’s beliefs about the truthfulness 
of the Sender’s message, I estimated Model VI. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable (P2exptruth) which takes the value 1 if the Receiver believes the Sender tells the 
truth, 0 otherwise. The independent variables are the dummies treatment variables, 
gender, and age. The results are reported in Table 7. 
 
Finding 17: Receivers are more likely to expect the Sender to tell the true in ExoInfo than in 
NoInfo. 
 
The table shows that Receiver was more likely to expect the Sender to tell the truth in 
ExoInfo than in NoInfo. This finding suggests that the Receiver anticipates a decrease in 
deceptive messages due to ex-post information. Receivers are 18% more likely to expect 
a true message. 
Coefficient Marginal effects
EndoInfo-Free 2.472*** 0.615***
(0.528)   
EndoInfo-Gain 1.910** 0.470***
(0.565)   
Receiver expects the truth (P2exptruth) 0.078 0.028
(0.408)   
Receiver follows message (P2foll) -0.165 -0.056
(0.487)   
Female -0.165   -0.058   
(0.431)   
Age 0.011 0.004  
(0.131)   
Constant -0.906
(2.520)    
N° Observations 
Prob > χ
2 
Pseudo R-Square
Log-likelihood
Independent variables
Note: The dependent variable was a dummy variable (P2info = 1 if the Receiver gets
ex-post information about the payoffs, P2info = 0 otherwise). Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values for the independent
variables. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * and p < 0.1. 
0.0001
52
-19.5334
0.4278
Receiver learns about the payoffs (P2info)
Model V
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Table 7. Determinants of Receiver’s beliefs about the Sender’s message
 
 
5.3.5. Sender’s belief about Receiver’s decision to learn about the payoffs 
 
To investigate the factors that affect Sender’s beliefs about whether or not the Receiver 
will learn about the payoffs, I estimated Model VII. The dependent variable was 
P1exinfo, which takes the value of 1 if player 1 expects the Receiver to learn about the 
payoffs.  
 
The independent variables included the treatment variables EndoInfo-Free and 
EndoInfo-Gain, and Sender’s characteristics: a gender dummy variable and age. The 
sample consisted of 52 observations. Table 8 reports the coefficients, standard errors, and 
the marginal effects.  
 
Finding 18: Senders are more likely to believe the Receiver will learn about the payoffs in 
EndoInfo-Free and EndoInfo-Gain than in EndoInfo-Costly. 
 
The coefficients for EndoInfo-Free and EndoInfo-Gain were positive and significant. 
Thus, Senders are more likely to expect the Receiver to learn about the payoffs in 
Coefficient Marginal effects
ExoInfo 0.768* 0.180**
(0.443)    
EndoInfo-Costly 0.818* 0.189**
(0.441)   
EndoInfo-Free 0.563  0.138   
(0.430)  
EndoInfo-Gain 0.773   0.172**
(0.512)   
Female -0.342  -0.099   
(0.209)  
Age -0.043  -0.012   
(0.067)  
Constant 1.284  
(1.438)  
N° Observations 
Prob > χ
2 
Pseudo R-Square
Log-likelihood
94
-46.2060
Note: The dependent variable was a dummy variable Receiver's belief about
message (P2exptr = 1 if the Receiver expects Sender's message will be true,
P2exptr = 0 otherwise). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects
evaluated at the mean values for the independent variables. *significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 10%. 
Independent variables
0.3044
0.0746
Model VI
Receiver expects the truth (P2exptruth)
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EndoInfo-Free than in EndoInfo-Costly, and similarly in EndoInfo-Gain than in 
EndoInfo-Costly. The probability increased by 51.5% in EndoInfo-Free and 27.3% in 
EndoInfo-Gain. This result confirms the Hypothesis 7.   
 
Table 8. Determinants of Sender’s belief about the Receiver’s information decision
 
 
5.3.6. Correlation between the Receiver’s decision to get ex-post information 
about the payoffs and the Receiver’s decision to follow the Sender’s 
message 
 
It is possible that the Receiver’s decision to follow the message or not may be influenced 
by his/her planned decision to be informed ex post or not. If the Receiver has already 
decided to be informed (say because it is free or because he/she actually be paid), then 
this could impact on her decision to follow the Sender’s message or not.  
 
Coefficient Marginal effects
EndoInfo-Free 1.953*** 0.515***
(0.571)    
EndoInfo-Gain 0.935** 0.273**
(0.471)    
Female 0.043   0.015    
(0.400)    
Age -0.060    -0.021    
(0.086)    
Constant 0.828
(1.797)    
N° Observations 
Prob > χ
2 
Pseudo R-Square
Log-likelihood
Model VII
52
-24.9878
Sender expects the Receiver to learn about the payoffs 
(P1expinfo)
Note: The dependent variable was a dummy variable (P1expinfo = 1 if the Sender expects
Receiver gets information about the payoffs, P1expinf = 0, otherwise). robust standard
errors in parentheses. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values for the independent
variables. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Independent variables
0.0072
0.2550
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If the Receiver has decided to be informed, and he/she assigns substantial weight to not 
finding out she was lied to, then she may prefer not to follow the message. If so, then the 
decision to follow is influenced by the information decision. Both the information and 
the decision to follow are then simultaneously determined. To address this potential 
endogeneity problem, I ran a bivariate probit model (Model VIII) and I estimated the 
joint probability of these two binary variables.  
 
In Model VIII, the dependent variables were the Receiver follows the Sender’s message 
(p2foll) and the Receiver gets ex-post information (p2info). The independent variables 
were treatment dummies, gender dummy, and a p2exptruth dummy, and age. The 
analysis is based on a sample of 52 observations. Table 9 shows the results of the 
estimated model.  
 
Finding 19: The Receiver’s decision to follow the Sender’s message is not correlated to the 
Receiver’s decision to get ex-post information about the payoffs.  
 
The estimated correlation coefficient between the bivariate outcomes was negative, but 
not statistically significantly different from zero (ρ = -0.145, p-value=0.802), indicating 
that the unobserved factors affecting the Receiver’s decision to follow the Sender’s 
message and the decision to get information about the payoffs are not correlated. This 
result confirms that the two choices, the Receiver’s decision to follow the Sender’s 
message and the Receiver’s decision to get ex post information about the payoffs are not 
jointly determined. 
 
Furthermore, the Receiver’s expectations about the truthfulness of the Sender’s message 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability that the Receiver learns 
about the payoffs, but it does have a statistically significant and positive effect on the 
probability that the Receiver follows the Sender’s message. The marginal effect of the 
joint probabilities indicates that, ceteris paribus and evaluated at mean values for the 
independent variables, the probability that Receiver expects the Sender’s message is true 
and the probability that the Receiver follow the Sender’s message increases by 34.4% if 
the Receiver expects the Sender’s message is true.  
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In contrast, EndoInfo-Costly does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
probability that the Receiver follows the Sender’s message, but it does have a statistically 
significant and negative effect on the probability that the Receiver gets ex post 
information about the payoffs. The marginal effect of the joint probabilities indicates 
that, ceteris paribus and evaluated at mean values for the independent variables, the join 
probability that the Receiver follows the Sender’s message and that the Receiver expects 
the Sender’s message is true decreases by 71.3% in the EndoInfo-Costly treatment. 
 
Table 9. Bivariate probit model
 
 
5.4. Receivers’ messages 
 
There is a large body of experimental evidence, which indicates that reciprocity is a 
powerful determinant of human behaviour. For instance, Fehr and Gächter (1998), 
Brandts and Charness (2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) showed that people are 
Receiver's information 
decision
Receiver's option 
decision
Marginal effect on 
joint probabilities
EndoInfo-Free 2.475*** -0.324 0.555***
(0.529)      (0.595)
EndoInfo-Gain 1.907*** -0.119 0.437***
(0.562)     (0.563)
P2 expects P1 to tell the truth 0.004    1.916*** 0.344**
(0.374)    (0.614)
Female -0.160    -0.142 -0.065
(0.432)    (0.508)
Age 0.003    0.381** 0.034
(0.121)    (0.187)
Constant -0.843 -7.410**
(2.427)    (3.711)
ρ (1,2) -0.145    
(0.286)    
N° Observations 52
Log-likelihood -31.9748
Likelihood-ratio test of ρ 0
χ
2(1) 0.261
p-value 0.610
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * and p < 0.1. Marginal
effects evaluated at the mean values for the independent variables.
Model VIII
Independent Variables
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willing to sacrifice their own payoff to increase/decrease the other’s payoff for the 
kind/unkind actions.13  
 
In this section, I investigate whether Receivers are willing to punish or reward the 
Sender’s actions by sending a harsh/kind message back to the Sender. Looking at the 
content of the messages, I identified up to twenty different categories: 1 = Thankful, 2 = 
Acknowledge, 3 = Fairness, 4 = Trust, 5 = Sarcasm, 6 = Anger, 7 = Apology, 8 = Humor, 9 = 
Confused, 10 = Hope, 11 = Warning, 12 = In doubt, 13 = Off-topic, 14 = Slang, 15 = You’d do 
the same, and 16 = No message. Table 10 contains a list of these categories, a description of 
each category, and an example of each category.14 Table 26 in Appendix I. Messages 
provides all unedited messages from ExoInfo treatment (session 1), alongside the 
Receivers’ chosen option and the messages classification. 
 
A message can fall into one or more than one category. Notice that when classifying the 
Receiver’s messages; I took into account not only the content of the Receiver’s message, 
but also the message sent by the Sender, and the Receiver’s chosen option. For instance, 
if the Receiver received message 2 and chose option B and the message say `enjoy the 
money’, I classified this message as a sarcasm.  
 
                                                          
13 Anderson and Putterman (2006) found significant levels of non-strategic sanctions in public goods.  
14 The complete Receivers’ messages unedited for each treatment along with the classification of the 
messages are available from the author upon request. Note that NoInfo did not allow the Receiver to send 
a message back to the Sender. 
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Table 10. Messages classification 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of messages by category. The more frequent category 
was thankful (20.61% of the cases), whereas the less frequent category was an apology 
(1.53%). Receiver apologised for not trusting or not following the chosen message. Only 
in 2.29% of the cases, Receivers thought that they would send the same message as the 
Sender did, and in 8.40% of the cases, Receivers did not send any message. Likewise, in 
2.29% of the cases, Receivers sent a message expressing anger, and in 8.40% of the cases, 
Receivers wrote a message indicating sarcasm. 
 
It is noteworthy that in 4.58% of the time, Receivers were not sure about the Sender’s 
intention. In order words, they were aware of the possibility of meeting a `sophisticated 
Category Label Description Example
1 Thankful The message expressed gratitude or joy `thanks'
2 Acknowledge
The message recognised the fact that the Sender has told
the truth or has lied
`well done', `no cool man'
3 Fairness The message referred to fairness `thank you for choosing the fair option'
4 Trust The message referred to trust `I'm obviously not a very trusting person'
5 Sarcasm The message was sent to mean the opposite `Enjoy your £14'
6 Anger The Receiver was angry or upset `so annoying feel like an idiot now'
7 Apologised The Receiver is sorry for not following the chosen message `apologies again for not trusting your original'
8 Humour The Receiver maked jokes `faith in humanity restored :)'
9 Confused The Receiver may expect more rounds `i dont know if theres anymore rounds'
10 Hope
The Receiver expects the her/his choice be good for both
players
`hope it works out in both of our favour'
11 Warning The Receivers warned the Sender if he decides to lie
`you might get more on one turn, but that
would force me to change my decision'
12 In doubt The Receiver doubts about the Sender's intention
`Thank you for being honest! At least I think
you were'
13 Off-topic The message was related to weather, food, etc. `have a lovely day!'
14 Slang The messages included slangs
`If you pick option A I will send you some
dank memes'
15
You'd do the 
same
The Receiver thought he/she would choose the same
message as the Sender if he/she were the Sender
`I will be honest too'
16 No message Empty message
Note: All messages were unedited
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liar’ (Sutter, 2009). This finding suggest that some Receivers believed that the Sender 
behaved strategically. For instance, one subject wrote: 
 
`I'm in an overly cynical mood today so I thought you'd be lying in order to get 
more money, but it turns out you were giving me the better option. Or maybe 
you were double-bluffing? Either way, enjoy your money, I'm off to the shop to 
buy a sandwich.’ 
 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of messages across treatments, regardless of whether the 
Receiver was informed about the payoffs or not. Receivers were more thankful in 
ExoInfo (23.53% of the time) and EndoInfo-Free (27.27% of the time), than in EndoInfo-
Costly (17.5% of the time) and EndoInfo-Gain (12.5% of the time).  
 
Receivers acknowledged the Sender’s action, either by praising the Sender for telling the 
truth or reproaching the Sender for telling a lie in ExoInfo, 11.76% of the time. Receivers 
also hoped that the chosen option benefited both in 17.5% of the time in EndoInfo-Costly. 
A non-parametric test showed that there were not statistically significant differences 
between treatments, χ2 (45) = 54.07, p = 0.167. However, there was significant difference 
between EndoInfo-Costly and EndoInfo-Free (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.086). 
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Figure 7. Distribution of Receivers’ messages 
 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of Receivers’ messages across treatments 
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Figure 9 shows the distribution of messages by whether the Receiver learned 
information about the payoffs. When the Receiver learnt about the payoffs, the more 
frequent category was thankful (22.41% of the time), whereas it was hope (20.51% of the 
time) when the Receiver did not learn the payoffs. In 1.53% of the cases, Receivers 
apologised for not trusting the Sender or not following the chosen message. A non-
parametric test showed that there were statistically significant differences across 
distributions (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.032). 
 
Figure 9. Distribution of Receivers’ messages across information decision 
 
 
I also investigated whether Receivers who learnt the payoffs reacted differently if they 
knew they have been told a lie or not. Figure 10 shows the distribution of messages 
across the decision to learn about the payoffs and by message. When the Receiver learnt 
about the payoffs and the Sender sent Message 1, more messages were thankful (33.3% 
of the time).  
 
However, when the Receiver learnt about the payoffs and the Sender sent Message 2, 
more messages were sarcasm (31.6% of the time). When the Receiver did not learn about 
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the payoffs, they sent more often hope messages. A non-parametric test showed that 
there were statistically significant differences across distributions when the Receiver 
learnt about the payoffs (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.000), but there were not when the 
Receiver did not learn about the payoffs (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.320). 
 
Figure 11 compares the distributions of Receivers’ messages by Sender’s message. The 
figure shows an interesting contrast. When Receivers received Message 1, they are more 
likely to send a thankful message, and when Receivers received Message 2 they are more 
likely to send a sarcastic message. A non-parametric test showed that there was not a 
significant difference between distributions (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.001). Therefore, 
emotions were related to the type of messages.  
 
Figure 12 shows the distributions of Receivers’ messages across Senders’ message and 
Receivers’ chosen option. When Receivers received Message 1 and chose option A, they 
sent back more often a thankful message. However, when Receivers received Message 1 
and chose option B, they sent back more often a sarcastic or off-topic message. A non-
parametric test showed that there was a significant difference between distributions 
(Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.005).  
 
On the other hand, when Receivers received Message 2 and chose option A, they more 
often sent a message referring to fairness. Likewise, when they received Message 2 and 
chose option B, Receivers more often sent a message referring to fairness or inequality 
(33.3% of the time). A non-parametric test showed that there was not a significant 
difference between distributions (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.481) 
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Figure 10. Distribution of Receivers’ messages across information decision and 
Sender’s message 
 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of Receivers’ message across Sender’s message
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Figure 12. Distribution of Receivers’ messages across message and chosen option 
 
 
In summary, there are four important findings from the analysis of the Receivers’ 
messages in this section. First, Receivers are more likely to send a thankful message than 
to get angry with the Sender. Second, there is significant difference if the Receiver learnt 
the payoffs and realised that he/she received a false message than if he/she received an 
honest message. When the message was false, Receivers are more likely to send a 
sarcastic message. However, when the message was true, Receivers are more likely to 
say thank you. These findings appear to be consistent with the idea that people care 
about intentions. This analysis is new, but the evidence is consistent with the evidence 
in Xiao and Houser (2009). The authors showed that people are willing to make non-
monetary punishment (Xiao and Houser, 2009).  
 
6. Free-form messages  
 
Previous experimental research has given considerable attention to deception using 
fixed messages where the Sender chooses a message from a pre-established menu of 
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messages (Gneey, 2005; Sutter, 2009; Erat and Gneezy, 2012). Thus, the Sender has only 
fixed options, for example, to lie or tell the truth. These papers observed a substantial 
fraction of true messages.  
 
In many real world situations, however, communication is not typically restricted to pre-
established menu of messages, people can freely decide what to write or say. Consider 
for example the expansion of internet that has increased the amount of textual 
communication received by individuals and organizations in the real world. People 
receive messages by Facebook, e-mail, and mobile phone. 
 
In this section, I move beyond the fixed messages and experimentally explore 
preferences for truth telling in a more natural environment. I ask the following questions: 
How many Senders lie in this case? Will they tell the truth or a straight lie? Will they 
send ambiguous messages that are not lies, but still intended to make the other person 
make the choice that the message Senders would like? How does the possibility of 
sending free text messages affect the Receiver’s behaviour compared with her behaviour 
in the fixed messages? 
 
Some laboratory experiments have allowed pre play communication, but they do not 
examine what people actually write. For example, Lundquist et al (2009) studied free 
form communication in a bargaining game.15 They showed that pre-play communication 
lead to the few lies and the most efficient outcomes. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) 
studied the effects of communication with a hidden-action in a trust game. They also 
found that communication led to better social outcomes.16 
 
In this section, I ran two additional treatments (FreeMess-NoInfo and FreeMess-
EndoInfo-Costly) where, as in the previous fixed message treatments, subjects play a 
                                                          
15 For instance, it is well established that non-binding pre-play verbal communication raises cooperation in 
public good-type settings (Ledyard 1995; Sally, 1995) 
16 Wang et al (2010) used eye tracking on a Sender-Receiver game to understand deception. The authors 
found that Senders do not pay much attention to Receiver’s payoffs compared to their own payoffs, but the 
Sender’s pupils dilated when they send deceptive messages, and dilated more when the deception is larger 
in magnitude. 
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Sender Receiver game, but instead of restricting Senders to choose from a given set of 
messages, the Sender had a maximum of 120 seconds to write a free-text message and 
send it to the Receiver. She can also write nothing. However, she is not allowed to reveal 
her identity nor threaten the Receiver with anything that could occur after the 
experiment. 
 
Figure 13 shows a screenshot of the task faced by the Sender for FreeMess-NoInfo and 
FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly. The Sender wrote their message in the text box at the bottom 
of the screen. Once the Sender sent his message, the message was recorded. When the 
Sender finished writing the message, they appeared on the Sender’s screen. Thus, the 
Sender can read the messages until the time runs out. A scrollbar emerges if the messages 
were very long. 
 
Figure 13. Sender’s decision screen for free-text message treatments  
 
 
In FreeMess-NoInfo, the Receiver after choosing between option A and B, the Receiver 
learns only about his own payoff and terminates the game. In FreeMess-EndoInfo-
Costly, the Receiver, after choosing between options A and B, decides whether she want 
to learn about the payoffs. If she decides to learn, she pays 60 pence. Note that the 
structure of the games and the payoffs remained essentially the same as for the fixed 
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message treatments. In this sense, the present experiment also provides a test of the 
robustness of the results presented in EndoInfo-Costly.  
 
Figure 14 shows a screenshot of the task faced by the Receiver for FreeMess-NoInfo and 
FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly. There were two buttons, one button reading, “I choose 
option A” and another button reading, “I choose option B.” The Receiver made her 
decision by clicking on one of the two buttons. Note that the Receiver can read the 
messages sent by the Sender before making her decision. 
 
Figure 14. Receiver’s decision screen for free-text message treatments 
 
 
A sample of the experimental instructions for FreeMess-NoInfo and FreeMess-EndoInfo-
Costly is included in Appendix B. Experimental instructions for free messages of this 
chapter, respectively. I ran 2 sessions for each treatment. The experiment was conducted 
between May and June 2017 at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social 
Science (CBESS) computerized laboratory at the University of East. A total of 24 sender-
receiver pairs participated in treatment 1 and 18 sender-receiver pairs participated in 
treatment 2. None of the subjects participated in more than one session.  
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The experimental protocol in each session was exactly the same as for NoInfo and 
EndoInfo-Costly, respectively. Sessions were also run at the Arts Laboratory of the 
Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East 
Anglia (UEA) in order to guarantee the same local environment for the individuals. 
Sessions were conducted and programmed using z-TREE (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
The average age was approximately 20.14 years (S.D. 2.03, min. 18, max. 31), 48.40% of 
the subjects were female, 87.77% were from United Kingdom, and 25% studied 
Economics and Business management. Details of the participants’ socio-economic 
background are available in Appendix D. Background of the participants in free 
messages.  
 
6.1. Classification  
 
When Sender can freely write a message, there is something of a spectrum of messages. 
Messages are classified in thirteen groups: 1 = All payoffs true, 2 = One payoff true, 3 = All 
payoffs false, 4 = One payoff false, 5 = Partial true, 6 = Ambiguous message, 7 = Direct 
recommendation, 8 = Indirect recommendation, 9 = Confused, 10 = Off-topic, 11 = It’s up to you, 
12 = Fairness, and 13 = No message. 17 Table 11 lists all the categories and provide a 
definition of each category and an example. All messages were classified as belonging 
to one or several categories.18  
                                                          
17 In the analysis of written messages, some studies use a computer-based text analysis program to classify 
liars and truth-tellers. For instance,  Gneezy (2005) and Erat, and Gneezy (2012) only classified lies.  
18 Table 27 in Appendix I. Messages shows all the unedited messages from FreeMessage-NoInfo treatment, 
session 1, along with the chosen option and the messages classification. The complete Senders’ messages 
unedited for each treatment are available from the author on request. 
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6.2. Senders’ messages 
 
Figure 15 shows a histogram of the Senders’ messages. More messages were partial truth 
(where relevant information was omitted) and made statements about fairness. 
Certainly, Senders do not tell very often outright lies about all the payoffs. These 
messages were only 4% of the total messages.  
 
The figure also reveals that Senders do not make a statement only about the Receiver’s 
payoff: 11% of the messages avoided sending a message about the payoff and talk about 
weather or mood, and 8% of the messages directly delegated the responsibility of the 
final payoff on the Receiver (category 11). I also found that 8% of the times, Senders sent 
an ambiguous message (category 6). Differently from previous Sender-Receiver games 
with fixed messages, the Sender usually makes statement where she compares her own 
payoff and the Receiver’s payoff. For example, one subject wrote: “so option B is the 
worse of one for you that makes me better off.” 
 
Figure 15. Distribution of Senders’ messages by category (n=74)
 
 
An exploratory analysis of the content of the Sender’s message for treatments shows that 
Senders are more likely to send a truth message about the payoffs in FreeMess-EndoInfo-
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Costly (9.4%of the time) than in FreeMess-NoInfo (2.4% of the time). Figure 16 shows 
the distribution of messages across treatments. It shows that Senders avoid telling the 
truth about all the payoffs in FreeMess-NoInfoa, when the payoffs cannot be disclosed. 
 
Few Senders tell a direct lie in FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly, when information can be 
verified. Instead, they tell a partial truth or send a message that avoids telling about the 
payoffs, an off-topic message. Additionally, in the FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly, Senders 
never send a direct recommendation message. The difference in the distribution of 
messages is not statistically significant. (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.377). Therefore, Senders’ 
messages are not affected by whether the Receiver can learn about the payoffs. 
 
I also investigated whether the Sender’s message differed by the Receiver’s option. 
Figure 17 shows the distribution of messages across treatments by chosen option. I found 
that the distribution of Sender’s messages was also similar in FreeMess-NoInfo and 
FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly if the Receiver chose Option A (Fisher exact test, p-value 
=0.595). Likewise, the distribution of Sender’s messages was also similar in FreeMess-
NoInfo and FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly if the Receiver chose Option B (Fisher exact test, 
p-value =0.598). 
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Figure 16. Distribution of Senders’ messages for FreeMess-NoInfo (n=41) and 
FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly (n=33)
 
 
Figure 17. Distribution of Senders’ messages across treatments in Option A (n=45) and 
option B (n=29) 
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Table 12 compares Receivers’ behaviour in the fixed and free message treatments. It 
shows that 55% of Receivers chose option B in NoInfo and 42% in FreeMess-NoInfo. The 
difference in these proportions is not statistically significant (1-sided Fisher's exact, p = 
0.282). The table also reveals that 40% of Receivers chose option B in EndoInfo-Costly 
and 28% in FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly. The difference in these proportions is not 
statistically significant (1-sided Fisher's exact, p=0.327).  
 
Moreover, 20% of Receivers learnt about the payoffs in EndoInfo-Costly and 6% learnt 
about the payoffs in FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly. However, the difference in these 
proportions was not statistically significant (1-sided Fisher's exact, p=0.205). Therefore, 
the data suggests that receiving a free text message does not affect the Receiver’s 
behaviour. 
 
6.4. Senders’ expectations 
 
Table 12 also compares Sender’s behaviour in the fixed and free message treatments. It 
shows that 41% of Senders expect the Receiver to choose option B in NoInfo and 46% in 
FreeMess-NoInfo. The difference in these proportions is not statistically significant (1-
sided Fisher's exact, p = 0.485).  
 
The table also reveals that 40% of Senders expect the Receiver to choose option B in 
EndoInfo-Costly and 22% in FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly. The difference in these 
proportions is not statistically significant (1-sided Fisher's exact, p=0.859). In addition, 
35% of Senders expect the Receiver to learn about the payoffs in EndoInfo-Costly and 
33% in FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly. However, the difference in these proportions was not 
statistically significant (1-sided Fisher's exact, p=0.593). Therefore, the data suggests that 
allowing Senders to write a free text message does not affect the Sender’s behaviour. 
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Table 12. Comparison of fixed and free message treatments 
 
 
7. Discussion 
 
The experimental results in this chapter confirm that more Senders are willing to tell the 
truth. This is consistent with previous Sender-Receiver games who report more truth 
telling than predicted by standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Gneezy 2005, Cai and 
Wang, 2006; Sánches-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007). 
 
Moreover, the data show that deception decreases automatic ex-post information about 
the payoffs decreased frequency of lying relative to the Baseline. A regression analysis 
confirms that the probability to lie decrease by 20% in ExoInfo (automatic disclose of 
information) compared to NoInfo (no information about the payoffs).   
 
Clearly, ex-post information about the payoffs is of great importance for deceptive 
behaviour. The evidence from this study is not all consistent with lying aversion. 
Subjects who tell the truth cannot be explained with reference to lying aversion alone. 
However, the decrease in lying in this experiment may be explained in terms of guilt 
and shame aversion. The evidence here is actually consistent with that presented by 
Behn et al (2014). The authors showed that costless ex post information about the payoffs 
decreases lying.    
 
Another important finding is that Receivers are willing to learn about the payoffs. 
Moreover, a significant minority learns about the payoffs even though it is costly to 
themselves.  This finding is not consistent with the usual standard economic theory, 
which predicts that a rational subject should never pay a positive sum of money for non-
instrumental information. The standard economic theory is that information is deemed 
Treatment
Proportion of 
Receivers 
chooosing 
option B
Proportion of 
Receivers 
learning about 
the payoffs
Proportion of 
Senders expecting 
the Receiver to 
choose option B
Proportion of Senders 
expecting the Receiver 
to learn about the 
payoffs
NoInfo 12/22 (55%) 9/22 (41%)
FreeMess-NoInfo 10/24 (42%) 11/24 (46%)
EndoInfo-Costly 8/20 (40%) 4/20 (20%) 4/20 (40%) 7/20 (35%)
FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly 5/18 (28%) 1/18 (6%) 4/18 (22%) 6/18 (33%)
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valuable if, and only if, it is instrumental for decision-maker. The data is not consistent 
with this view.  
 
There are several reasons why Receivers get ex-post information about the payoffs. One 
might be curiosity. Golman and Loewenstein (2015) define curiosity as the `desire for 
knowledge for its own sake, even in the absence of material benefits’ The Receiver would 
like to find out what he could have gotten if he had made a different choice, and what 
the other player got. The psychology literature has identified that higher levels of 
curiosity are associated with higher demand for information (see Loewenstein (1994) for 
a review of the literature). Another explanation might be that the Receiver wants to 
reciprocate or has a particular desire to verbally punish the Sender by sending a harsh 
message if the latter has lied. In an interesting study, Fels (2015) showed how the 
anticipation of the emotional impact of information seems to be an important factor 
determining attitudes toward information. 
 
An analysis of the Receiver’ messages show that most Receivers do not send a harsh 
message. However, Receivers sent a sarcastic message when they learn the payoffs and 
know the Sender has lied. Future research may wish to explore the extent to which 
demand for non-instrumental information holds across other different settings. In 
addition, one might also want to collect data to distinguish between curiosity and 
punishment hypotheses. For instance, the Receiver can get information, but cannot send 
a message back to the Sender. According to the curiosity hypothesis, as much 
information will be collected in this treatment, while the punishment/reward 
hypothesis predicts that no information will be collected. These can be treatments for 
further empirical work. 
 
I also extend the Sender-Receiver game beyond the fixed message and run two 
additional treatments where the Senders can write a free message to the Receiver. I found 
that Senders are not willing to tell straight lies; instead, they are willing to tell partial 
truths. These results suggest that fixed message treatments fail to capture the large range 
of preferences for truth telling. An interesting question for future research would be 
what will happen if people engage in a conversation (bilateral communication) before 
the Receiver make his/her decision. How does this affect the propensity to lie?   
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8. Conclusion 
 
In previous Sender-Receiver games, deception is totally disclosure to the experimenter, 
but the Receiver does not know about the payoffs. The Receiver never learns about the 
truth. The principal objective of the research reported in this chapter is to examine 
experimentally the role of ex-post information about the payoffs in Sender-Receiver 
games: the Receiver can ex-post, and at a cost, find out if the Sender’s messages were 
true or not. 
 
Previous research have showed that ex ante disclosure of conflicts of interest fails to 
reduce deception (Koch and Schmidt, 2010). I used a simple Sender-Receiver game and 
conducted five different treatments. In treatment 1, the Receiver never learns about the 
payoffs. In treatment 2, the Receiver, after choosing between option A and B, 
automatically learns about the payoffs. 
 
In treatment 3, the Receiver, after choosing between option A and B, decides whether 
she wants to learn about the payoffs. If the Receiver chooses to learn about the payoff, 
he/she decreases his/her payoffs by £1. Treatment 4 is identical to treatment 3, but now 
information is free. Finally, treatment 5 is identical to treatment 3, except that if the 
Receiver chooses to learn about the payoff, he/she increases his/her payoff by £0.10. 
 
The main results emerging from this study is that providing ex post information, 
compared to non-information, can significantly reduce the probability to lie. This result 
is hard to reconcile with Senders being exclusively motivated by lying aversion. The 
effect of ex post information about the payoffs on deception is consistent with models of 
guilt and shame aversion.  
 
An interesting finding is that a significant minority of Receivers get ex post information 
about the payoffs, even though it is costly to themselves. In the current design, there is 
not strategic reason to get information about the payoffs. Hence, the evidence contradicts 
the standard assumption that Receivers view information as merely a means for making 
better decisions, in which case no one should get information about the payoffs. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3: The Effect of Ex-Post Information Acquisition in Sender-
Receiver Games: Experimental Evidence 
 
A. Experimental instructions for fixed messages 
B. Experimental instructions for free messages 
C. Background of the participants in fixed messages 
D. Background of the participants in free messages 
E. Belief elicitation’s questionnaires 
F. Post-experimental questionnaire 
G. Additional analysis: intentional deception 
H. Regression variables 
I. Messages 
 
Appendix A. Experimental instructions for fixed messages 
 
Note: Instructions specific to Player 1 and to Player 2 were shown separately to Player 1 and 
Player 2, respectively, on their computer screens.  
 
All treatments (beginning of the experiment) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment, you can earn money. 
What you earn will depend upon your decision and on the decision of another 
participant in the room. No data that you provide can be associated with your person. 
All data will be treated confidentially.  
 
Please follow the instructions carefully. These instructions explain how the experiment 
works. If any of the instruction are unclear, or if you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and I will come and assist you. Please do not talk to any other participant 
during the experiment. 
 
In this experiment, you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room. 
I call him/her your co-participant. One of you will be assigned to the role of Player 1 
and the other will be assigned to the role of Player 2. You will hold this role throughout 
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the experiment. Player 1 will not learn the identity of Player 2, and similarly Player 2 
will not learn the identity of Player 1. 
 
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
A.1. Instructions for NoInfo treatment  
 
Options: There are two options, A and B. Each option specifies an amount of money to 
Player 1 and to Player 2. Player 1 will be informed about how much each option pays 
out to each player, but Player 2 will not get any information about these amounts. 
 
Decisions: There are two messages. Both players will know what the messages are. 
Player 1 first chooses one of the messages and sends it to Player 2. After reading the 
message, Player 2 then chooses Option A or Option B, and each player receives the 
payment from the chosen option.  
 
Player 2 will then be informed how much he/she will be paid from the chosen option, 
but Player 2 will never learn how much Player 1 got, and Player 2 will also never learn 
how much the option that he or she did not choose gave to Player 1 and 2.   
 
After Player 2 has made his or her decision, no more decisions will be made.  
 
A.2. Instructions for ExoInfo treatment: 
 
This experiment has two stages.  
 
First stage 
 
Options: There are two options, A and B. Each option specifies an amount of money to 
Player 1 and to Player 2. Player 1 will be informed about how much each option pays 
out to each player, but Player 2 will not get any information about these amounts. 
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Decisions: There are two messages. Both players will know what the messages are. 
Player 1 first chooses one of the messages and sends it to Player 2. After reading the 
message, Player 2 then chooses Option A or Option B, and each player receives the 
payment from the chosen option.  
 
Second stage 
 
Options: Player 2 will be informed how much he/she will be paid from the chosen 
option, and how much Player 1 got. Player 2 will also learn how much the option that 
he or she did not choose gave to Player 1 and 2.    
 
Message: Player 2 can then write one or several messages and send it to Player 1. Player 
2 is free to write whatever he or she prefers (he/she can choose not to write anything), 
but I ask Player 2 not to use threatening language or reveal his or her identity. If I see 
that Player 2 does this, I reserve the right to only pay him or her the participation fee.  
 
After Player 2 has send his message to Player 1, no more decisions will be made. 
 
A.3. Instructions for EndoInfo-Costly treatment: 
 
This experiment has two stages.  
 
First stage 
 
Options: There are two options, A and B. Each option specifies an amount of money to 
Player 1 and to Player 2. Player 1 will be informed about how much each option pays 
out to each player, but Player 2 will initially not get any information about these 
amounts. 
 
Decisions: There are two messages. Both players will know what the messages are. 
Player 1 first chooses one of the messages and send it to Player 2. After reading the 
message, Player 2 then chooses Option A or Option B, and each player receives the 
payment from the chosen option.  
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Player 2 will then be informed how much he/she will be paid from the chosen option, 
but Player 2 will not learn how much Player 1 got, and Player 2 will also not learn how 
much the option that he or she did not choose gave to Player 1 and 2.    
 
Second stage 
 
Options: Player 2 can pay £1 to find out how much money the chosen option gives to 
Player 1, and how much the option that Player 2 did not choose would have given to 
each player. If Player 2 decides to pay £1 to get this information, the £1 will be subtracted 
from Player 2’s overall earnings.  
 
Message: Regardless of whether or not Player2 has paid for information, Player 2 can 
write one or several messages and send it to Player 1. Player 2 is free to write whatever 
he or she prefers (he/she can choose not to write anything), but I ask Player 2 to not use 
threatening language or reveal his or her identity. If I see that Player 2 does this, I reserve 
the right to only pay him or her the participation fee.  
 
After Player 2 has send his message to Player 1, no more decisions will be made. 
 
A.4. Instructions for EndoInfo-Free treatment: 
 
This experiment has two stages.  
 
First stage 
 
Options: There are two options, A and B. Each option specifies an amount of money to 
Player 1 and to Player 2. Player 1 will be informed about how much each option pays 
out to each player, but Player 2 will not get any information about these amounts. 
 
Decisions: There are two messages. Both players will know what the messages are. 
Player 1 first chooses one of the messages and sends it to Player 2. After reading the 
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message, Player 2 then chooses Option A or Option B, and each player receives the 
payment from the chosen option.  
 
Second stage 
 
Options: Player 2 will be informed how much he/she will be paid from the chosen 
option, and how much Player 1 got. Player 2 will also learn how much the option that 
he or she did not choose gave to Player 1 and 2.    
 
Message: Player 2 can then write one or several messages and send it to Player 1. Player 
2 is free to write whatever he or she prefers (he/she can choose not to write anything), 
but I ask Player 2 not to use threatening language or reveal his or her identity. If I see 
that Player 2 does this, I reserve the right to only pay him or her the participation fee.  
 
After Player 2 has send his message to Player 1, no more decisions will be made. 
 
A.5. Instructions for EndoInfo-Gain treatment: 
 
This experiment has two stages.  
 
First stage 
 
Options: There are two options, A and B. Each option specifies an amount of money to 
Player 1 and to Player 2. Player 1 will be informed about how much each option pays 
out to each player, but Player 2 will initially not get any information about these 
amounts. 
 
Decisions: Player 1 is first given 120 seconds to write one or several messages to send to 
Player 2. Player 1 is free to write whatever he or she prefers (he or she can choose not to 
write anything), but I ask Player 1 not to reveal his or her identity. When the 120 seconds 
are gone, Player 1 cannot write anymore. After reading the message, Player 2 then 
chooses Option A or Option B, and each player receives the payment from the chosen 
option.  
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Player 2 will then be informed how much he/she will be paid from the chosen option, 
but Player 2 will not learn how much Player 1 got, and Player 2 will also not learn how 
much the option that he or she did not choose gave to Player 1 and 2.    
 
Second stage 
 
Options: Player 2 can pay £1 to find out how much money the chosen option gives to 
Player 1, and how much the option that Player 2 did not choose would have given to 
each player. If Player 2 decides to pay £1 to get this information, the £1 will be subtracted 
from Player 2’s overall earnings.  
 
Message: Regardless of whether or not Player2 has paid for information, Player 2 can 
write one or several messages and send it to Player 1. Player 2 is free to write whatever 
he or she prefers (he/she can choose not to write anything), but I ask Player 2 to not use 
threatening language or reveal his or her identity. If I see that Player 2 does this, I reserve 
the right to only pay him or her the participation fee.  
 
After Player 2 has send his message to Player 1, no more decisions will be made.  
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Appendix B. Experimental instructions for free messages 
 
B.1. Instructions for FreeMess-NoInfo treatment 
 
Options: There are two options, A and B. Each option specifies an amount of money to 
Player 1 and to Player 2. Player 1 will be informed about how much each option pays 
out to each player, but Player 2 will not get any information about these amounts. 
 
Decisions: Player 1 is first given 120 seconds to write one or several messages to send to 
Player 2. Player 1 is free to write whatever he or she prefers (he or she can choose not to 
write anything), but I ask Player 1 not to reveal his or her identity. When the 120 seconds 
are gone, Player 1 cannot write anymore. After reading the message, Player 2 then 
chooses Option A or Option B, and each player receives the payment from the chosen 
option.  
 
Player 2 will then be informed how much he/she will be paid from the chosen option, 
but Player 2 will never learn how much Player 1 got, and Player 2 will also never learn 
how much the option that he or she did not choose gave to Player 1 and 2.    
 
After Player 2 has made his or her decision, no more decisions will be made.  
 
B.2. Instructions for FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly treatment: 
 
This experiment has two stages.  
 
First stage 
 
Options: There are two options, A and B. Each option specifies an amount of money to 
Player 1 and to Player 2. Player 1 will be informed about how much each option pays 
out to each player, but Player 2 will initially not get any information about these 
amounts. 
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Decisions: Player 1 is first given 120 seconds to write one or several messages to send to 
Player 2. Player 1 is free to write whatever he or she prefers (he or she can choose not to 
write anything), but I ask Player 1 not to reveal his or her identity. When the 120 seconds 
are gone, Player 1 cannot write anymore. After reading the message, Player 2 then 
chooses Option A or Option B, and each player receives the payment from the chosen 
option.  
 
Player 2 will then be informed how much he/she will be paid from the chosen option, 
but Player 2 will not learn how much Player 1 got, and Player 2 will also not learn how 
much the option that he or she did not choose gave to Player 1 and 2.    
 
Second stage 
 
Options: Player 2 can pay £1 to find out how much money the chosen option gives to 
Player 1, and how much the option that Player 2 did not choose would have given to 
each player. If Player 2 decides to pay £1 to get this information, the £1 will be subtracted 
from Player 2’s overall earnings.  
 
Message: Regardless of whether or not Player2 has paid for information, Player 2 can 
write one or several messages and send it to Player 1. Player 2 is free to write whatever 
he or she prefers (he/she can choose not to write anything), but I ask Player 2 to not use 
threatening language or reveal his or her identity. If I see that Player 2 does this, I reserve 
the right to only pay him or her the participation fee.  
 
After Player 2 has send his message to Player 1, no more decisions will be made. 
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Appendix C. Background of the participants in fixed messages 
 
Table 13. Percentage of male and female subjects by treatment 
 
 
Table 14. Percentage of subjects per country 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
NoInfo (T1) 22 50.00 22 50.00
ExoInfo (T2) 22 55.00 18 45.00
EndoInfo-Costly (T3) 20 50.00 20 50.00
EndoInfo-Free (T4) 17 47.22 19 52.78
EndoInfo-Gain (T5) 16 57.14 12 42.86
Total 97 51.60 91 48.40
Male Female
Treatment
Country Frequency Percent
Canada 4 2.13
China 1 0.53
France 1 0.53
Germany 1 0.53
Greece 1 0.53
Holland 1 0.53
Hong Kong 1 0.53
Italy 2 1.06
Malaysia 1 0.53
Singapore 1 0.53
South Africa 1 0.53
Sri Lanka 1 0.53
Sudan 1 0.53
Switzerland 1 0.53
Tanzania 1 0.53
USA 4 2.13
United Kingdom 165 87.77
Total 188 100
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Table 15. Percentage of subjects by field of study 
 
Field of Study Frequency Percent
Accounting and Finance 1 0.53
Actuarial Science 2 1.06
American Studies 1 0.53
Biological Studies 11 5.85
Business and Management 8 4.26
CMP 1 0.53
Chemistry 2 1.06
Cognitive Neuroscience 1 0.53
Computer Science 6 3.19
Drama 4 2.13
Ecology 3 1.6
Economics 35 18.62
Engineering 2 1.06
English Literature 12 6.38
Environmental Sciences 7 3.72
Film and English 2 1.06
Film and History 2 1.06
Film and Television 2 1.06
Film and Televsion 2 1.06
Forensic And Investigative Chemistry 1 0.53
French with Business 1 0.53
Health sciences 1 0.53
History 8 4.26
History and Politics 1 0.53
International Development 15 7.98
Languages 2 1.06
Law 10 5.32
Marketing 1 0.53
Mathematics 7 3.72
Media 1 0.53
Medicine 4 2.13
Natural Sciences 1 0.53
Nursing 2 1.06
Oceanography 1 0.53
Pharmacy 9 4.79
Philosophy 2 1.06
Politics 5 2.66
Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 2.66
Psychology 5 2.66
Society, Culture and Media 1 0.53
Speech and Language Therapy 1 0.53
Total 188 100
188 
 
 
 
Table 16. Percentage of subjects by language 
 
 
 
Table 17. Descriptive statistics for age by treatment 
 
 
 
 
Table 18. Descriptive statistics for experimental earnings by treatment 
 
 
 
 
Language Frequency Percent
Another language 7 3.72
English 181 96.28
Total 188 100
Mean S.D Min Max 
NoInfo (T1) 44 20.23 2.60 18 31
ExoInfo (T2) 40 20.00 1.41 18 24
EndoInfo-Costly (T3) 40 20.50 2.26 18 28
EndoInfo-Free 36 20.19 1.60 18 25
EndoInfo-Gain 28 19.64 1.87 18 27
Total 188 20.14 2.03 18 31
Age (years)
Treatment
Number of 
subjects
Mean S.D Min Max 
NoInfo (T1) 44 10.00 2.99 6.00 14
ExoInfo (T2) 40 10.00 1.81 6.00 14
EndoInfo-Costly (T3) 40 9.90 2.66 5.00 14
EndoInfo-Free (T4) 36 10.00 2.34 6.00 14
EndoInfo-Gain (T5) 28 10.04 2.84 6.10 14
Total 188 9.99 2.53 5.00 14
Treatment
Number of 
subjects
Experimental Earnings (£)
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Appendix D. Background of the participants in free messages 
 
 
Table 19. Percentage of subjects by gender  
 
 
Table 20. Percentage of subjects by country 
 
 
Table 21. Percentage of subjects per language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender Frequency Percent
Male 37 44.05
Female 47 55.95
Total 84 100.00
Country Frequency Percent
Cyprus 1 1.19
Hong Kong 1 1.19
USA 2 2.38
United Kingdom 80 95.24
Total 84 100.00
Language Frequency Percent
Another language 3 3.57
English 81 96.43
Total 84 100.00
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Table 22. Percentage of subjects by field of study 
 
Field of Study Frequency Percent
Accounting and Finance 1 1.19
Actuarial Science 1 1.19
Biological Sciences 1 1.19
Biology 5 5.95
Business 3 3.57
Climate Change 1 1.19
Ecology 1 1.19
Economics 16 19.05
English Literature 8 9.52
English and Film Studies 1 1.19
Environmental Sciences 12 14.29
Film and English Studies 1 1.19
History 6 7.14
History and Film 1 1.19
Humanities 1 1.19
International Development 4 4.76
Languages 1 1.19
Law 4 4.76
Literature and History 1 1.19
Mathematics 1 1.19
Medicine 2 2.38
Occupational Therapy 1 1.19
Pharmacy 5 5.95
Philosophy 1 1.19
Politics 1 1.19
Psychology 2 2.38
Speech and Language Therapy 2 2.38
Total 84 100.00
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Table 23. Descriptive statistics for age by treatment 
 
 
 
Table 24. Descriptive statistics for experimental earnings by treatment 
 
 
  
Mean S.D Min Max 
FreeMess-NoInfo 48 19.83 2.36 18 31
FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly 36 19.33 1.35 18 24
Total 84 19.62 1.99 18 31
Treatment
Number 
of subjects
Age (years)
Mean S.D Min Max 
FreeMess-NoInfo 48 10.00 2.61 6 14
FreeMess-EndoInfo-Costly 36 9.97 2.14 6 14
Total 84 9.99 2.41 6 14
Treatment
Number of 
subjects
Experimental earnings (£)
192 
 
 
Appendix E. Belief elicitation’s questionnaires 
 
Figure 18. Questionnaire screen for elicitation of Sender’s beliefs for EndoInfo-Costly, 
EndoInfo-Free, and EndoInfo-Gain 
 
 
Figure 19. Questionnaire screen for elicitation of Receiver’s beliefs about the Sender’s 
message for NoInfo, ExoInfo, EndoInfo-Costly, EndoInfo-Free, and EndoInfo-Gain 
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Appendix F. Post-experimental questionnaire (all treatments) 
 
Figure 20. Post-experimental questionnaire’s screens 
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Appendix G. Additional analysis: intentional deception 
 
Previous experimental evidence from Sender-Receiver games have suggested that 
Senders can also tell the truth to deceive the Receiver: the Sender anticipating that the 
Receiver would reject the message, sends the true message (Sutter 2009, Sánchez-Pagés 
and Vorsatz 2007). In this section, I examine the Sender’s intention to deceive.  
 
Figure 21 shows the relative frequency of Senders expecting the Receiver to implement 
the chosen message depending upon the chosen message. If the Sender sends Message 
1, he/she expects the Receiver to implement the chosen message in 77% of the cases in 
NoInfo, 81% of the cases in ExoInfo, 79% of the cases in EndoInfo-Costly, 92% of the 
cases in EndoInfo-Free, and 67% of the cases in EndoInfo-Gain.  
 
On the other hand, if the Sender sends Message 2, he/she expects the Receiver to 
implement the chosen message in 67% of the cases in NoInfo, 75% of the cases in ExoInfo, 
17% of the cases in EndoInfo-Costly, 60% of the cases in EndoInfo-Free and 40% of the 
cases in EndoInfo-Gain. Therefore, those Senders who sent Message 1 do not actually 
intend to deceive the Receiver.19 
 
                                                          
19 Sutter (2009) called `liar’, the Senders who send Message 2 and expect the Receiver will choose Option B; 
`benevolent liar’, the Senders who send Message 2 and expect the Receiver will choose Option A; 
`sophisticated truth-teller’, the Senders who send Message 1 and expect the Receiver will choose Option B; 
and `benevolent truth-teller’, the Senders who send Message 1 and expect the Receiver will choose Option 
A. 
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Figure 21. Sender’s expectations depending upon the chosen message 
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Appendix H. Regression variables 
 
Table 25. Definition of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition
NoInfo = 1 if treatment is NoInfo; 0 otherwise.
ExoInfo = 1 if treatment is ExoInfo; 0 otherwise.
EndoInfo-Costly = 1 if treatment is EndoInfo-Costly; 0 otherwise.
EndoInfo-Free = 1 if treatment is EndoInfo-Free; 0 otherwise.
EndoInfo-Gain = 1 if treatment is EndoInfo-Gain; 0 otherwise.
Sender sends Message 2 (P1m2) = 1 if the Sender sends Message 2; 0 otherwise. 
Sender sends Message 1 (P1m1) = 1 if the Sender sends Message 1; 0 otherwise. 
Sender expects Receiver follows the message (P1expfoll)
= 1 if the Sender expects the Receiver to follow
the message; 0 otherwise. 
Sender expects Receiver gets information (P1expinfo)
= 1 if the Sender expects the Receiver to get ex-
post information about the payoffs; 0 otherwise. 
Receiver follows the message (P2foll)
= 1 if the Receiver follows the Sender's message; 0 
otherwise.
Receiver gets ex-post information about he payoffs (P2info)
= 1 if the Receiver decides to get ex-post
information about the payoffs; 0 otherwise.
Receiver expects message to be true (P2exptruth)
= 1 if the Receiver expects the Sender's message to 
be true; 0 otherwise.
Age = subject's age in years
Male = 1 if the subject is male; 0 otherwise
Female = 1 if the subject is female; 0 otherwise.
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Appendix I. Messages 
 
Table 26. Receivers’ messages for ExoInfo treatment (only session 1) 
 
 
Treatment Session ID Message Message 
Receiver's chosen 
option
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
ExoInfo 1 1
Cheers geeze This is like that tv show golden balls 
Dont lure me into false hope I Ill set you a beer
1 A X X X
ExoInfo 1 2 2 A X
ExoInfo 1 3 thanks 1 A X
ExoInfo 1 4
lol I'm obviously not a very trusting person At least 
you were nice about it haha or were you being 
strategic because most people would have thought 
the other was lying? sneaky enjoy your £14 if only I 
was player one I'm just going to keep sending 
messages haah i'll trust you next time if we do it 
again please don't fuck me over :) apologies again 
for not trusting your original
1 B X X X X X X
ExoInfo 1 5 Well played 1 A X
ExoInfo 1 6
Be truthful everytime If you start lying, then I can 
find out after and I will be unsure what to pick next 
time 
1 A X X
ExoInfo 1 7 Thank you for telling the truth 1 A X
ExoInfo 1 8 Cheers :) 1 A X
ExoInfo 1 9 sharing is caring what would jesus do? 2 B X
ExoInfo 1 10
cheers, :D lets try and both get the most money out 
of this i like uea hehe 
1 A X X
ExoInfo 1 11
If you pick option A I will send you some dank 
memes, like A is a pretty swell deal, we both get £10 
of dank cush. Option B is pretty alright too I guess, 
we both gen money for both but you don't get as 
many memes for it, so in all fairness it's not really a 
very good deal in the long run due to lack of 
memes. TLDR pick option A bro
1 A X X
Note: All messages are unedited. The complete messages from the Receivers are available from the author upon request. ID indicates the Receiver. 1 = Thankful, 2 = Acknowledge, 3 = Fairness, 4 = Trust, 5 = Sarcasm, 6 = Anger, 7 = 
Apology , 8 = Humour , 9 = Confused, 10 = Hope, 11 = Warning, 12 = In doubt, 13 = Off-topic, 14 = Slang, 15 = You'd do the same, and 16 = No message.
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Table 27. Senders’ messages for FreeMess-NoInfo treatment (only session 1) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 1 Option A I get £14 and  you get £6, Option B we both get £10 B X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 2
I can't remember if player 2 is allowed to reply to this, but either way I'm not really 
sure what I'm supposed to be saying to you... I guess it's supposed to be a way of me 
telling you what the options are? In which case, if you choose option A we will get an 
equal amount, and if you choose option B we get different amounts! 
A X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 3 I am going to choice the option that gives us the same amount of money A X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 4
pick one at random both options are decent for both of us. option b may be slightly 
better
A X X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 5 go for option A i think it would be fairer A X X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 6 OPTION B B X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 7 You decide A or B A X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 8
Hello, not sure what I am supposed to write here I'm going to chose a the fair option 
Option A?
A X X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 9 Option A is £10 each and option B is £14 to player 2 and £6 to player 1 A X X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 10 enjoy the money :) A X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 11 option a is £14 player 1 and £7 player 2 option b is £10 to both players B X
FreeMess-NoInfo 1 12 Hello, I will be fair with my decision I will give you the same amount as myself :) A X X
Treatment Session ID Messages 
Receiver's 
chosen option
Categories
Note: The complete unedited Senders' messages are available from the author upon request. ID indicates the Sender. A indicates the Receiver chose option A, B indicates the Receiver chose option B. 1 = All payoffs true, 2 = One
payoff true, 3 = All payoffs false, 4 = One payoff false, 5 = Partial true, 6 = Ambiguous message, 7 = Direct recommendation, 8 = Indirect recommendation, 9 = Confused, 10 = Off-topic, 11 = It’s up to you, 12 = Fairness, and 13 = No
message. 
